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Abstract
Innovation is regarded as the principal source of sustainable competitive advantage,
yet many firms approach innovation haphazardly and without discipline. These firms
appear poorly equipped to implement a comprehensive innovation strategy as they
focus only on incremental innovation and are committed to preserving the status quo.

A dynamic capabilities approach was selected because of its focus on the
development of management capabilities. This research has answered the call for
fine-grained qualitative case studies to look at the detail of how dynamic capabilities
are deployed to better understand how these capabilities work in practice and whether
and how they might differ across firms. By the analysis of three embedded business
units in the one case organisation this research has opened the innovation “black box”
and provided a capability framework for strategic managers to build, systematise and
replicate within their organisations. It is a higher order capability which provides
managers with the capacity to manage the component capabilities of the
Organisational Innovation Capability framework together with their linkages and
interdependencies to impact the firm’s existing resource base.

It also identifies

strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning capability and alliance building
capability as the essential preconditions for innovation capability renewal.

In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum in understanding the
“how” of dynamic capabilities. It provides learning for management practice on how
dynamic capabilities originate, how firms built and deployed their Organisational
Innovation Capability and how distinctive processes support the creation,
modification, reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve
competitive advantage.

Most importantly, it has provided a framework for an

Organisational Innovation Capability which can be applied in practice.
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Chapter One
1INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

1.1

Introduction

Innovation is regarded as an imperative for firms seeking to achieve sustainable
competitive advantage with the expectation that it is endogenous to the firm (Hunt
and Davis 2008, p. 12). In rapidly changing market conditions with shrinking market
knowledge driven by compressed life cycles, fragmenting and disaggregating
markets, and proliferating media and distribution channels, developing successful
innovation is challenging (Day 1994a, p. 9; Han, Kim and Srivastava 1998, p. 30).

Yet, despite the universal acceptance of the need for innovation and the vast literature
on the processes and approaches to support innovation success (Crossan and Apaydin
2010; Cooper 1996; 1999), the academic literature suggests that innovation is rare
and episodic and that few firms achieve innovation success on a consistent basis
(Hamel 2006; Cooper 1996; 1999; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001; Rothwell et al., 1974).
The McKinsey Global Survey, Innovation and Commercialisation supports this
persistent challenge as 50% of the 2,240 executives surveyed responded positively to
these questions: “We have pockets of successful innovation, but innovation is rarely
scaled throughout the organisation” and “We have lots of good ideas but do not get
enough of them through to commercialisation” (McKinsey 2010).

As 40% of

respondents said that their companies made commercialisation decisions in an ad hoc
manner, the inconsistency in innovation outcomes is not surprising.

“How do firms develop an innovation capability to achieve continued differential
firm performance within an industry?” The dynamic capabilities framework provides
an explanation of how firms might constantly renew their innovation capability in
rapidly changing environments.

It is an influential framework for investigating

10

strategic renewal of the firm as researchers seek to understand and investigate
managerial capabilities, organisational resources and strategies that enable a firm to
renew, augment and adapt its innovation capability over time (Teece 2007).
1.2

Background to the Research

With the changing dynamics of business, innovation is regarded as the principal
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Teece 2007; Teece 1998, pp. 55-60;
Leonard and Sensiper, 1998, p. 112). While the need for innovation is regarded as an
organisational imperative, many firms approach innovation haphazardly and without
discipline, expecting another serendipitous Newtonian apple to fall from the sky.
Cooper argues that there has been little improvement in the innovation success rate as
actors “seem to fall into the same traps that their predecessors did back in the 1970’s”
(Cooper 1999, p. 2) and that merely studying successful and unsuccessful new
product projects, as he and his colleague have done in the past, misses many of the
key factors in success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 2007, p. 2). Most organisations
appear poorly equipped to implement a radical innovation strategy as they focus on
incremental innovation and are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo”
(Stringer 2000, p. 71).

Why is the success rate for new product development and innovation so low
particularly when numerous success/failure criteria have been identified in the
academic literature? (Rothwell et al., 1974; Cooper 1980, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004;
Wycoff 2003; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001). Crossan and Apaydin in their analysis of
525 reviews and meta-analyses, highly cited papers, and recent papers on innovation
found no overarching framework of innovation determinants.

In addition, their

review found that while the organisational learning and knowledge-based views were
quite

prominent,

innovation

research

was

generally

fragmented,

lacked

interconnectedness and was poorly grounded theoretically (2010, pp. 1164, 1165,
1174).

Hamel considered that the reason for the innovation hiatus is that “senior leaders do
not have a clear, well-developed model of what innovation looks like as an
11

organisational capability” (2003). One of the reasons for the lack of management
understanding is that “innovation as a process is under developed in the literature”
(Crossan and Apaydin 2010, p. 1167). Hamel argued that firms need to “move from
innovations as exceptions; move beyond innovation as a specific role or structure,
beyond innovation as a once-in-a-while project, to thinking about innovation as a
deep capability” (2003, emphasis added).

This position is consistent with the

dynamic capabilities approach because of its focus on the ongoing renewal of
management capabilities (Teece 2007; Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4; Agarwal and Helfat
2009, p. 283).

While some consider that the situation simply requires “more commitment and a
more innovative approach to the process of innovation” (Booz Allen 2005, p. 4,
emphasis added), following the recommendation of Hamel, the importance of an
Organisational Innovation Capability (OIC) cannot be denied.

The objective of

building such a capability is to create, distinctive and difficult-to-imitate valuecreating resource advantages through the integration, adaptation and reconfiguration
of the firm’s endowed assets and resources (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 6; Teece et
al., 1997, p. 528; Barney 1991, p. 102). OIC’s represent the integration of systems,
processes, skills and behaviours and it is within this architecture that an innovation
capability will be investigated.
1.3

Research Question

The research question is “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”. The intention of this
research question is to address the paucity of academic research in the management
literature by opening the innovation “black box” and providing an explanation of the
how an organisational innovation capability is constructed, i.e. how are structures,
systems, processes, skills, and behaviours inherent in this organisational capability,
what is the process of renewal and what are the organisational preconditions required
to support a well balanced, productive and successful OIC.
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1.4

Research Approach

A postpositivist paradigm was selected because of its emphasis on critical multiplism
as a means of falsifying, rather than verifying hypotheses and its increased reliance
upon qualitative research techniques (Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193). Case study
research was selected as the research approach because of its ability to answer “how”
and “why” questions in the context of a complex world of lived experience. Another
compelling reason is the formative stage of dynamic capabilities research as the
boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not necessarily apparent
(Yin 2009, p. 18).

Based on the innovation capability literature this research conceptualised an OIC in
the IT solutions context 1.

The OIC was conceptualised using the dynamic

capabilities approach consisting of three constructs: organisational innovation
intensity, market-focused learning capability and innovation infrastructure renewal
capability and two organisational preconditions: organisational learning capability
and entrepreneurial intensity. To analyse the validity of this framework a single case
organisation (CO) was selected for research comprising three embedded units with
substantially different paths, processes and positions. A within-case analysis of three
business units within the CO was conducted and followed by a cross-case analysis
between the three business units to identify similarities and differences in the process
of building an OIC. While the researcher was employed by the CO, the CO was
selected on the basis that it provided the highest “opportunity to learn” (Stake, 1994,
p. 243) for the CO and the researcher, as at the time that the research was conducted,
the CO was undergoing significant change as it endeavoured to capitalise on its
acquisitions, expand into new markets and increase the success rate of innovation and
the speed of commercialisation.

From the case analysis, an OIC was conceptualised and then compared to the
framework conceptualised from the innovation capability literature.
1

IT solutions context includes the integration of system sub-components into a single functioning
system. The sub-components may include software either developed or acquired by the integrator. In
this case study, IT solutions were often implemented to support major infrastructure projects.

13

1.5

Outline of the Thesis

An outline of the thesis is contained in Figure 1.1 below.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Background to the Research
Research Question
Research Approach
Outline of the Thesis

Contributions to Theory
Contributions to Management Practice
Limitations of Scope
Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 2: Conceptualising an Organisational Innovation Capability
Introduction
Innovation Overview
The IT Solutions Industry
Barriers to Innovation
A Theoretical Foundation for an Organizational Innovation Capability
Dynamic Capabilities
Conclusion

Chapter 3: Research Approach and Research Methodology
Introduction
The Research Paradigm
Justification of the Research Approach
Research Procedures
Validity and Reliability
Conclusion

Chapter 4: Case Study Research Findings
Introduction
The Case Organisation – Inherited and Embedded Path Dependencies
Case Analysis of Three Embedded Business Units
Cross Case Comparison
Core dimensions of an Organisational Innovation Capability
Preconditions required to support an OIC
Conclusion

Chapter 5: Contribution and Conclusions
Introduction
Capability Descriptors: A Comparison with the Literature
Comparing OIC Frameworks
Further Implications for Theory
Implications for Management Practice
Limitations
Future Research
Conclusion

Appendix and Bibliography

Figure 1.1 Outline of Thesis
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1.6

Contributions to Theory

This research has opened the innovation “black box” and provided a capability
framework which will provide guidance to strategic managers as they attempt to
build, systematise and replicate an innovation capability within their organisations.
The OIC framework which emerged from the case analysis answers the call to
address the “abstract and intractable” nature of dynamic capabilities (Danneels 2008,
p. 536) through detailed, micro mechanisms based on qualitative fieldwork to identify
how a capability is deployed and how it works (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37).

Through the analysis of the formation of an OIC in three embedded business units in
the CO this research focused on understanding the complex world of contemporary
experience from the point of view of its participants (Yin 2009, pp. 8, 11) and, in
doing so, provided a closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of idiosyncratic
organisational innovation phenomena (McKelvey 2003, p. 6) beyond the common
unit analysis of the firm. This higher order capability provides managers with the
capacity to achieve competitive advantage by managing the component capabilities of
the OIC framework, together with their linkages and interdependencies, to create new
or augmented resources by transforming the firm’s existing resource base.

In addition, while most of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition
had been identified previously in the literature this research has brought them
together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship.
In doing so, while supporting the innovation literature and the inclusion of each
construct, it extends the current understanding of entrepreneurship by combining it
with the intentionality and discipline of strategic management to complement the risk
orientation inherent in entrepreneurship.

The research has also extended the

definition of innovation intensity from the internal focus to include external factors
such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances and its ecosystem.
1.7

Contributions to Management Practice

The key contributions of this dissertation to management practice include the
imperative for management to understand the nature of the firm’s path dependencies
15

and their impact upon organisational change, the criticality of generative learning to
challenging the status quo and the firm’s mental models, and the accuracy of
management’s perceptions of the firm’s environment and their impact upon
innovation capability development. One other primary contribution is the emphasis
upon coherency of the way the components are integrated and linked together to form
the OIC as this coherency, rather than the components of the capability, may itself be
the source of competitive advantage.
1.8

Limitations

This research, like all research, suffers from some limitations.

Firstly, it has

investigated a single CO with its own peculiar characteristics. Secondly, as the
analysis is based upon data from one firm the ability to make inter-firm comparisons
is limited. A third limitation is that the primary industry focus of the research was on
IT solutions firms operating in the government high level security sector (GHLSS)
with a limited focus on the commercial high level security sector CHLSS. Further, as
the qualitative research was conducted over several months it did not provide
opportunity to gain an understanding of the development of the OIC and the
competitive advantage created over time. A final limitation may be the employment
of the researcher by the CO. While this employment assisted in the research and
facilitated access to interviewees and sensitive information, there is the possibility
that the researcher’s experience within the CO may have influenced the selection of
interviewees or led to a less objective analysis of the cases.
1.9

Structure of the Dissertation

This introductory Chapter 1 has outlined the practice and theoretical background to
the problem that motivated this dissertation. Subsequently, the research problem and
the research approach selected to pursue this objective were described. The key
contributions to theory and management practice were also identified.

In Chapter 2 a conceptualisation of the organisational innovation capability is
presented. The Chapter begins by providing a brief overview of innovation and the
IT solutions environment. It then describes organisational barriers to innovation
16

identified in the literature and builds a theoretical and conceptual framework to test
the research question. The Chapter includes an overview of the extant dynamic
capabilities research and the theoretical foundations upon which this framework is
based. A dynamic capabilities framework was developed to guide an examination of
an innovation capability to better understand how these capabilities work in practice
and whether and how they might differ across firms (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009,
p. 46).

The third chapter justifies and describes the research methodology used to address the
research question posed in section 1.3. The research paradigm selected was identified
together with the justification for the selection of the case study methodology as the
research approach. The Chapter then continues with a description of the research
procedures implemented including the case study selection and design, the data
collection and analysis processes before concluding with a discussion regarding
validity and reliability.

Chapter 4 provides an understanding of the case study data collected, identifies key
themes and patterns in the data and describes the innovation capability dimensions in
each case study. The Chapter begins with an introduction to the case organisation.
Inherited path dependencies of the three embedded business units were examined to
reveal how current innovation approaches emerged. The process of analysis involved
building concepts from the data and seeking evidence to support linkages between
those concepts. The data was interrogated to identify evidence that confirmed the
presence of dimensions evident in the literature as contributing to an OIC and
clarified the constructs that defined them. Evidence was then sought to support or
reject the propositions generated from the innovation literature as well as the
interrelationships between the dimensions. The data was examined to identify the
presence of additional dimensions, interrelationships and constructs that were not
evident in the literature.

A cross-case analysis was then conducted to highlight similarities and differences in
approaches in the formation of an innovation capability within the three business
17

units and to inform the innovation dynamic capability frameworks which emerged
from the data. This analysis enabled a case derived OIC to be developed comprising
three preconditions – an organisational learning capability, strategic entrepreneurship
and an alliance building capability – and four components - innovation infrastructure
and OIC renewal, an innovation absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and
organisational innovation intensity.

The fifth and concluding chapter provides a description of the core dimensions of the
OIC derived from the research. The capability descriptors of the OIC are compared
to the literature and the linkages between the components identified. The Chapter
continues with an outline of the contributions of the research to innovation theory and
management practice.

In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum focused on
understanding the “how” of dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Maritan 2007, p. 37). It
has revealed management practice insights on how dynamic capabilities originate,
how firms build and deploy an OIC and how distinctive processes support the
creation, modification, reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve
competitive advantage. Most importantly, it has provided a theoretical framework for
an OIC which can be applied in practice.
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Chapter Two
2Conceptualising an Organisational Innovation Capability

2.1

Introduction

Irrespective of the success or failure metrics employed or the industry studied, the
literature is united in the view that innovation success rates are unacceptable (de
Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010; Cooper 1996, 1999; Connell et al., 2001; Hamel 2003).
The continued failure of organisations to achieve innovation-based sustainable
competitive advantage can be partially attributed to the focus of innovation research
on technological innovation (Weerawardena 2003, p. 409). Where attempts have
been made to open the innovation capability “black box” they have focused primarily
on new product development (Pavlou and El Sawy 2006; Blum 2004; Verona and
Ravasi 2003), specifically, processes related to new product development such as
research and development (Macher and Mowery 2009; Blum 2005), and
entrepreneurial venturing (Katzy et al., 2003).

This chapter builds a theoretical foundation and a conceptual framework to address
the research question “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.

The research of the

innovation capability will not be confined to incremental or radical innovation as to
do so would impinge upon the exploratory nature of the inquiry. It begins in sections
2.2 and 2.3 with an overview of innovation and the IT solutions industry respectively
and then continues in section 2.4 with an analysis of the organisational barriers to
innovation identified in the literature as these barriers have significant implications
for firms seeking to build an innovation capability. Section 2.5 provides a theoretical
foundation for an OIC. Initially, theory supporting the concept of capability renewal
is introduced and conclusions drawn on how the notion of renewal might be
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evidenced in an OIC. Next, prior research on components of an OIC were organised,
analysed, synthesised and arguments presented regarding the key dimensions of a
well balanced, highly performing OIC. To provide initial answers to the research
question, an OIC framework derived from the innovation capability literature is
depicted in section 2.6.1. The preconditions of the OIC are described in detail in
section 2.6.2 with the construct of the OIC described in section 2.6.3.

The theoretical foundation is based on the dynamic capabilities framework which
may enable a firm to effectively adapt to its changing environment and achieve
competitive advantage Teece (2007). An OIC provides an explanation of a firm’s
ability to sustain its competitive advantage in terms of its ability to “integrate, build,
and reconfigure” its innovation resources in response to dynamic environmental
changes (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516).

The key to achieving comparative and

competitive advantage is to identify the elements of firm-specific innovation
capabilities that can be sources of advantage, and to explain how combinations of
competences and resources can be deployed and developed (ibid., p. 510). This
“dynamic capability” approach, builds on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV)
and evolutionary economics (Barney 2001a pp. 646, 647, Ambrosini and Bowman
2009, p. 29; Helfat et al., 2007, pp. 13-15; Teece 2000, p. 1105, Collis and
Montgomery 1995, p. 119).

The RBV provided the foundation for developing a capability framework for the
constant struggle to achieve “superior financial performance” (Hunt 1999, p. 153) in
a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition, price/performance rivalry,
increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies” (Teece et
al., 1997, p. 509). While the dynamic capabilities approach has been applied to many
disciplines, little research has been directed to developing a holistic OIC, both
technological and non-technological (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 388),
notwithstanding that “at its core, a theory of dynamic capabilities is a theory of
innovation” (Rodan 2002, p.152).
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2.2

Innovation Overview

2.2.1

Introduction

While innovation is widely considered as “the lifeblood of corporate survival and
growth” (Zahra and Covin 1994, p. 183) and “represents the core renewal process in
any organisation” (Bessant et al., 2005, p. 1366), there are at least “60 definitions
from different disciplinary traditions and paradigms” (Baregheh et al., 2009, p. 1325)
as “(i)nnovation is studied in many disciplines and has been defined from different
perspectives” (Damanpour and Schneider 2006, p. 216).

Joseph Schumpeter, regarded as the godfather of innovation (Tidd et al., 2005, p. 7),
stressed the importance of innovation as a basis for achieving competitive advantage
defining innovation as “the competition from the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation…
competition…which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (1975, p. 84).

Newness is an underlying theme of most definitions of innovation (Schumpeter 1975,
p. 84; Damanpour 1996, p. 694; Thompson 1965, p. 2). Damanpour’s expansive
definition of innovation has been selected by way of example:
Innovation is conceived as a means of changing an organization, either as a
response to changes in the external environment or as a pre-emptive action
to influence the environment. Hence, innovation is here broadly defined to
encompass a range of types, including new product or service, new process
technology, new organization structure or administrative systems, or new
plans or program pertaining to organization members (1996, p. 694).
As innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs and the means by which they
exploit change, entrepreneurs need to search purposefully and intentionally for the
sources of innovation, the changes and their symptoms that indicate opportunities for
successful innovation to endow its resources with a new capacity to create wealth
(Drucker 1985, pp. 17, 27). Bessant and Tidd argue that the forms of innovation can
be reduced to four dimensions of change (2011, p.19). Product innovation focuses on
changes in the products or services which an organisation offers whereas process
21

innovation changes in the way in which those products or services are created and
delivered. By contrast, position innovation brings changes in the context in which the
products or services are introduced while paradigm innovation changes the
underlying mental models which frame what the organisation does.

Another

dimension is the degree of novelty involved in the innovation with novelty extending
along a continuum from incremental to radical change.

Change is possible at

component or sub-system level or across the whole system (ibid., p. 22).
2.2.2

The Innovation Process

Innovation is a core business process associated with survival and growth (Tidd et al.,
2005, p. 67). Eveleens’ research found 12 innovation process models in management
literature, policy papers as well as scientific handbooks with the general tendency for
the models becoming, over time, “more complex, more interdisciplinary, more
integrated and more connected with their surroundings” (2010, pp. 5, 6). Three of the
models developed during the period 1962 to 1994 remain in use, while the rest were
published from 1999 onwards. This analysis concluded that most of the innovation
process models were largely “based on (1) radical (2) products and processes in the
(3) private sector (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Cormican and O Sullivan 2004;
Verloop 2004; Andrew and Sirkin 2006)” but “other types of innovations
(incremental and/or services) (were) considered as well (Tidd and Bessant 2005;
Jacobs and Snijder 2008)” although with less attention (ibid., p. 6).

All of the models identified by Eveleens included “certain phases, stages,
components, building blocks, or main activities” with an implied or explicit order in
these phases, though not necessarily linear (ibid., p. 7). For instance, Hansen and
Birkinshaw’s model “presents innovation as a sequential, three-phase process that
involves idea generation, idea development, and the diffusion of developed concepts”
(2007, p. 122). Researchers continue to debate the linearity of the innovation process
phases (Eveleens 2010, p. 7; Rosing 2011, p. 6). Those supporting linearity argue
that later phases are built on the phases which logically precede them in the linear
succession with a superior innovation outcome being achieved if the ideal sequence
of events can be followed. By contrast, the opposing view argues that innovation
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processes are complex, non-linear and interdependent with deviation from the “neat
and linear succession of phases” as the “different activities underlying innovation
processes such as idea generation and the implementation of ideas…(are) relevant
throughout the whole innovation process and not only during certain time frames
within the process” (Rosing 2011, p. 6).

The importance of these innovation process models is that they focus management’s
attention on the need “to take an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts” and on
strengthening their weak links (Hansen and Birkinshaw 2007, p. 122, 125).
However, the need to go beyond innovation as a process was stressed by Drucker
where he argues that what most organisations have failed to recognise is that “the
very foundation of entrepreneurship is the practice of systematic innovation”
(Drucker 2002, p. 102).
2.2.3

Open Innovation

One major trend in regard to ideation has been the transition from closed to open
innovation (Chesbrough 2003). In the old model of closed innovation firms believed
that successful innovation required control so “companies must generate their own
ideas that they would then develop, manufacture, market, distribute and service
themselves” (ibid., p. 36).

With the growing availability of private venture capital, the increased number and
mobility of knowledge workers and the consequent difficulty for companies to
control their proprietary ideas and expertise, came a move toward the end of the 20th
century to open innovation and the breaking down or increasing permeability of
traditional corporate boundaries. With the increased openness came the recognition
that “a single organisation cannot innovate in isolation” (Dahlandera and Gann 2010,
p. 699).

Open innovation facilitates the flow of intellectual property, ideas and people into
and out of a firm. While much of the focus has been on outside-in open innovation
attention also needs to be directed to inside-out open innovation where a firm places
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some of its assets or projects outside its firm boundaries (Chesbrough and Garman
2009, p. 70). With this new model of open innovation, firms commercialise ideas
from both internal and external sources with the knowledge from one source
complemented by that of the other, thereby increasing the robustness of the idea
screening process. Through open innovation firms can commercialise internal ideas
through licensing agreements or channels outside of their current businesses, such as
companies (which might be financed and staffed with some of the company's own
personnel), in order to generate value for the organisation. This approach means that
“the boundary between a firm and its surrounding environment is more porous,
enabling innovation to move easily between the two” (ibid., pp. 36, 37).
2.3

The IT Solutions Industry

Information technology (IT) solutions and information systems (IS) disciplines have
been transformed from the traditional “back office” orientation of administrative
support towards a more strategic role within a firm where it cannot only support the
business strategies but also define new strategies (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993,
p. 4).

The continued evolution has led to the convergence of information and

communication technology design, execution, storage, transmission and reusable
knowledge has created new opportunities (Demirkan et al., 2008, p. 356).

With the increasing focus on service orientation (ibid.), the IT solutions industry is
characterised by the “fast pace of technological change, which leads to the rapid
introduction of new products, presents unique challenges to incumbent firms in the IT
industry” where “the cost of entry is usually low and startups with intellectual capital
can emerge as industry leaders in a short time (for example, Cisco and Google)”
(Banker et al., date unknown, p. 2). These start ups target the “flaws or blind spots
result from a company's mistaken or incomplete view of its industry and competition,
the poor design of the competitive analysis system, inaccurate managerial
perceptions, or ineffective organizational processes” (Zahra and Chaples 1993, p. 9).

24

In addition to the rapid changes taking place in technology “the complex and
imposing challenges associated with IT management, development, and use demand
interdisciplinary approaches to their resolution” (Benbasat and Zmud 2003, p. 185).
2.4

Barriers to Innovation

2.4.1

Introduction

Cooper argued that there has been little improvement in the success rate as innovation
actors “seem to fall into the same traps that their predecessors did back in the 1970’s”
(Cooper 1999, p. 2). These views are supported by a recent Accenture Survey (2008)
of 601 senior executives from companies with annual turnover in excess of US$750m
per annum which were pursuing business strategies that depend on a stream of
innovation. The Survey indicated that only 41% were fully satisfied with how their
firms pursued innovation; only 15% were very satisfied with the conversion rate of
ideas to new service offerings and 13% considered that the innovations were
repeatable.

Most organisations appear poorly equipped to implement a radical

innovation strategy as they are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo”
(Stringer 2000, p. 71) or are constrained by experience or their myopic management
(Braganza et al., 2009, pp. 49, 51). While organisations sense the changing nature of
the world, they focus on incremental innovation as they have too much invested in
the status quo to embrace radical innovation. Even when innovation occurs, there is
generally a focus on acquiring a new product, than acquiring a new capability
(Stringer 2000, pp. 72, 80).

The question that must be raised is “Why is the success rate for new product
development and innovation so low particularly when numerous success/failure
criteria have been identified in the academic literature?” The lack of improvement in
the innovation success rate is puzzling since a myriad of critical success factor lists
and innovation killers have been published (Crossan and Apaydin 2010; Rothwell et
al., 1974; Cooper 1980, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 2007;
Wycoff 2003; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001).
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Organisational barriers to innovation have been identified by many authors (Braganza
et al., 2009, p. 46; Sapsed et al., 2007; Petersen 2010; Christensen et al., 2008; Baker
and Sinkula 2002; Leonard 1998; Senge 1990) with Leonard concluding that an
organisation’s strengths or capabilities are simultaneously also its weaknesses which
manifest themselves in organisational rigidities (1998, p. 30). In the same way that
an organisation’s culture is difficult to articulate, the impediments to innovation may
be equally as subtle particularly as core capabilities and rigidities are built through
the same activities (Fastabend and Simpson 2004, p. 5; Leonard 1998, p. 30). While
a classification of innovation barriers has been developed (Sapsed et al., 2007), the
key innovation barriers are institutional and relate to belief systems, information and
behaviour as well as path dependency barriers and organisational inertial tendencies.
2.4.2

Belief System Barriers

Belief system barriers are based on the gap between an organisation’s real (theories in
use) and perceived (espoused) reality with radical innovation potential decreasing
with a widening gap (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 15; Argyris and Schon 1996, p. 13).
Typically, organisations with high belief system barriers have flawed mental models
and limit their behaviours and actions to the options and alternatives which are
consistent with their existing mental models and theories-in-use.

Belief system barriers frequently manifest themselves by omitting key activities in
the new product process such as the nature and scope of market research (Cooper
1999, p. 16). A highly technical cognitive belief system may lead to “a bias towards
placing disproportionate weight on hard evidence (i.e. tangible and visible factors)”
leading to an undue emphasis on a product’s technical features (Han, Kim and
Srivastava 1998, p. 30).
Orlikowski and Gash provide an alternative and supportive view of belief system
barriers. They call the organisational “biases and limitations” frames and argue that
they can have “both facilitating and constraining effects” (Orlikowski and Gash 1994,
p. 176). In commenting on the risks in promoting emerging technologies, Day and
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Schoemaker warn about “the biases and limitations of people’s thinking frameworks”
as limiting organisational vision and effective implementation (2000, p. 6).

Frames are valuable when they “structure organisational experience, allow
interpretation of ambiguous situations” and so “reduce uncertainty in conditions of
complexity and change, and provide a basis for taking action” (Orlikowski and Gash
1994, p. 176). But, in an echo of the Day and Schoemaker warning, Orlikowski and
Gash contend that “frames are constraining when they reinforce unreflective reliance
on established assumptions and knowledge, distort information to make it fit existing
cognitive structures, and inhibit creative problem solving” by creating “psychic
prisons” that inhibit learning because people are unable to see old problems in a new
light (Orlikowski and Gash 1994, p. 177; Bolman and Deal 1997, p. 5).
Belief system barriers are also evident in the fundamental assumptions made by
management in relation to the implementation of the managerial functional
disciplines (Argyris 1999, p. 55). Embedded in these managerial disciplines is the
micro-causal theory of implementation; a theory based on the assumption that
intended consequences follow from prescriptive roles and enablers. With effective
coaching, employees can achieve the required skill levels. Ineffective performance
can be eliminated as it can be traced to errors and mismatches with the result that
actions become automatic, routine, and therefore, manageable (Argyris 1999, pp. 55,
56). These beliefs are deeply entrenched within organisation as they are largely tacit
(Senge 1990, p. 12).
2.4.3

Information Barriers

Information barriers manifest themselves in “the propensity for managers to dismiss
information and knowledge inconsistent with their current view of the world, their
trusted mental models and theories-in-use believing that these are the outcome of
rational analyses and successful experiences” (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 17).
External knowledge is subject to a screening process biased towards familiar and
existing knowledge types (Leonard 1998, p. 40; Braganza 2009, p. 49) or limited to
established and local search locations (Sapsed 2007, p. 5).
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Another information barrier is the “liability of success” which invests individual with
“special interests in the status quo” and a propensity for risk averseness (playing the
game “not to lose” rather than to win) (Sinkula 2002, p. 256; Lawler and Galbraith
1994, p. 7; Braganza 2009, p. 49). The repeated success leads the organisation to
“the presumed correctness of past actions and interpretations” resulting in
complacency and the rejection of information that conflicts with conventional
wisdom (Day, 1994, p. 24). Similarly, the success of an established business model
can limit the information that gets fed into or filtered out of the corporate decision
making process so that firms may forgo valuable business opportunities (Chesbrough
2010, p. 358).
2.4.4

Behavioural Barriers

Organisational behavioural barriers include the failure to change behaviour even
though disconfirming evidence or insight into the inadequacy of managerial mental
models or theories-in-use is received (Baker and Sinkula 2002, p. 17; Pontiskoski and
Asakawa 2010, p. 28; Braganza 2009, p. 51), as well as behaviours imposed by or
entrenched in organisational routines (Van der Panne, van Beers and Kleinknecht
2003, p. 314).

Organisational defensive routines, while intended for individual and organisational
survival, promote behaviour that is counterproductive to innovation and to learning
(Argyris 1999, p. 56). Defensive routines are individual or organisational threat or
embarrassment minimisation or prevention strategies.

They have the effect of

inhibiting the identification of or reducing the cause of the embarrassment or threat
(Argyris 1999, p. 56). These counterproductive routines promote behaviours that
cover up errors and a culture of inflexibility, which in turn inhibits effective
organisational performance.

They also promote a culture where failure is

unacceptable and errors cannot be discussed without blame or criticism as “defensive
reasoning prohibits questioning the defensive reasoning” (Argyris 1999, pp. 56, 57).
Behaviours which are inconsistent with an innovation orientation such as failure to
take responsibility, and suppressing negative emotions and feelings, especially those
associated with embarrassment or threat, become the predominant organisational
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logic (Argyris 1999, p. 57). The result is that belief system and information barriers
are maintained and entrenched with the self-fuelling process maintaining the status
quo and inhibiting genuine learning (Argyris 1999, p. 57).

Behavioural barriers are relevant to the IT solutions context. The nature of software
development is such that, in the absence of firm-wide disciplined and institutionalised
practices, software teams and developers often turn to ad hoc and a multiplicity of
individual and non standard practices in the software development process (Ethiraj et
al., 2005, p. 34).
2.4.5

Path Dependency Barriers

The organisation’s historic legacy can intrude on the present and shape its future as
the future is implicitly assumed to look much like the present, so that experimentation
addresses doing what the organisation does now, better – not differently (Leonard
1995, p. 35). A firm’s historical legacy is associated with deep seated and embedded
values which impact the accumulation of capabilities so that “to perhaps a surprising
degree, many companies that appear to have evolved over time still have deep roots
in their technological origins” (Leonard 1998, p. 26).

An organisation’s resources also can also be a path dependency barrier. As Penrose
noted “the services that resources will yield depend on the capacities of the men using
them, but the development of the capacities of men is partly shaped by the resources
men deal with. The two create the special productive opportunity of a particular
firm” (2009, p. 70).

The firm’s congenital knowledge, knowledge held at its birth (Sinkula 1994, p. 38),
determines “what it searches for, what it experiences and how it interprets what it
encounters” (Huber 1991, p. 91) with a heavy bias toward the types of knowledge
already known to feed core capabilities (Leonard 1998, p. 40). This results in limited
experimentation as newly acquired knowledge flow along well-worn paths.

If

allowed to continue “unchecked and unexamined…predilections towards core
capabilities can choke off enriching knowledge from unexpected sources” (Leonard
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1998, pp. 39, 40). These limitations are often reinforced by the associated cognitive
preference.

An organisation’s cognitive orientation will frequently lead to the

implementation of the comfortable clone syndrome in which employees are hired
based on their conformance to organisational cognitive thinking styles and the
similarity of their interests and training (Leonard and Straus 1997, p. 112). These
preferences work as cognitive filters to the information sought and received so that
unfamiliar information is rejected (ibid.) with the consequence that information
barriers are formed and entrenched.

Another critical consequence of path dependency is its impact on learning with
Sinkula warning emphatically that “past learning inhibits new learning” (2002,
p. 256). Prior knowledge determines an organisation’s ability to recognise the value
of new information, to learn from that new knowledge and to exploit it (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990, p. 128) as well as its ability to learn and the quantum of such learning
(Zack 1999, p. 28).

Path dependency also manifests itself in thought precluding innovative problem
solving activities where “functional fixedness” – i.e. the tendency for people to be
quite fixed in their perception of how objects could be used once that use was
suggested - limits search patterns to prior experience and successes (Leonard 1998,
p. 61). As organisations develop excellence in one knowledge domain, it becomes
relatively unreceptive to ideas from others (Leonard 1998, p. 59).

Functional

fixedness mind-sets arise from “the brain’s tendency to store, process, and retrieve
information in related blocks” with these blocks constituting the mental models, or
schema, against which information is calibrated and that used to solve problems.
While mind-sets are highly useful in routine activities, the limited range of problemsolving responses developed can transform capabilities into dysfunctional and core
rigidities (Leonard 1998, pp. 61, 62).
2.4.6

Organisational Inertial Tendencies

Mature organisations have a tendency to maintain the status quo rather than challenge
it or the assumptions upon which it is based as “many pressures conspire to keep
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managers internally focused and comfortable with the status quo long after
disquieting signs should have made them edgy” (Braganza et al., 2009, p. 46;
Leonard 1998, p. 31). Organisational learning from history is seen as “a faulty
mechanism” (Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 8) as it involves “encoding
inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour” (Levitt and March, 1988,
p. 320). The mechanism is faulty as the encapsulated routines make the lessons, but
not the history, accessible to individuals and organisations that have not experienced
the history (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320). In this way organisational routines, in
which “action stems from a logic of appropriateness or legitimacy, more than from a
logic of consequentiality or intention” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320), are “thus
over-learned, such that actors are more habit driven and imitative than rational”
(Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 8; see also Pontiskoski and Asakawa 2010, p. 28).

Organisational routines thus create organisations that have self-perpetuating
processes that maintain the status quo by limiting genuine learning, and reinforcing
the deception (Argyris 1999, p. 57). Organisational inertia becomes institutionalised
through the often unintended, implementation of belief, information and behavioural
barriers. For instance, Levitt and March assert that organisational routines and beliefs
are changed through direct experience in regard to trial and error experimentation and
organisational search (1988, p. 321). In relation to the latter, an organisation may
limit the range of its alternatives to resolving a problem or issue due to the
experiences that they have accumulated with known routines (belief or information
barrier) or fall into a competency trap where routines are regarded as rigid
notwithstanding that organisational learning may have taken place in the application
of a routine (Levitt and March 1988, pp. 321, 322).

Prior investment choices are also a barrier to organisational innovation. Where high
technology products are involved, such as hardware and software, the investment is
often in systems with strong functional interdependence among components of the
system. Accordingly, from both the point of view of the innovative firm and the
prospective customer, there are path dependency barriers as well as a high tendency
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for inertia because of investments made previously (Teece 2007, p. 1332; Duncan
1995, p. 38).
2.4.7

Conclusion

The barriers to innovation referred to in this section have significant implications for
organisations seeking to develop an innovation capability.

In particular, an

organisation needs to be aware that its strengths and capabilities can simultaneously
be its weaknesses, and accordingly, that core capabilities can become core rigidities
in the absence of dynamism in the maintenance, development and continuous
enhancement of that capability. It is critical for any firm which wishes to develop an
innovation capability to be aware of the innovation barriers within its organisation
and to takes steps to ensure that strategies are implemented to minimise or eliminate
the negative impacts of the identified barriers and path dependencies upon
innovation.

In order to overcome the persistent and often entrenched barriers to innovation firms
need to intervene to overcome these innovation inhibitors (Petersen 2010; Braganza
et al., 2009, p. 52; Sapsed et al., 2007). The importance of preconditions to the
innovation capability will be addressed in section 2.6.2.1.
2.5

A Theoretical Foundation for an Organisational Innovation
Capability

2.5.1

The Resource–based View of the Firm

The invisibility of critical success factors and the low innovation success rate (Cooper
1999, pp. 2, 8, 9) requires the development of an organisational competency to bring
about innovation as a result of intended action such that “the outcome bears a definite
resemblance to what was intended” (Dosi et al., 2000, p. 2). Some argue that the
market for valuable strategic resources and competencies is efficient and that over
time no real profits exist except in rare circumstances where information asymmetry
occurs (Rodan 2002, p.152; Lockett et al., 2009, p. 11). An alternative, and more
compelling argument, is that as valuable organisational resources can rarely be
acquired, they must be built inside the firm with the process sometimes taking years
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or even decades (Rodan 2002, p.152; Teece 2007, p. 1338; Teece et al., 1997, p. 528;
Spender 1996, p. 46). For instance, Teece et al. are emphatic in their view that the
“soft” constituent elements of competencies and capabilities such as “values, culture
and organisational experience” cannot be traded or acquired.

The RBV of the firm is an influential theoretical framework for planning and
achieving firm-level sustainable competitive advantage (Teece 2000, p. 1105; Collis
and Montgomery 1995, p. 119) and understanding the evolution of firm resource
stock over time and the impact of the evolution of competitive advantage (Ambrosini
and Bowman 2009, p. 29). Accordingly, it provides the foundation for development
of a capability framework for achieving “superior financial performance” (Hunt
1999, p. 153) in a “Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition,
price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of
existing competencies” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509).

Barney was first to challenge the two Porterian assumptions - firm homogeneity in
terms of resources and strategy, and temporal resource advantage – and substituted
firm resource heterogeneity (i.e. asymmetric distribution of resources among
competing firms) and immobility (i.e. not readily available in the factor markets),
and the sustainability of the heterogeneity of its resources (1991, p. 101; Hunt 1999,
p. 149) in their stead. Under the RBV, firms now focused on their own internal
resources and competencies to supplement the Porter-led external focus on industry
structure and the search for a favourable competitive position within that structure
(Porter 1985, p. 1).

Barney defined a firm’s resources to include “all assets, capabilities, organisational
processes, firm attributes, information (and) knowledge controlled by a firm that
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency
and effectiveness” (1991, p. 101). These “resources are firm-specific assets that are
difficult, if not impossible, to imitate” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). Therefore, if
resources are valuable, rare, inimitable, durable, and difficult to substitute (Barney
1995, Collis and Montgomery 1995, pp. 120-123) then sustainable competitive
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advantage can be achieved through value-creating strategies (Barney 1991, p. 102).
Teece et al. extended the RBV generally and also specifically to “rapidly changing
environments” (1997, p. 516; see also Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 31) and
explained the firm’s ability to sustain its competitive advantage in terms of its
dynamic capabilities – its ability to “integrate, build, and reconfigure” its resources in
response to dynamic environmental changes (1997, p. 516; see also Ambrosini et al.,
2009, p. S9).

Based on Bharadwaj, typical key resources within the IT solutions context include (1)
tangible resources such as the hardware and software IT infrastructure components,
(2) the human IT resources comprising the technical (programming, systems analysis
and design in emerging technologies), managerial and project management IT
solutions skills (including abilities such as the effective management of IS functions,
coordination and interaction with the user community, and project management and
leadership skills), and (3) the intangible idiosyncratic IT-enabled resources such as
intellectual capital or knowledge assets, customer orientation, and synergy (2000, pp.
171173 2; see also Benbasat 2003, p. 186) The tangible resources provide the delivery
platform to enable information to be seamlessly and automatically shared across
systems and services.

Strong human IT resources (technical and managerial IT skills, employees culture of
change and adaptability, empowering human resource structures) are critical for the
effective integration and alignment of the IT and business planning functions as the
absence of an integrated IT infrastructure severely restricts an organisation's business
choices. These human IT resources, when viewed from a resource-based perspective,
are difficult to acquire and complex to imitate, thereby serving as sources of
competitive advantage (ibid., pp. 172-174).

2

While this comment was made in relation to the development of an IT capability within a firm rather
than the supply of IT solutions to another firm, it is submitted that a services firm must have those IT
resources before it supply those services to another firm.
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2.5.2

The Resource-based View and Evolutionary Economics

With economic reward being transitory due to the propensity for competitors to
imitate successful innovation, Schumpeter bypassed static economic theories and
postulated that an evolutionary economic system would have within it the seeds for
positive adjustment and change otherwise it could not evolve (Matthews 2003, p. 4).
To Schumpeter, the fundamental source of organisational variation was in the
entrepreneurial recombination of factors, resulting in new applications of existing
processes or business models to new areas of application, rather than their innovation
at first instance (ibid., p. 8).

Barney’s positioning of RBV in evolutionary economics facilitates the development
of arguments in respect of the way organisational routines and capabilities change
over time (Barney 2001a, pp. 646, 647). He observed that routines are part of the
firm’s resources and capabilities and it is the “most efficient and effective routines,
which generate competitive advantage” (Barney 2001, p. 646). Routines contribute
to sustainable competitive advantage by the creation of new resource sets through
reconfiguring, transforming and recombining assets and resources, leveraging
existing resources such as business models, processes or systems in other parts of the
business, learning through experimentation to improve efficiency and effectiveness of
the operations and processes, and the creative integration of resources (Ambrosini
and Bowman 2009, p. 35).
2.5.3

The Resource Advantage Theory of Competition

The RBV has provided a foundation for the Resource-Advantage Theory (RA
Theory) postulated by Hunt and Morgan (1995, 1997, 1999). Under this evolving
theory which describes the evolutionary, disequilibrium-provoking process of
competition (Hunt 2011, p. 11), the firm’s objective is to attain superior financial
performance by combining and exploiting its resources to achieve a position of
comparative advantage in a market or a segment of a market (1995, p. 6). In so
doing, the firm’s internal capabilities (“what it does well’) are linked with the
environment in which it competes (“what the market demands and what competitor’s
offer”) (Collis and Montgomery 1995, p. 120).

While many other competition
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theories are rooted in one discipline, the RA Theory is an interdisciplinary dynamic,
process theory of competition that has been developed in various disciplines
including marketing, management, economics, general business and ethics (Hunt and
Arnett 2003, p. 1).

In addition, it has affinities with other theories including

evolutionary economics, ‘Austrian’ economics, industrial-organisation theory, and
the resource- and competence-based traditions (Hunt and David 2008, p. 12; Hunt
2011, p. 9).

The key to achieving comparative and, therefore, competitive advantage is to
“identify the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities that can be sources of
advantage, and to explain how combinations of competences and resources can be
deployed and developed” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 510). This dynamic capability
approach, builds on the RBV of the firm and evolutionary economics by linking the
dynamic (the ability to renew competencies in response to rapidly changing business
environments) with capabilities (the strategic management role bringing congruence
to the dynamic environment) (ibid., p. 515). It is this linking which provides the
context for resources and the active integration, construction and reconfiguration of
those resources within a dynamic environment which enables firms to achieve market
positions of comparative and/or competitive advantage through increases in
efficiency and effectiveness.

The RA Theory provides the theoretical framework for the firm’s constant struggle
for comparative advantages in resources that will yield marketplace positions of
competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance (Hunt 2011,
p. 11).

The competition is among firms within a market segment to achieve

comparative advantage from their unique resource mix (Hunt 1997, p. 60).
Accordingly, the competitive process yields “numerous, vigorous, ongoing,
disequilibrating struggles among firms for comparative advantages in resources”
(Hunt 1999, p. 153), and it is this disequilibria which is the driver for reactive and
proactive innovation and thus increased efficiency/effectiveness (Hunt and Morgan
1999, p. 149). The firm achieves its competitive advantage objective if it creates
comparative value, i.e. more customer value than its competitors at either the same or
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a lower cost, or it creates the same value as its competitors at a lower cost (Hunt
1999, pp.149, 154).

While reactive innovation arises from a rival firm’s realisation that it is producing
inefficiently/ineffectively, proactive innovation is “not prompted by specific
competitive pressures as is genuinely entrepreneurial in the classic sense of
entrepreneur” (Hunt 2011, p. 11).

While the advantaged firm already has a

competitive advantage, the entrepreneurship is driven by the firm’s desire to increase
the efficiency-effectiveness gap between it and its rivals, and so, increase its
competitive advantage. Accordingly, proactive innovation is the product of “renewal
competencies” which move the firm to new levels of competitive advantage (Hunt
1999, p. 154). These competencies enable the firm to “(1) anticipate potential market
segments (unmet, changing, and/or new needs, wants, and desires); (2) envision
market offerings that might be attractive to such segments; and (3) foresee the need to
acquire, to develop, or to create the required resources, including particular
competences, to produce the envisioned market offerings” (Hunt 1999, p. 154).
Thus, learning and innovation are endogenous to the RA Theory as they arise directly
out of the process of competition (Hunt 1997, p. 60, 1999, p. 153; Hunt and Davis
2008, p. 12).

One of the key achievements of the RA Theory is the consolidation of the expanded
view of what constitutes a resource and the relevance of that definition for a marketbased economy (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 8). The view now encompasses both
tangible and intangible resources which are available to the firm and which enable it
to “produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has some value for
some market segment(s)” (Hunt 2011, p. 14).

While the tangible resources are well understood and documented, the intangible,
“higher order resources” (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 12) require consideration as it is
often these which are most difficult to imitate (Barney 1995, p. 53), to neutralise or
create causal ambiguity to either the resource owner or its competitors (Hunt and
Davis 2008, p. 18). For instance, in regard to a superior product offering, there could
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be significant ambiguity as to which of the firm’s resources are being used to produce
the desired attribute (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 12) or the mix of those resources.

Each firm has a unique mix of resources due to the heterogeneity of resources and
their imperfect mobility (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 7). If a resource or the resource
mix is sufficiently rare then it may produce competitive advantage for the firm (Hunt
and Morgan 1995, p. 7). The key is for the firm to create idiosyncratic resources –
those which are “relatively immobile (difficult to buy in the factor markets),
inimitable (difficult to copy or duplicate), nonsubstitutable (difficult to find or create
functional equivalents for), and nonsurpassable (difficult to find or create functional
superiors for)” (Hunt 1999, p. 152).

The key attributes which facilitate the

identification and production of idiosyncratic resources are tacitness, causal
ambiguity, social or technological complexity, interconnectedness, mass efficiencies,
and time compression diseconomies so that they are less likely to be quickly and
effectively neutralised and more likely to produce a sustainable competitive
advantage (Hunt 1999, p. 152; Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 16).
2.5.4

Corporate Entrepreneurship

Corporate entrepreneurship has been growing in increasing importance as
“entrepreneurial strategies suggest ways to revitalise existing organisations and make
them more innovative” (Cooper, Markman, and Niss 2000, p. 116). Research in
entrepreneurship endeavours to find answers to questions such as, “(1) why, when,
and how opportunities for the creation of goods and services come into existence; (2)
why, when, and how some people and not others discover and exploit these
opportunities; and (3) why, when, and how different modes of action are used to
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities” (Shane and Venkataraman 2000, p. 218).

To possess a corporate entrepreneurship strategy, firms must, through “consistency in
approach and regularity in behaviour” (Ireland et al., 2009, p. 37), “significantly
display the three foundational elements of an entrepreneurial strategic vision, a proentrepreneurship organizational architecture, and entrepreneurial processes and
behavior as exhibited throughout the organization. The absence or weakness of any
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of these elements would indicate that a corporate entrepreneurship strategy does not
exist in a firm” as to operate effectively as a strategy it must “run deep” within the
organisation (ibid., p. 38). Corporate entrepreneurship has been described by Morris
et al., (2008, p. 81) as being comprised of corporate venturing and strategic
entrepreneurship and their characterisation is depicted in Figure 2.1 below.
Corporate
Entrepreneurship

Corporate Venturing

• Internal corporate venturing
• Co-operative corporate venturing
• External corporate venturing

Strategic
Entrepreneurship
•
•
•
•
•

Strategic renewal
Sustained regeneration
Domain redefinition
Organisational Rejuvenation
Business Model reconstruction

Figure 2.1 Corporate Entrepreneurship Framework
The focus of corporate venturing is the addition of new businesses either internal or
external to the firm or in partnership with one or more other entities. By contrast,
strategic entrepreneurship exhibits “large-scale or highly consequential innovations
that are adopted in the firm’s pursuit of competitive advantage” (Kurato 2007, pp. 6,
7). Ireland et al. described entrepreneurship is terms of opportunity seeking so that
strategic entrepreneurship, the integration of the mutually supportive disciplines of
strategic management and entrepreneurship, is the combination and synthesis of
opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking behaviour (2003, pp. 964, 966).
2.6

Dynamic Capabilities

The concept of dynamic capabilities, while still in its infancy and focused on
foundational level issues (Helfat and Peteraf 2009, p. 92), is an influential framework
which has enabled strategic managers competing in a Schumpeterian world of
innovation-based competition to analyse and operationalise the organisational
resources and methods of effective wealth creation (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509; Teece
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2007; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009). This paper argues for the development of an
organisational innovation capability. The dynamic capabilities approach provides a
theoretical framework for examining how a firm can integrate, adapt and reconfigure
its endowed assets and resources to create “renewal capabilities” which lead to
comparative and/or competitive advantage and “superior financial performance” in a
market or a segment of a market (Teece 2007; Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 6).
Utilising this theoretical framework, this research provides a definitional context for
evaluating key organisational capabilities that directly impact an organisation’s drive
towards consistent and effective innovation in a rapidly changing environment.

With the continuing development of the dynamic capabilities concept, the definition
of dynamic capabilities has itself evolved through incremental improvements. Teece
et al. defined dynamic capabilities as “the firm's ability to integrate, build, and
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing
environments” (1997, p. 516). While Eisenhardt and Martin’s definition of dynamic
capabilities is largely consistent with this definition, they extend the dynamism
concept of Teece et al. (1997) beyond achieving environmental congruence to
capabilities which produce value-creating market and ecosystem change as markets
emerge, collide, split, evolve and die (2000, p. 1107; see also Teece 2007, p. 1341).
In addition, Eisenhardt and Martin do not limit dynamic capabilities to a firm’s
functional environment as they extend their definition to include “alliance and
acquisition routines that bring new resources into the firm from external sources”
(2000, p. 1108, emphasis added).

Helfat et al. define dynamic capability as “the capacity of an organisation to
purposefully create, extend, and modify its resource base” which includes its
“tangible, intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities which
the organisation owns, controls or has access to on a preferential basis” (2007, p. 4).
Following Ambrosini et al. (2009, pp. S10, S11), the Helfat definition has been
adopted as it provides a synthesis of prior definitions and makes explicit the need for
a minimal degree of intentionality (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009, pp. 94, 95).
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In identifying organisational dynamic capabilities it is first necessary to identify “the
foundations upon which distinctive and difficult-to-replicate advantages can be built,
maintained and enhanced” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). Three classes of factors that
help determine the way in which the firm’s distinctive competencies and dynamic
capabilities evolve were identified (ibid., pp. 518-524; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009,
pp. 39, 40).

Processes
Processes include organisational and managerial firm-specific routines relating firstly,
to co-ordination and integration of organisational activity such as recognising the
congruencies and complementarities among processes, and between processes and
incentives; secondly, to learning as a process by which repetition and experimentation
enable tasks to be performed better and quicker both on an individual and
organisational level which in turn result in newer and improved routines; and thirdly,
to the reconfiguration of the organisation’s assets and structures in response to or
anticipation of changing markets and technologies.

Positions
The organisation’s legacy of assets includes its technology and complementary
assets, its difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets complementary to them, its
organisational structure, internal linkages and its financial assets. These factors also
include the firm’s management, their ability to sense changes in their competitive
environment and to reconfigure assets to meet the changing environment. Another
related internal factor is the management’s perception of the environmental change
and the accuracy of those perceptions.

In addition to the internal position, its external position “refers to the firm vis-à-vis its
institutional environment and its markets” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 39).
Together with the paths a firm has travelled, positions enable or constrain dynamic
capabilities (ibid.).
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Path Dependencies
An organisation’s strategic direction is a function of both its current position and the
paths available to it, with the former being shaped by the path it has traveled and its
previous investments. The firm’s history and its strategic choices constrain its future
behaviour and reinforce the propensity of learning to be close to previous activities
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 522). Similarly, according to Eisenhardt and Martin, path
dependencies are more accurately described in terms of learning mechanisms which
guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities (2000, p. 1114). Consequently, path
dependency “not only defines what choices are open to the firm…but puts bounds
around what its internal repertoire is likely to be in the future (Teece et al., 1997,
p. 515). However, while path dependencies constrain strategic options “the business
enterprise is not necessarily trapped by its paths” (Teece 2007, p. 1341).

Fundamental to capability development is the concept of organisational routines.
Routines are “the building blocks of capabilities” and represent successful solutions
to particular problems (Dosi et al., 2000, p. 4; Teece et al., 1997, p. 520). The
managerial and organisational processes are embedded within the firm in its routines,
patterns of current practice and learning, such as the way information is gathered and
processed and encompass both individual and collective interaction, learning and
knowledge generation (Teece 1997, pp. 518-520).

These routines, “whether

deliberately organised or spontaneously evolved, structure activities, processes and
information” (Van der Panne, van Beers and Kleinknecht 2003, p. 313). Routines
contribute to sustainable competitive advantage in “distinct ways of co-ordinating and
combining” to facilitate the embedding of competence and capability with the firm
(Teece et al., 1997, p. 519).

Other resource creation mechanisms include

reconfiguration, leverage, learning and integration being applied at either the core
process or support activity level (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293).

Ambrosini et al. (2009) also identified three levels of dynamic capabilities which are
related to managers’ understanding of the need for change based on their perceptions
of internal and external environmental dynamism.

In an environment which is

perceived to be stable, incremental dynamic capabilities are applied to achieve
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continuous improvement (incremental adjustment or adaptation) of the firm’s
resource base. In dynamic environments, core capabilities can become core rigidities
and so renewing capabilities - those that refresh, adapt and augment the resource base
– are required to create or introduce new resources or to combine existing resources
in new ways. Without this renewal of the way in which the firm performed it would
not be able to “survive and prosper under conditions of change” (Helfat et al., 2007,
p. 1). These first two levels are usually what the literature refers to as dynamic
capabilities. However, dynamic capabilities are also part of the resource base of an
organisation and since they act to create, modify or extend an organisation’s
resources it implies that dynamic capabilities can modify or extend dynamic
capabilities (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4). Therefore, where managers perceive the
environment to be turbulent or where external changes are non-linear or
discontinuous, regenerative capabilities are required to create, extend or modify the
existing embedded dynamic capabilities, i.e. these change the way the firm changes
its resource base (Ambrosini 2009).

While the dynamic capability framework has been associated with the quest for
sustainable competitive advantage, Helfat et al. (2007) and Ambrosini et al. (2009)
have decoupled the notion that dynamic capabilities automatically lead to competitive
advantage. Capability life cycles were also identified as a source of heterogeneity in
organisational capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf 2003) as dynamic capabilities follow a
similar evolutionary life cycle to products with recognisable stages such as growth,
maturity and decline. In addition, there is opportunity for the capability to branch
into retirement, retrenchment, renewal, replication, redeployment or recombination at
any point in its life cycle (ibid., p. 1000).
2.6.1

Organisational Innovation Capability Research

Hamel considers that the reason for the innovation hiatus is that management needs to
“move from innovations as exceptions; move beyond innovation as a specific role or
structure, beyond innovation as a once-in-a-while project, to thinking about
innovation as a deep capability” (2003, emphasis added). This position is consistent
with the dynamic capabilities approach because of its focus on the development of
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management capabilities (Teece et al., 1997, p. 510). Accordingly, innovation has
been identified as a capability critical for competing in a dynamic and turbulent
environment.

Based on their knowledge content, Verona classifies rent-generating routines in
terms of their functional or integrative capabilities.

Technical knowledge is

enhanced by the firm’s functional capabilities. Integrative capabilities, on the other
hand, facilitate the integration of knowledge from outside the firm as well as blend
technical competencies across departmental boundaries (Verona 1999, p. 134;
Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 379).

Innovation capability has been defined as “the ability to continuously transform
knowledge and ideas into new products, processes and systems for the benefit of the
firm and its stakeholders” with this higher order capability enabling the moulding and
management of multiple capabilities to successfully stimulate innovation (Lawson
and Samson 2001, pp. 380, 384). In highly competitive and high-velocity markets,
dynamic capabilities take on a different character being simple (not complicated),
experiential (not analytic), and iterative (not linear) processes with situation-specific
knowledge created and applied in the context of simple boundary and priority-setting
rules (Eisenhardt 2000, p. 1113).

Multiple views of the elements of a successful innovation enterprise are present in the
literature (Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010, p. 43; Lawson and Samson 2001; Tushman
and O’Reilly 1997; Cooper 2004; Grant 1996; Verona and Ravasi 2003; Pavlou and
El Sawy 2006; Blum 2004). These range from an approach where the author includes
a list of all tangentially relevant factors such as learning orientation, market
orientation, culture, innovation metrics and subsequent and continued measurement,
organisational structure (Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010, p. 43; Lawson and Samson
2001; Cooper 2004, 2005) to the approach where most factors are considered to be
preconditions with the principal drivers for the dynamic capability being
entrepreneurship and learning how to be better at innovation (Weerawardena 2003).
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Another approach is where a single resource such as knowledge is said to capture the
essence of the organisational innovation capability (Grant 1996, p. 375; also Verona
and Ravasi 2003). The theoretical framework defining the boundaries for this current
research recognises that some of the dimensions identified in research investigating a
firm’s OIC are components of the capability itself, while others are dimensions of the
organisational environment which bound the skills and behaviour inherent in the
capability.

The debate about which dimensions to include in any OIC must take place in a
broader context than new product development.

Teece et al. define dynamic

capabilities as “the subset of competence/capabilities which allow the firm to create
new products and processes” (1994, p. 541, emphasis added).

Therefore, the

conceptualisation of an OIC that focuses only on technological innovation or new
product development cannot, by definition, be a holistic model of innovation. As
Blum concluded, it provides “a disaggregated view of dynamic capabilities” (2005, p.
11).

Key organisational innovation dimensions synthesised from the literature are
included in the Table 2.1 below. While there is still no dominant organisational
innovation theory, key dimensions are beginning to emerge with consistency. Two
factors have emerged as innovation preconditions – learning and entrepreneurial
intensity.

Learning is prevalent as a key innovation dimension either explicitly

(Bessant and Buckingham 1993; Lawson and Samson 2001; Pavlou and El Sawy
2006; Blum 2004; Weerawardena 2003; Van der Panne et al., 2003) or implicitly in
the type of organisational culture required for effective and consistent innovation
(Cooper 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly 1997; Verona and Ravasi 2003).
Entrepreneurial capability or intensity is displayed in types of organisational
behaviour such as proactive risk taking, experimentation, promotion of crossfunctional teams (Miller 1983; Weerawardena 2003).
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Table 2.1 Organisational Innovation Dimensions
Author

Innovation Dimensions

Lawson and
Samson 2001

• Vision and strategy
• Harnessing the competence base
• Organisational intelligence (learning about customers and competitors)
• Creativity and idea management
• Organisational structure and systems
• Culture and climate
• Management of technology (p. 388)
Ambidextrous organisation characterised by
• Senior management “articulating a clear, emotionally engaging, and consistent
vision; building a senior team with diverse competencies, developing a healthy
team process (p.171).
• Innovation infrastructures (comprehensive rewards and recognition that
promote creativity and facilitate implementation, p. 172),
• Innovation diamond
• Existence of a product innovation and technology strategy
• Effective and efficient idea-to-launch process
• Resource commitment and focus on the right projects (portfolio management)
• People, positive culture for innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g. foster
effective cross-functional teams and provide strong support and empowerment
to those teams) and leadership
• High-quality new product process
• Defined new product strategy
• Resources of people and money
• R&D spending for new product development
• High-quality new product project teams
• Senior management committed to, and involved in, new products
• Innovative climate and culture
• Use of cross-functional project teams
• Senior management accountability for new product results.
• Systems and structure: Innovation infrastructure (“loosely coupled based on the
absence of permanent formal structures”, p. 598) with continuous collection and
evaluation of proposals, free allocation of time and skills and centralised
allocation of financial resources
• Culture: Open and informal culture characterised by openness to individual
proposals and creativity
• Actors: Contributive and motivated employees
• Physical resources: Flexible workplace design

Tushman and
O’Reilly 1997

Cooper 2005

Cooper and
Kleinschmidt
2007

Verona and
Ravasi 2003

Pavlou and El
Sawy 2006

Blum 2004

• Sensing the environment - identifying consumer needs and new market
opportunities - captured by market orientation
• learning which builds new thinking, generates new knowledge and enhances
existing resources – captured by absorptive capacity
• co-ordinating activities - resource allocation, task assignment and activity
synchronisation – captured by co-ordination capability and
• integrating resources captured by collective mind (p. 8)
• Effective cross functional teams
• Experimentation and Exploit and explore orientation
• Integration, learning and reconfiguring routines
• Streams of new products (p.159)
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Author

Innovation Dimensions

Weerawardena
2003

•
•
•
•

Van der Panne
et al., 2003

•
•
•
•
•
de Waal, Maritz
and Shieh 2010

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Market-focused learning capability
Organisational Innovation Intensity
Entrepreneurial capability
Culture oriented towards innovation and an awareness of the collective nature
of innovation
Prior experience with innovation projects (learning-by-doing)
Multi-disciplinary R and D team
Clearly articulated innovation strategy and aligned management style
Project compatibility with firm competencies
Innovation product has relative quality and price advantage and good market
timing (page 327)
Formulation of an innovation strategy
Having an innovation supportive organisation
Collaborating with innovation partners (external linkages)
The identification of appropriate innovation metrics and subsequent and
continued measurement
Developing and implementing suitable innovation processes
Making use of appropriate innovation tools
Providing innovative leadership (page 43)

An organisation’s market-focused learning capability is a measure of its ability to
learn from market changes (both customer preferences and competitor actions) and
has been consistently included in previous conceptualisations of an OIC.
Organisational innovation intensity reflects the extent of the firm’s innovations across
its products, processes, management and marketing focus, and the ability to learn
about what customer’s value, how competitors are adjusting their value propositions,
how competitor’s success in innovation is changing and what are the drivers of those
changes in innovation success.

Recent research developed and refined comprehensive measures of market-focused
learning capability and organisational innovation intensity (Weerawardeena 2003)
and also identified the importance of innovation infrastructure renewal (Gold et al.,
2001).

Weerawardena found that market-focused learning capability and

organisational innovation intensity are interrelated as the learning enables firms to
“pursue both technological (product and process) and non-technological (marketing
and organisational systems) innovations” (Weerawardeena 2003, p. 419). In addition,
market-focused learning will influence innovation infrastructure renewal as new ideas
and approaches to innovation management are learned from the environment.
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Infrastructure renewal may in turn influence the extent and nature of market-focused
activity and the intensity of innovation pursued.

The OIC is depicted in Figure 2.2. The framework comprises two preconditions organisational learning and entrepreneurial intensity - and the three interdependent
components - organisational innovation intensity, innovation infrastructure capability
renewal, market-focused learning capability.
ORGANISATIONAL
PRECONDITIONS

Organisational
learning capability

Entrepreneurial
intensity

Organisational innovation
intensity

Innovation infrastructure
capability renewal

Market-focused learning
capability

Figure 2.2 Organisational Innovation Framework
2.6.2

Organisational Preconditions supporting an OIC

2.6.2.1 Importance of Preconditions
The structure of the OIC is consistent with management literature which identifies
capabilities or leadership behaviours which facilitate capability development. Gold et
al. support the existence and importance of preconditions and their characterisation as
capabilities in the following quotation:
Importantly, organizations may not be equally predisposed for successful
launch and maintenance of knowledge management initiatives. Therefore, a key
to understanding the success and failure of knowledge management within
organizations is the identification and assessment of preconditions that are
necessary for the effort to flourish. These preconditions are described broadly

48

as "capabilities" or "resources" within the organizational behavior
literature…(2001, p. 186, emphasis added).
The hierarchical nature of capabilities and the relevance of preconditions to
innovation is also encapsulated by Baker and Sinkula when they identify five levels
of organisational learning (2002, p. 10). Based on this hierarchy they define three
types of marketing firms. These firms are defined “by the strength of their market
orientation and learning orientation and are characterised by different learning
approaches, which determine their innovation capabilities” (ibid., emphasis added).
Jarratt and O’Neill (2002) support the hierarchical nature of capabilities when they
state “that cultural dimensions such as flexibility and consultation are organisational
preconditions or values that support relational behaviour. Similarly, Jarratt argues
that “it has also been established that a firm’s learning is facilitated by structures that
encourage interaction between all organizational members irrespective of their status
or expertise (Hedlund, 1994)” (Jarratt 2009, p. 367). Ireland et al. provide further
support for the hierarchical approach by their identification of the antecedents to
corporate entrepreneurship strategy (2009, p. 26).

As a consequence of the

hierarchical nature of capabilities, if an organisation has, for instance, limited
learning capabilities, it follows that its innovation capability, as well as its ability to
renew that capability, will be constrained.

The RA Theory as an evolutionary, process theory of competition provided the
compulsion for the need for preconditions to facilitate innovation capability renewal
as it placed significant emphasis on proactive and reactive innovation (Hunt and
Davis 2008, p. 14). Proactive innovation arises, not from competitive pressures, but
from the initiative of the firm’s entrepreneurial management in expectation of
superior financial performance. The absence of entrepreneurial management action
results in disadvantage in efficiency and effectiveness (ibid., p. 13).

Reactive

innovation is dependent upon organisational learning. Through the ongoing process
of disequilibrating competition, organisations learn as the result of the continued
feedback from relative financial performance which provided signals of the firm’s
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relative market position and resource advantage or disadvantage (ibid., p. 14), and
this learning prompted an innovation response.

As organisational learning and entrepreneurial management are endogenous to the
RA Theory it is imperative that these attributes be included as preconditions for an
innovation capability framework. Without these preconditions, a firm will lack the
will and innovation capacity (O’Connor et al., 2007, p. 551) to engage in proactive
innovation and the antecedents for success.
2.6.2.2 Entrepreneurial Intensity
The firm’s entrepreneurial intensity is a key factor in determining its capability
building activity (Weerawardena 2003, p. 410) as “the managerial competence of a
firm is to a large extent a function of the quality of the entrepreneurial services
available to it” (Penrose 1995, p. 32). Teece states that “enterprises with good
dynamic capabilities will have entrepreneurial management that is strategic in nature
and achieves the value-enhancing orchestration

of assets inside, between, and

amongst enterprises and other institutions within the business ecosystem” (2007,
p. 1344).
This capability is demonstrated by the innovative, proactive and risk seeking
propensity of its strategic leaders and infuses through the organisational environment
(Deshpande and Webster 1992).

Penrose characterised a growing enterprise as

having “a psychological predisposition on the part of individuals to take a chance in
the hope of gain, and, in particular, to commit effort and resources to speculative
activity with the success of the firm being a function of the entrepreneurial services
available to it” (1995, pp. 30, 32). Other supporting elements include the firm’s
acceptance of risk as an inherent part of innovation (Rothwell 1992, p. 227), a no
blame culture with no punishment for failure (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 2004,
p. 37), good internal and external communication with an open communication
culture (Rothwell 1992, p. 223; Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 2004, p. 37) and the
capacity for innovation as a corporate-wide task (Rothwell 1992, p. 223, 224).
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Associated with innovation behavioural orientation is recognition by senior
management of the “people-centeredness” of the innovation process (ibid., p. 224),
the requirement of senior management commitment to and visible support for
innovation (Cooper 2004; Connell, Edgar et al., 2001, p. 36; Van der Panne, van
Beers and Kleinknecht 2003, p. 321; Rothwell 1992, p. 227), as well as the
organisation’s commitment to the development of human capital and its ability to
attract and retain dynamic, open-minded managers (ibid., p. 224).

Thus,

organisational entrepreneurial intensity appears in Figure 2.2 as an organisational
precondition that will define the extent and nature of the organisational innovation
intensity and innovation infrastructure renewal dimensions of an OIC.
2.6.2.3 Organisational Learning Capability
Dynamic capabilities which provide superior financial performance are inimitable
and rare (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). The RA Theory recognises organisational
learning as one of a number of competitive advantage driving resources (Hunt and
Morgan 1996, p. 108). Dickson goes so far as to say that higher-order learning is the
fundamental construct surpassing comparative advantage in product value as it gives
a firm a comparative advantage in learning, and, consequently, in innovation (1996,
p. 104, emphasis added).

Organisational learning is widely regarded as imperative to achieving competitive
advantage, superior financial performance (Hult et al., 2000; Hunt and Morgan 1996,
p. 108; Dickson 1996, p. 104; Baker and Sinkula 1999a) and capability renewal,
particularly as it cannot be copied (ibid., p. 411). Learning is considered to be the
principal process by which management innovation occurs with Stata arguing that
“the rate at which individuals and organisations learn may be the only sustainable
competitive advantage, especially in knowledge-intensive industries” (1989, p. 64).

As capabilities are complex bundles of skills, collective learning and accumulated
knowledge, the learning dimension of the OIC is of paramount importance (Day
1994, p. 38).

Learning enables organisations to link organisational memory to

knowledge, products, processes and technologies as well as mainstream capabilities
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(Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 382). The organisational learning capability, i.e. the
learning culture of an organisation, has been confirmed as a dimension of an
organisation’s environment supporting a market orientation (Baker and Sinkula
1999a) and, therefore, is positioned in Figure 2.2 as an organisational precondition
supporting an OIC. Consistent with the findings of Baker and Sinkula, it is argued
that the ability of an organisation to glean ideas for innovation from its market,
identify new processes that will advance the innovation potential of the organisation
and understand how new technology might re-shape value creation for the market
will be bounded by the learning culture of the organisation.

Edmonson and Moingeon’s definition encapsulates organisational learning’s iterative
nature:
Organisation learning is a process in which organisation’s members actively use
data to guide behaviour in such a way as to promote the ongoing adaptation of the
organisation…It is a process of acting, assessing, and acting again – an ongoing
cycle of reflection and action that cannot be taken for granted in organisations
noted for their adherence to routine (1998, p. 12).
Companies that wish to compete on the basis of their knowledge need to follow the
Japanese holistic approach to knowledge creation which recognises that the company
is a living organism, not a machine (Nonaka 1991, p.97). The critical factor that
stimulates continuous innovation and self-renewal is the recognition that “the
knowledge-creating company is as much about ideals as it is about ideas” (ibid.). “To
create new knowledge means quite literally to re-create the company and everyone in
it in a non-stop process of personal and organisational self-renewal. In a firm with
these knowledge-creating capabilities inventing new knowledge is not a specialised
activity…It is a way of behaving, indeed a way of being, in which everyone is a
knowledge worker – that is to say, even an entrepreneur” (ibid.). The focus on ideals
rather than ideas is consistent with academic literature on organisational learning
levels as the challenge to ideals parallels the challenge to governing variables in
generative learning as with generative learning “managers must challenge employees
to re-examine what they take for granted” (ibid., p. 102).
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Organisational learning takes place with distinct systemic styles (levels) ranging from
zero (not learning), to single (called adaptive learning by Senge 1990 and error
correction by Wijnhoven 2001), double (“generative learning” by Senge 1990 and
“innovation” by Wijnhoven 2001, p. 183) and triple loop learning (also called deutero
learning) (Argyris 1999, p. 67ff; Senge 1990, p. 8; Snell and Chak 1998, pp. 339ff;
Wijnhoven 2001, p. 182; Ortenblad, 2004, p. 133). For Wijnhoven, the actionoutcome approach is affected by the environmental complexity (increasing
complexity leads to the addition of more factors to understand what is occurring) as
well as the level of dynamism in the environment (increasing dynamism is
demonstrated by the frequency of changes in the factors) (2001, p. 183).

As it reflects the degree to which values influence the propensity of the organisation
to “proactively question whether their existing beliefs and practices actually
maximise organisational performance (Argyris and Schon 1978)” (Baker and Sinkula
2002, p. 8), learning orientation occurs along a continuum with adaptive learning
(single loop learning) towards the beginning and generative learning (double loop
learning) and triple loop learning towards the other end of the continuum (Osterberg,
2004, pp. 145, 146). Organisations have the capacity to increase or decrease the level
of their orientation (Sinkula, Baker and Noordewier 1997, p. 309) and, in doing so,
can select from the above range of learning orientations with their choice influencing
both learning and the effectiveness of the organisation’s performance (Osterberg,
2004, p. 145). While this continuum is adopted it is not suggest that adaptive,
generative and triple loop learning are mutually exclusive but that additional learning
capabilities are added in moving from left to right along the continuum (DiBella,
Nevis and Gould 1996, p. 374; see also Loverde 2005).

The IT solutions context has implications for the entrepreneurial, organisational
learning and market focused leaning capabilities. Typically, highly technologically
turbulent environments are characterised by a short cycle of technological innovation
and obsolescence (Song et al., 2005, p. 263) and so it is imperative that the
entrepreneurial management of these firms take proactive action to put in place
organisational processes to capture new technical information, tap developments in
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exogenous science, monitor customer needs and competitor activity, and shape new
products and processes (Teece 2007, p. 1323). Teece argues that the new knowledge
acquired must be filtered and must flow, guided by appropriate innovation
infrastructure, to those capable of making sense of it (ibid.).

Proactive technology search activities include research and development but the
search needs to include the core as well as to the periphery of a firm’s business
ecosystem with knowledge sought from potential collaborators such as customers and
suppliers that are active in complementary innovation activities (ibid., p. 1324).
2.6.3

Construct of an OIC

In this research, explanation will be sought of how an OIC can be conceptualised in
an information technology solutions context, and the role of learning in OIC renewal.
It will identify and capture the synergy between the key dynamic elements of Hunt
and Arnett’s conceptualisation of the RA Theory (2003), proactive and reactive
innovation, and Weerawardena’s comprehensive innovation measures (2003).

The OIC framework that has been developed to ensure a comprehensive set of
dimensions, has primarily been adapted from constructs contained in research
undertaken by Weerawardena 2003 and Gold et al. (2001), i.e innovation
infrastructure renewal, organisational innovation intensity, and market-focused
learning capability. The inclusion of organisational environmental dimensions of
entrepreneurial capability or intensity (Weerawardena 2003) and organisational
learning capability (described by Slater and Narver 1995 and Stata 1989) will
provide important insight as to why an OIC is successful in achieving sustainable
competitive advantage in some businesses and unsuccessful in others.

These constructs have been selected as sustaining continuous innovation requires an
organisation to “create a context that spurs creativity from all parts of the organisation
at any time” (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 599, emphasis added). The research focus
is on the key role of strategic management in the integration, adaptation and
reconfiguration of organisational innovation resources (Teece et al., 1997, p. 515) and
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the need to create an ambidextrous organisation (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 74).
The ambidextrous organisation must be able to host “multiple, internally inconsistent
architectures, competencies and cultures, with built-in capabilities for efficiency,
consistency and reliability on the one hand (for reactive innovation prompted by the
market focused learning capability) and experimentation, improvisation and luck on
the other (for proactive innovation prompted by the entrepreneurial capability)”
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1999, p. 20; italicised words in parentheses added). It must
exhibit both the flawless execution of sustaining innovations while the organisation
rigorously pursues the foundations of its next growth business through disruptive
innovation (Anthony and Christensen 2005, p. 3).

The importance of innovation infrastructure capability renewal also flows from the
requirement for organisational ambidexterity. “Different kinds of innovation require
different organisational hardware – structures, systems and rewards - and different
kinds of software – human resources, networks and culture” (Tushman and O’Reilly
1999, p. 20) so that the innovation infrastructure arises not from a predetermined plan
or design but from innovation imperatives as they emerge from time to time (Verona
and Ravasi 2003, p. 601). These “semistructures” balance order and disorder and
enable the organisation to “rest on a loosely coupled arrangement as the distribution
of tasks and resources is not strictly regulated by the designed structure” (Verona and
Ravasi 2003, p. 600; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 3). People at all levels have
extensive interactions and are empowered to identify key innovation resources and
integrate and reconfigure them in new ways, and redesign organisational roles, tasks
and responsibilities depending on the current needs and needs that emerge through
the innovation process (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 600; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997,
p. 3). They have freedom to improvise existing products, explore the future with
extensive low cost probes and “link products together over time through rhythmic
transition processes from present projects to future ones, creating a relentless pace of
change” (ibid.).

Organisational innovation intensity provides an understanding of the organisation’s
commitment through the orientation of its resources towards innovation concentration
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and/or diversity. A firm with a high intensity indicates that the organisation has
introduced radical innovations in each of the four value-creating categories products, processes, management and marketing (Weerawardena 2003, p. 415). The
importance of this construct is in deciphering the contradiction of operating both for
today and tomorrow, balancing conflict and dissent among organisational business
units and implementing management strategies to develop streams of innovation
(Tushman and O’Reilly 1999, p. 21).

Innovation infrastructure is crucial in an IT solutions environment as its set of
resources, and the flexibility of those resources, make feasible both innovation and
the continuous renewal of IT systems (used within the firm for knowledge capture,
memory storage and knowledge dissemination) and this, in turn, may lead to
sustainable competitive advantage (Bharadwa 2000, p. 173).

The nature of the

infrastructure affects the innovator's costs and development time and so flexible
infrastructure reduces the time for imitation (reactive innovation), and may reduce the
cost of innovation and enhance a firm’s strategic options (Duncan 1995, p. 44).
Implicitly, the breadth and degree of integration of the use of IT within a firm should
be an additional factor which facilities product, process and managerial innovation
within the firm.

As capabilities are developed gradually through human exchange the dedicated
investment in continuous learning is an organisational imperative (Fuchs, Mifflin,
Miller and Whitney 2000, p. 119) as a “superior learning environment will leverage
the use of all resources…” (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p. 411). Learning enables
organisations to link organisational memory to knowledge, products, processes and
technologies as well as mainstream capabilities (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 382).
Only those organisations with the best learning capability and the greatest capacity
for absorbing external knowledge will survive (Zack 1999, p. 141).

Failure to

acknowledge and practice the importance of continuous organisational learning will
result in core capabilities becoming core rigidities (Leonard Barton 1998, p. 30),
specifically dampening the ability of a firm’s OIC to deliver appropriate and timely
innovation outcomes.
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As learning is endogenous to capability renewal a construct depicting the dynamic
components of an OIC must include mechanisms that support both proactive and
reactive learning (Jarratt 2004). Organisational ambidexterity is demonstrated in two
second order factors which facilitate both the exploration of new opportunities while
diligently exploiting existing capabilities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, p. 74). The
central dimension of innovation infrastructure capability renewal incorporates the
notion of a dynamic capability in that it places both the elements of innovation
infrastructure and the process of renewing that infrastructure at the core of an OIC.
Market-focused learning capability will capture the firm’s propensity to learn from
customer, market and environmental changes (Weerawardena 2003, p. 415).

A

firm’s entrepreneurial capability will identify the extent to which the organisation’s
leaders are “genuinely entrepreneurial” by being innovative, proactive and risk
seeking unprompted by competitive pressures (Hunt and Arnetts 2003, p. 7;
Weerawardena 2003, p. 414).

As the dynamic capabilities approach was developed to explain firm-level success
and failure (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509), the common unit of analysis is the firm
(Jarratt 2004, 2005; Gold, et al., 2001; Protorerou, Caloghirou and Lioukas 2005;
Lawson and Samson 2001; Rosenbloom 2000; Hilliard 2004 and Matcher and
Mowery 2004). While there is focus on firm-level analysis the “firm” has not been
defined with the term appearing to encompass organisations with a single product to
multi-divisional corporations with a wide variety of business foci. The breath of the
term, “the firm”, creates a dilemma as dynamic capabilities research should be
situational as business opportunities flow from a firm’s unique paths, processes and
positions (Teece et al., 1997, p. 509). This research contributes to the concept of
dynamic capabilities by examining for the first time, the conceptualisation of an OIC
within multiple business units of the same firm 3. The research will examine whether
an OIC exists for the entire organisation or whether the dynamics of the OIC differ
depending on the entrepreneurial capability and organisational learning capability

3

Brown and Eisenhardt 1997 examined 9 business units but these were in 9 firms
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that are evident within the business unit. The impact of the OIC will be examined to
ascertain its contribution to sustainable competitive advantage and how it can be
understood and achieved.
2.6.4

Linkages between OIC Preconditions and Components

As capabilities are built and nurtured by the entrepreneurial key decision makers of
the firm (Teece 1997; 2007, p. 1344), Weerawardena argued that entrepreneurship is
the “key factor determining the capability building activity of the firm” (2003,
p. 410). The importance of entrepreneurship is reinforced by the RA Theory as
proactive innovation is “genuinely entrepreneurial” (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 14). In
the RA Theory organisational learning and innovation are endogenous to the firm
with reactive learning highly dependent upon the effectiveness of the firm’s ability to
learn from its financial performance and its relative competitive effectiveness and
efficiency.

The importance and relationship of the entrepreneurial intensity and

organisational leaning capability has been established in section 2.6.2.1.

The linkage between market-focused learning capability and entrepreneurial and
organisational leaning capability arises from the reactive innovation which is an
inherent part of the process of competition. Learning can originate from formal
market research, competitive intelligence, dissecting competitor’s products or
benchmarking and test marketing, and generally this learning is activated by the
competitive process (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 14). This linkage is also supported by
Weerawardena’s findings that entrepreneurial firms pursuing organisational
innovation-based competitive strategy build and nurture distinctive market-focused
learning capabilities (2003, p. 419).

While entrepreneurial intensity is demonstrated by the innovative, proactive and risk
taking propensity of a firm’s strategic managers, organisational innovation intensity
captures the breadth of its commitment to innovation. The entrepreneurial firm’s
market-focused learning capability influences its organisational innovation intensity
as those firms which “have excellent market sensing skills are more likely to develop
radical changes to products, processes, marketing methods and managerial systems”
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(ibid., pp. 417, 418). The linkage to organisational learning is explicit is respect of
market-focused learning but implicit in respect to the other elements of innovation
intensity.

The firm’s capacity to reconfigure and transform itself, i.e. renewal, is a learned
organisational skill (Teece et al., 1997, p. 521). Through generative and double loop
learning the firm is able to “challenge old assumptions” and “change its view of the
world” in order to continually renew its systems and procedures to meet changing
market and environmental conditions (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p. 412; Dickson
1996, p. 104). Accordingly, innovation infrastructure capability renewal is dependent
on organisational learning with the firm that develops and sustains superior, higher
order learning processes being able to achieve a long-term sustainable competitive
advantage (Dickson 1996, p. 104). The proactive component of the entrepreneurial
capability initiates pre-emptive changes to its innovation infrastructure to support its
proactive innovation.
2.7

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter began with the identification of organisational innovation barriers
identified in the literature. After a review of the extant dynamic capabilities research
and the theoretical foundations upon which this framework is based, prior research on
components of an OIC were organised, analysed, synthesised and arguments
presented regarding the key dimensions of a well balanced, highly performing OIC.
The literature derived OIC comprised two preconditions – organisational learning
capability and entrepreneurial intensity – and three components - innovation
infrastructure renewal, organisational innovation intensity, and market-focused
learning capability. The conceptual model of the OIC is depicted diagrammatically
in Figure 2.2 in section 2.6.1. It demonstrates the hierarchical nature of capabilities
and the importance of preconditions as determinants of the capabilities as well as the
relationships between the preconditions and components of the OIC. The purpose of
the literature derived OIC was to provide a framework for comparison with the OIC
derived from the case analysis in Chapter 4.

59

Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology (case study research) used to address the
research question - “How can an Organisational Innovation Capability be
conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is the role of
learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”.

It begins with the

identification of the research paradigm (postpositivism) and follows with the
justification of the research approach. The procedure for the selection of the case is
then described followed by the interactive data management strategy applied.
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Chapter Three
3RESEARCH APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1

Introduction

The research question posed in section 1.3 is “How can an Organisational
Innovation Capability be conceptualised in an information technology solutions
context, and what is the role of learning in organisational innovation capability
renewal”.

The objective of this research question is to build on the academic

research in innovation management dynamic capabilities by opening the “black box”
and providing evidence supporting the conceptualisation of an organisational
innovation capability.

While some consider that the failure of organisations to achieve consistent innovation
simply requires “more commitment and more innovative approaches to the process of
innovation” (Booz Allen 2005, p. 4, emphasis added), here the importance of
developing an organisational innovation capability is emphasised.

The research

question will be considered in the theoretical framework of dynamic capabilities
linked to an IT solutions context and developed for this research. This approach
provides a framework for examining how the firm can integrate, adapt and
reconfigure its endowed assets and resources to create “renewal capabilities” which
lead to comparative and/or competitive advantage, sustainable competitive advantage
and “superior financial performance” in a market or a segment of a market (Hunt and
Morgan 1995, p. 6). Utilising this theoretical framework, the substantive research
provides a definitional context for evaluating key organisational capabilities that
directly impact an organisation’s drive towards efficient, effective and sustainable
innovation.
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Dynamic capabilities are particular relevant in this “Schumpeterian world of
innovation-based competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the
‘creative destruction’ of existing competencies”, the uncertainty of the nature of
future competition and markets and the consequent focus on time-to-market
responses for new products and services (Teece et al., 1997, pp. 509, 515; Teece
2007, p. 1341).

Chapter 2 provided a theoretical foundation for the development of an OIC which has
the capability to sustain and adapt organisational resources and competencies in
fulfillment of long term strategies notwithstanding volatile competitive conditions,
altered strategies and the loss of key employees, typical of the research context
(Nadler and Tushman, 1997, p. 5). This chapter describes the research paradigm and
justification for the selection of the case study methodology as the research approach.
It then continues with a description of the research procedures, including the case
study selection and design, the data collection and analysis processes, before
concluding with a discussion regarding validity and reliability.
3.2

The Research Paradigm

The identification of the research paradigm makes explicit the fundamental
assumptions of the research perspective and provides a rationale for the positioning of
the scholarly work (Yin 2009, p. 26; Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 112; Maxwell 1996,
p. 4;).

The postpositivist paradigm has been selected as from an ontological

perspective, the postpositivist acknowledges the existence of an objective or “real
reality” which can only be “imperfectly apprehendable because of basically flawed
human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of the
phenomena” (Guba and Lincoln 1994, pp. 109, 110).

The postpositivist epistemological view largely abandons the positivist’s assumption
that the researcher and the investigated object are independent entities as it is
impossible for the former to be purely objective (Toma 1997, p. 683). However,
research objectivity is considered to be a “regulatory ideal” with considerable
emphasis placed on ensuring that “external guardians of objectivity” such as critical
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traditions applied and the critical community engaged (Guba and Lincoln 1994,
p. 110). According to Crotty, postpositivism is concerned with “probability rather
than certainty”, a level of objectivity rather than absolute objectivity, and the desire to
“approximate the truth rather than aspiring to grasp it in its totality or essence” (1998,
p. 29).

Epistemologically, the postpositivist acknowledges that the researcher cannot be
purely objective (Toma 1997, p. 683). This perspective has been labelled critical
realism as the apprehended reality must be subject to the widest possible scrutiny to
ensure that it is a close as possible to, although it never achieves, perfect reality
(Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193).

Methodologically, postpositivism emphasises “critical multiplism” as a means of
falsifying rather than verifying hypotheses (Guba and Lincoln 2005, p. 193).
Postpositivist research is conducted in more natural settings, with greater reliance on
the collection of more contextual information, the reinforcement of discovery as an
element in inquiry, and the solicitation of emic perspectives to provide an
understanding of the meanings and purposes that individuals ascribe to their actions
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 110). This perspective focuses on “people as data
collection instruments, qualitative methods, use of tacit knowledge, grounded theory
inductive

analysis,

purposeful

rather

than

random

sampling,

idiographic

interpretation, and the case study reporting mode” (McKelvey 2003, p. 7), and,
therefore has a “closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of organisational
phenomena coming to appreciate its fundamentally complex, idiosyncratic, and, multi
and mutually causal nature” (McKelvey 2003, p. 6).

Empirical research on the organisational innovation dynamic capability is a relatively
new area of management research. While the dynamic capabilities approach has been
applied to many capabilities, little research has been directed to developing a holistic
organisational innovation capability (Lawson and Samson 2001, p. 388).
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Organisational capabilities are built over time and are “the result of complex
processes comprising the accumulation of small decisions and actions undertaken
over many years in a situation of great uncertainty” (Katzy et al., 2003, p. 4).
Accordingly, as quantitative research is unlikely to be able to identify and explore the
nature of the dynamic capabilities, qualitative research is the preferred, although not
necessarily exclusive, research approach.

Another reason is that while the key

informant technique, used in data collection by many dynamic capabilities
researchers, is an efficient method for data collection, when used for collecting
survey and questionnaire data it generally suffers from an inability to capture tacit
knowledge or assumptions, as these may not have been articulated.
3.3

Justification of Research Approach

Five major research strategies are identified for conducting social science research.
The question of when to use each strategy – case study method, experiments, surveys,
histories and the analysis of archival information - depends on the answers to three
questions: firstly, the type of research question posed, secondly, the extent of control
an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and finally, the degree of focus on
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin 2009, p. 8).

Yin defines case study research as an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (ibid., p.18). The remainder
of this section will apply Yin’s three questions as a basis for justifying the selection
of the case study method.

After an examination of 14 academic papers and dissertations with a focus on
dynamic capabilities (Lawson and Samson 2001; Hilliard 2004; Ethiraj et al., 2000;
Gold et al., 2001; Protorerou et al., 2005; Pavlou and El Sawy 2005, 2006; Katzy
2003; Jarratt 2004, 2005; Macher and Mowery 2009; Rosenbloom 2000; Choudrie
and Dwivedi 2005; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009), and the book, Dynamic
Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organisations (Helfat et al., 2007), it
was concluded that the case study is the preferred primary strategy to investigate a
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phenomenon “in its natural context” (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994, p. 13) and to
answer the “‘how’ or ‘why’ questions being posed”, whilst retaining “the holistic and
meaningful characteristics of real-life events”, such as dynamic capability life cycles
and managerial processes and routines (Yin 2009, p. 4). With these phenomenondriven research questions, case studies give the researcher the flexibility to define the
research question broadly (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 26).

The nature of the research question in relation to an OIC requires an explanatory
response as this “how question” deals with present-day operational links with sticky,
practice based routines which need to be traced over time, rather than a single
occurrence or incidence (Yin 2009, p. 9). Case study research is also the most
appropriate research methodology as it emphasises research in dynamic naturalistic
settings and the importance of contexts to generate explanations for observed
attitudes and behaviours (Clegg, Kemp and Legge, 1986, p. 8; Benbaset et al., 1987,
p. 371). Consistent with this view, Eisenhardt and Graebner argue that case studies
are relevant for theory building and are one of the best, if not the best, of the bridges
from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research (2007, p. 25).

By using a qualitative/postpositist perspective for the case study inquiry, the
researcher attempts to interpret how an OIC is operationalised in search for
explanation and theory.

Ambrosini and Bowman argue that “qualitative smaller

sample studies are likely to be more appropriate for understanding the subtlety of
resource creation and regeneration processes” and call for “fine-grained case studies”
to provide a strategy-as-practice perspective (2009, p. 37, 46).

Case study research is “a search for explanation and theory rather than just a report
on an empirical research” (Kanter, 1977, p. 291) and is considered to be the most
appropriate research methodology as the “research and theory are at their early,
formative stages” (Benbasat et al., 1987; p.369; Darke et al., 1998, p. 279). As the
broad approach to the research question is to gain a better understanding of the
interplay between people, organisational strategy as well as the organisation itself, the
selection of case study research as a new methodology is appropriate.
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Darke et al. (1998, p. 279) specifically point to case study research as applicable
where a phenomenon is dynamic and not yet matured or settled.

While their

observation relates to information systems research, they extend its scope to
“business strategy concerned with use of the Internet, or where terminology and a
common business language and a set of definitions are not yet clearly widely
accepted”. An investigation into innovation management capability would fall within
the reach of their comments.

The use of the case study methodology for information technology and systems
research is well established (Dube and Pare 2003; Benbasat et al., 1987; Darke et al.,
1998). Reasons for its validity as a viable research strategy are firstly, it allows the
researcher to conduct research in its “natural setting, learn about the state of the art,
and generate theories from practice”, particularly as the focus has shifted from
technical to organisational issues; secondly, it allows the researcher to answer “how”
and “why” questions by understanding the nature and complexity of its IT solution
development processes; thirdly, the approach is highly relevant to areas where there
is rapid change of pace in the information systems area and where few case studies
have previously been carried out (Benbasat et al., 1987, p. 370) as it opens “the way
to new ideas and new lines of reasoning and pinpoints the opportunities, challenges
and issues facing IT specialists and managers” (Dube and Pare 2003, p. 598); and
finally, the holistic investigation inherent in case study research suits the “need to
understand the complex and ubiquitous interactions among organisations,
technologies and people” (ibid.).
3.4

Research Procedures

3.4.1

Case Study Selection

In conducting case study research for developing constructs and theory “nothing is
more important than making a proper selection of cases” (Stake, 1994, p. 243).
Eisenhardt also emphasised the importance of case selection arguing that the concept
of population is also applicable in this context (1989, p. 537). This concept is crucial
for two reasons: firstly, because it defines the set of cases from which the research
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sample is selected, and, secondly, because it controls extraneous variation and helps
to define limits for generalisation of the findings (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 537).
However, Yin calls it a misconception to believe that case studies are to represent a
formal “sample” from some larger universe as generalising from case study research
does not depend on statistical inference (statistical generalisation) but on the making
of logical inferences (analytic generalisation) (Yin 2004, p. 7).

A critical issue in case study research is the selection of the number of case studies
undertaken by a researcher. It is widely acknowledged that there is no ideal number
of cases and that single-case or multi-case design can lead to successful research
outcomes (Darke 1998 et al., p. 281; Yin 2009, p. 58). A single case may be
appropriate where it represents a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory or
where exploratory research is undertaken, a single case may provide the foundation
for developing explanations of why a phenomenon occurs with the opportunity for
these explanations to be subject to discussion and application in other contexts (Darke
et al., 1998, pp. 277, 281; Yin 2004, p. 7). Other rationales for a single case include
an extreme or unique case, a representative or typical case, or a revelatory case (Yin
2009, pp. 60-62).

Multi-case designs allow both literal and theoretical replication and cross-case
comparison with this approach also capable of adoption for exploratory research
(Darke et al., 1998, p. 281).

Multiple-case designs have important advantages.

Firstly, they provides a platform to respond to a common criticism of single-case
studies that they are unique and idiosyncratic and, therefore, have limited value
beyond the circumstances of the single case. Secondly, the researcher will collect an
amount of comparative data which will assist in analysing the findings (Yin 2004,
p. 8). Another key consideration in the selection of the number of cases to be studied
is that there is a trade-off between a “deep understanding of a particular social setting
and the benefits of comparative insights” with the greater the number of contexts a
researcher investigates, the less contextual insights he can communicate (Dyer and
Wilkins 1991, p. 614). Negative cases can also provide a rich source of analytic
thinking (Bazeley 2009, p. 6).
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Four basic types of case designs are identified by Yin (depicted in Figure 3.1)
depending upon whether the case is single or multiple and whether or not multiple
units of analysis are involved (2009, p. 46). The application of this matrix results in
single-case (holistic) designs (Type 1), single-case (embedded) designs (Type 2),
multiple-case (holistic) designs (Type 3), and multiple-case (embedded) designs
(Type 4) (ibid.).

Figure 3.1 Case Study Design
The design format used in this research is Yin’s Type 2 single embedded case with
multiple units of analysis. While the researcher was employed by the CO, the CO
was selected on the basis that it provided the highest “opportunity to learn” (Stake,
1994, p. 243) for the CO and the researcher, as at the time that the research was
conducted, the CO was undergoing significant change as it endeavoured to capitalise
on its acquisitions, expand into new markets and increase the success rate of its
innovation and the speed of commercialisation. It was also adapting from a single
project GHLSS technology contractor to a broader supplier of products and services
to both the high level security sector and the commercial sector. These transitions
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emphasised the CO’s inherited and embedded path dependencies and provided
opportunities to examine how various business units addressed these challenges in
their quest for organisational innovation.

As the CO had operated in the GHLSS and was also a private company there was,
apart from public speeches and an interview with a national business magazine,
limited public information available about its innovation processes, particularly at the
business unit level. While publically there was a strong management commitment to
innovation as an organisation-wide practice there appeared to be a gap between the
espoused innovation approach and actual practice. The employment of the researcher
by the CO provided the opportunity for interviewees who were passionate about
innovation, but frustrated by the CO’s approach, the opportunity to speak opening
and frankly about their innovation experience. It also provided access to sensitive
strategic and operational documents which would not have been made available to an
outsider. The CO was also selected as it met one research challenges of Ireland et al.
- the difficulty in “identifying firms exhibiting highly entrepreneurial (corporate
entrepreneurship) strategies” as these firms “may be few in number” (2009, p. 40).

While this case study focuses on a single case organisation in a single corporate
setting, it does not constitute a single case as it is involves the study of multiple
business units of the CO, each with different processes, paths and positions
(Eisenhardt 1991, p. 623; Teece et al., 1997, pp. 518-524).

Therefore, the CO

comprises multiple subunits within the one organisation and this availability provides
significant opportunity for multiple and extensive levels of analysis within the CO,
thus enhancing the insights into the single case (Yin 2009, p. 46). While a study of
this nature has compelling benefits, Yin warns against the possibility of the
researcher becoming so absorbed with the subunits that the holistic case begins to be
ignored with the result that the orientation of the case shifts from its original design.
An examination will be conducted of how an OIC can be conceptualised in the CO
and within three business units to test the proposition that the value of dynamic
capabilities must be evaluated in the market context within which the business unit
operates (Barney et al., 2001, p. 631). In the CO, the OIC will be studied in each of
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three business units to understand its emergence, renewal and continued
development.
3.4.2

Data Collection

An OIC was studied in three business units in the case organisation (CO) as an
anticipatory data reduction strategy to limit the data collected (Miles and Huberman
1994, p. 10). No explicit confidentiality agreement was entered into between the CO
and the researcher. However, it was an agreed understanding, based on a high level
of trust in the researcher that the name of the case organisation would not be
disclosed and that steps would be taken to limit identification without impacting upon
the integrity of the case study and analysis.

The focus of the research was to examine in the CO if one OIC model applied or
whether different OIC models applied in different business units depending on the
organisational and market context. Multiple data collection methods were combined
with the triangulation of the resultant data (converging lines of inquiry) from those
sources as this led to stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses and greater
confidence about what is concluded than if only one data source was used (Eisenhardt
1989, pp. 537, 538; Yin 2009, p. 15; Yin 2004, p. 9; Pare 2002).

The primary focus was on qualitative research as the examination of a dynamic OIC
within the CO was exploratory and the fundamental variables of the construct were
uncertain as capabilities flow from a firm’s unique processes (Cresswell 2002, p. 22)
and its “fully firm-specific resources, their context, and how they were created or
renewed” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37).

Qualitative data techniques included interviews, archival records and observation.
Qualitative data was primarily collected through interviews based on a semistructured instrument (copy included in the Appendix) to guide, but not confine, the
boundaries of the conversation. The semi-structured instrument began by asking
details of the interviewee’s work experience both generally and within the CO. It
then proceeded to ask questions about innovation success and failure within the
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business unit in which the interviewee was employed. The interviewee was then
asked to identify the reasons for and barriers to innovation success as well as describe
any innovation processes in their business unit and changes over time to those
processes.

To conclude the interview, questions were raised in respect of the

business unit’s structure and culture and the impact of these dimensions on
innovation.

Individuals within the selected business units who had expertise and experience, and
were involved in the innovation management process were invited to participate.
These names were identified by speaking to staff involved in innovation within each
business unit or innovation champions within the CO. In addition, one interview was
conducted with the Chief Technology Officer of the CO as he played an important
and wide-ranging role in regard to innovation. The number of interviews conducted
in each business unit and the CO are listed in Table 3.1 below. All but one of the
interviews were conducted in the period September to December 2006.

One

clarifying interview was conducted in December 2008.
Organisation

Interviews

First Business Unit

6

Second Business Unit

7

Third Business Unit

5

Case organisation

3

Table 3.1 Table of Interviews
Consideration was also given to balancing the different professional disciplines and
different levels of responsibility and seniority to ensure that a diversity of
perspectives was analysed (Verona and Ravasi 2003, p. 582; Brown and Eisenhardt
1997, p. 4) and to minimise the impact of interviewee bias (Eisenhardt and Graebner
2007, p. 30).

Interviewees included research and development managers,

commercialisation managers, those primarily involved in knowledge creation and
those who report to them. These interviews enabled the data to be collected in “close
proximity to the specific situation”, provide “richness and holism, with a strong
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potential for revealing complexity” as well as “‘thick descriptions’ that are vivid,
nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 10).

The focus of the interviews was on the personal innovation experience of the
interviewee within their business unit. Interviews were conducted either in person or
by phone by the researcher and lasted from 60 to 90 minutes. To ensure validity, all
interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee. One interviewee in
the First Business Unit (COFBU) was interviewed twice to gain richer detail and to
clarify key ideas which emerged from the initial interview.

The purpose of the interviews was to gain a picture of the situation in which an OIC
was built. This included determining the presence of organisational preconditions for
innovation such as knowledge management, learning orientation and organisational
culture as well as the key activities, processes and behaviours that represent these
constructs and the presence, nature and strength of the barriers to innovation. This
qualitative research also covered strategies implemented by the organisation to
strengthen the innovation preconditions as well as those that contained, removed or
reduced the strength of the innovation barriers.

Some archival records and written documentation were also used in the data analysis
process as these provided a valuable source of qualitative data (Miles and Huberman
1994, p. 9). The documents included speeches on innovation by the General Manager
of the SBU and the Group General Manager of the CO, the SBU’s Strategic
Technology Roadmap and reports, policies, business and product development
strategies.

The most important use of these documents was to corroborate and

augment evidence from other sources (Yin 2009, p. 18) as well as confirm the
business unit’s commitment to particular path. In this case the analysis of documents
provided the essential preliminary analysis of the CO’s position, processes and path
dependencies (Teece et al., 1997, p. 522).

Observation of innovation activities such as the annual engineering conference,
research and development, and commercialisation meetings, provided the opportunity
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to monitor relevant behaviour or environmental conditions and gain impressions and
insights rather than relying solely on the opinions of interviewees (Yin 2009, p. 106).
These observed activities were not recorded and provided a general background to the
primary data collection methods.

A key feature emphasised for theory building from case studies is the frequent
overlap between data collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538; Miles and
Huberman 1994, p. 10ff).

Overlapping analysis with data collection gives the

researcher a head start in analysis, as well as allowing the researchers to take
advantage of flexible data collection (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538). This flexibility
enables the researcher to make adjustments during the data collection process to
probe new research themes that emerge, to data collection instruments or data
sources. While this flexibility is legitimate as researchers endeavor to understand
each case in as much depth as is feasible, it is not a license to be unsystematic
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 539).

Data reduction was essential due to the volume of data collected from the multiple
data collection methods (Miles and Hubermann 1994). Data was reduced in an
anticipatory way by the research paradigm and design strategies selected.

The

strategies include preparation of data summaries, data coding, theme identification
and clustering (Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429).
3.4.3

Data Analysis

While data analysis is the heart of building theory from case study research, it is also
the most difficult and least codified part of the research process (Eisenhardt 1989,
p. 539). The complexities of data analysis often lead to “false expectations that the
data will somehow speak for themselves” (Yin 2004, p. 15).

Miles and Huberman define data analysis in terms of three linked sub-processes: data
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification with the links and
relationships between the sub-processes depicted in Figure 3.2 below (1994, p. 429).
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Data
Display

Data
Collection

Data Reduction

Conclusions:
drawing/verifying

Figure 3.2 Interactive Data Management
It was important to recognise that “these processes occur before data collection,
during study design and planning; during data collection as interim and early analyses
are carried out; and after data collection as final products are approached and
completed” (1994, p. 429).

Data reduction was essential due to the volume of data collected from the multiple
data collection methods. It was reduced in an anticipatory way by the research
paradigm and design strategies selected.

Data reduction strategies include

preparation of data summaries, data coding, theme identification and clustering
(Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429).

Data display is defined as an organised,

compressed assembly of information that facilitates the drawing of meaning and
promotes action taking (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 429). The third sub-process,
conclusion drawing and verification, involved drawing meaning from the data with
strategies including comparison/contrast, pattern and theme identification, clustering
and checking results with respondents (Huberman and Miles 1994, p. 429).

An analytic strategy was applied to “treat the evidence fairly, produce compelling
analytic conclusions, and rule out alternative interpretations” (Yin 2009, p. 130).
Following Yin’s first and preferred strategy, the theoretical propositions guided the
case study, shaped the data collection process and gave priority to particular analytic
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strategies by focusing attention on certain data and ignoring other data (2003, pp.
111, 112).

Data analysis began with building individual case studies to facilitate intimacy with
each case as a stand-alone entity and to allow the embedded unit’s unique patterns to
emerge (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540).

Cross-embedded unit pattern analysis was

implemented to develop conceptual insights, refine the unique aspects of each case
and to promote divergent ways of analysing the data such as by selecting categories
or dimensions and then looking for within-group similarities coupled with intergroup
differences or by selecting pairs of cases and then listing similarities and differences
between each pair (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 6). By
writing up each embedded unit in detail as well as developing individual reflective
remarks, coding and other tools, and then undertaking cross-embedded unit
comparison, a rich familiarity with the case emerged (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540).

Effective cross-case analysis promotes deeper understanding and explanation (Miles
and Huberman 1994, p. 173). Cross-case pattern analysis was essential to minimise
the researcher’s limited processing skills as researchers “leap to conclusions based on
limited data, (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), they are overly influenced by the
vividness (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) or they sometimes inadvertently drop
disconfirming evidence (Nissbet, and Ross, 1980)” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 540). Crosscase pattern analysis counteracted these tendencies by promoting divergent ways of
analysing the data such as by selecting categories or dimensions and then looking for
within-group similarities coupled with intergroup differences or by selecting pairs of
cases and then listing similarities and differences between each pair (Eisenhardt 1989,
p. 540).

The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts compared to the recorded
interviews. Initially, the data transcripts were analysed manually (highlighting key
passages, identifying themes, repeated concepts and narratives) to determine if it was
necessary to use a software package for the data analysis process. Following this
preliminary analysis, it was decided that, with the quantity of data and the emerging
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nature of the concepts, a qualitative data analysis software would add structure to the
process. NVivo v8 was selected based on its data management capabilities and
because it addressed some of the limitations of other packages.

All of the interview transcripts were imported into NVivo. The transcripts were then
open coded to Free Nodes which were developed based on the initial data analysis
and the emerging theoretical properties of the category (Glaser and Strauss 1967,
p. 106). After further analysis and prolonged engagement with the data and nodes,
Tree Nodes were created to enable common elements to be grouped with each Tree
Node “internally consistent but distinct from one another” (Marshall and Rossman
2010, p. 215). During the further analysis there was a continual adjustment of the
Tree Nodes to provide additional richness to the analysis (Yin 2009, p. 128). The
initial characterisation of the Tree Nodes differed significantly from the final Tree
architecture.

Some of the Tree Nodes identified included Innovation Factors,

Innovation Facilitators, Innovation Barriers and Narratives. With the Tree Node
Innovation Factors there were sub-nodes such as Challenging environment, CrossFunctional Team, Flexibility and Relationships.

The underlying purpose of the

analysis was to allow the data to speak for itself.
3.5

Validity and Reliability

In order to continually maintain the quality of the case study design, four
conventional benchmarks were applied: construct validity, internal validity
(isomorphism of findings with reality), external validity (generalisability) and
reliability (in the sense of stability) (Yin 2009, p. 40; Guba and Lincoln 2005,
p. 205). These tests were applied throughout the design phase, as well as during the
data collection, data analysis and the reporting processes to increase the quality of the
case study and overcome traditional criticisms of the weakness of case study research
(Yin, 2003, p. 35).

To address construct validity, multiple sources of evidence were used during data
collection to promote convergent lines of inquiry and establish a chain of the
evidence collected (Yin 2009, p. 42). For this research at least five respondents in
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each business unit were interviewed to ensure that the observations associated with a
single informant were minimised and to provide greater confidence in the evidence
collected. Internal validity is important for explanatory studies as it confirms causal
relationship. Key internal validity analytic tactics included pattern matching across
cases and explanation building, particularly where the explanations reflected some
theoretically significant propositions (Yin 2009, p. 42).

External validity was

achieved by applying replication logic across multiple cases (embedded business
units) to achieve analytic generalisation (Yin 2009, p. 43) as if “two or more cases are
shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed” (Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007, pp. 38, 39). In case study research, reliability refers to the stability,
accuracy, and precision of measurement (Treloar 2001). To minimise error and bias
a case study protocol was developed thereby ensuring that the procedures were well
documented and can be repeated with the same results. Procedures for this research
involved the preparation of semi-structured interview instruments with the same data
collection process followed consistently for each interviewee.

The Table below (Table 3.2) summarises the eleven key recommended tactics
covering the four conventional quality tests and also indicates the ways in which the
research design and conduct for this case study responded to the recommendations.
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Tests

Construct
validity

Internal
validity

External
validity

Reliability

Case Study Tactic

Research Phase
in which tactic
occurs

Action taken in this research

Use multiple sources
of evidence

Data collection

Use of interviews, documentary evidence and
physical artifacts

Establish chain of
evidence

Data collection

Interview data both taped and transcribed in real
time; multiple evidence sources entered into
customised object-oriented database

Have key informants
review draft case study
report

Composition

It was intended that the case studies would be
reviewed by key informants before publication.
However, as the three business units had been
sold at the time of completion of this research
this tactic was not implemented.

Do pattern matching

Data analysis

Patterns identified across cases

Do explanation
building

Data analysis

Some causal links identified

Do time series analysis

Data analysis

Not to be performed in this research,

Do logic models

Data analysis

Not performed- requires time series data

Use rival theories
within single cases

Research design

Not used because of exploratory nature of
research and lack of existing competing theories

Use replication logic in
multiple-case studies

Research design

Multiple cases investigated using replication
logic

Use case study
protocol

Data collection

Same data collection procedure followed for
each case; consistent set of initial semi
structured questions used in each interview

Develop case study
database

Data collection

Interview transcripts, documents, other notes
and links to physical artifacts entered into
research database

Table 3.2 Case Study Tactics
Source: based on Treloar 2001

3.6

Conclusion

The case study method was selected as the research approach for the study of the
research question as this method is an empirical inquiry which investigates
contemporary phenomena in the organisation’s real-life context. This approach was
appropriate for an investigation of an innovation management dynamic capability
where theory and understanding are in their formative years (Darke et al., 1998,
p. 279). In addition, the answer to the “how” question was likely to be from the
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identification and analysis of practice-based routines with embedded and sticky
knowledge which cannot be analysed effectively except within its naturalistic context
(Yin 2009, pp. 8, 11).

The objective of Chapter 4 is to provide an understanding of the case study data
collected, identify the key themes and patterns in the data and to understand the key
innovation capability dimensions in each case study. The Chapter begins with an
introduction to the CO and follows with the analysis of the three embedded business
units in order to identify whether the case data supported the propositions generated
through the literature.

A cross-case analysis highlights the similarities and differences in approaches in the
formation of an innovation capability. The case-derived OIC is then described.
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Chapter Four
4CASE ANALYSIS

4.1

Introduction

This research is focused on examining the development of an innovation capability in
three embedded business units with an IT solutions business focus within the case
organisation (CO).

These business units displayed varying levels of innovation

performance, and the case analysis will reveal the different innovation capability
foundations and approaches to innovation capability reconfiguration to align with
changing business environments.

The objectives of Chapter Four are to present the findings of the data analysis,
identify key themes and patterns in the data and to present the key innovation
capability dimensions within three business units of the CO. This Chapter begins
with an introduction to the CO and a discussion of how “history matters” and the
paths and positions which defined it. The case analysis continues by exploring the
embedded and inherited path dependencies of the three business units to establish
how their current innovation approach emerged. The process of analysis involved
building concepts from the data and seeking evidence to support linkages between
those concepts.

Emphasis was placed on routines as the fundamental units of

capability operation and drivers of change. In addition, the analysis revealed how the
path dependencies have affected each of the business units in their response to
internal and/or external environmental pressures and how they embraced change in
their approach to innovation.

The data was interrogated to identify evidence that confirmed the presence of
dimensions evident in the literature as contributing to an OIC and clarified the
constructs that defined them. Evidence was sought to support or reject the research
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framework generated through the literature which captured the interrelationships
between the components.

The data was examined to establish the presence of

additional dimensions, interrelationships and constructs that were not evident in prior
literature.

A cross-case analysis was then undertaken to highlight similarities and differences in
approaches in the formation of the innovation capabilities and to inform the
innovation dynamic capability framework which emerged from the data. In Chapter
5 the framework is compared to that derived from the literature, seeking explanations
of differences in dimensions, constructs and linkages.
4.2

The Case Organisation – Inherited and Embedded Path
Dependencies

4.2.1

Introduction

It is well established that the paths that a firm has travelled shape, guide and constrain
the available and viable paths for its future (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 100; Teece et al.,
1997, p. 522).

This section provides a brief perspective of the inherited and

embedded path dependencies of the CO which will inform the analysis of the three
business units. An analysis of the CO’s paths, resources and processes provides
valuable insight into the path dependencies of those business units and how those
dependencies, resources and processes impacted upon each business unit’s innovation
capability in the changing business environments that each faced.

The CO commenced operations in the mid 1990’s when it split from its parent
organisation. The parent organisation’s heritage extended to the mid 1950’s. In the
second half of the 20th century it had a reputation as a highly regarded contractor in
major engineering projects and, later, the government high level security sector
(GHLSS). After the split, the CO was primarily a single project GHLSS technology
contractor. Through a process of strategic diversification it acquired complementary
and expansionary resources and grew to become one of Australia’s largest privately
owned diversified companies, delivering products and services to government and
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commercial markets in Australia, the United States, the Pacific and Europe (CO
website).

The CO had, at the time of the research, total assets of approximately A$1 billion,
annual revenues of over A$1 billion and employed 3,500 people (CO Innovation
Speech by Group Managing Director, 2005).

It aimed to build a culture of

innovation: a culture which listened to customers; looked for opportunities; invested
in research and development; encouraged initiative and capitalised on new ideas. It
also claimed to be driven by the challenge of delivering innovative solutions that its
customers valued highly.
4.2.2

Path Dependency Challenges

A “risk averse”, narrowly defined customer driven innovation culture
When the CO was formed it was a major GHLSS contractor with a long term contract
for the delivery of successive shipping infrastructure projects. The tight control of a
second generation unlisted family owned company with a single GHLSS project
posed significant innovation management challenges. While a desire to devolve
management responsibility to the business unit level was evident, “every time
something slightly goes out of wack they revert to form and want to control
everything” (FBU4).

These path dependency challenges were encapsulated in the following quotation:
(the CO) has had one major customer being the government and in particular,
the (GHLSS) …(P)laying to that customer’s needs… sets a certain culture..., a
narrow mindedness all of which typically is not the sort of characteristics you
are going to look for in encouraging innovation. The (GHLSS)…tends to be
hugely conservative, averse to risk.…(O)ur people tend to be therefore
conservative and averse to risk, both of which mitigate against having highly
creative, innovative minds and highly creative innovative solutions (Cor1).
Knowledge and resource constrained innovation
The CO’s key capabilities (project management and system integration for major
GHLSS infrastructure projects) were embedded in the management of major long
term and highly technical and technology intensive projects, primarily for the
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GHLSS. These capabilities led to the organisation having a reputation for completing
projects on-time and on-budget (FBU5, SBU6, SBU2, Cor1).

The financial

imperatives from these projects resulted in a focus on a trilogy of fiscal measures
(profit, cashflow and economic value add) without significant recognition of the
value of intangible assets, and in particular, knowledge and intellectual property.
Senior management in the CO regarded key issues pertaining to innovation, such as
knowledge capture and sharing, as “overhead intensive activities” and so relegated
them in importance (FBU5, Cor1, Cor6, Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise
Location and Technology Transfer in the CO, 2005). Staff were required to “stay
focused on the hole in front of them” and “were not permitted to look outside of the
project to see and react to what (was) on the horizon or even to help and learn from
people in adjacent trenches” (Cor1). Activities which might be innovative and could
result in cheaper, superior or more expeditious client outcomes were generally
ignored (FBU5).

The CO had wide ranging technical skills (engineering for a broad variety of major
GHLSS infrastructure projects, system design, software design and implementation,
IT security) which enabled it to win GHLSS and Government infrastructure contracts
for technology and technical products. As a high proportion of its staff were highly
skilled engineers developing technical solutions, they played a dominant role in
ensuring that the technical paradigm was the lens through which the world was
viewed. While a technical mindset was essential for innovation, it provided a filter
which either excluded or minimised the importance of other relevant information
(Cor1, TBU3, TBU4). Knowledge sharing within the CO was not a cultural norm
with knowledge lost because “people won’t share it”. The attitude was “I can’t tell
you that because you’ll know as much as I do” induced by the “fear that knowledge
sharing will put them out of a job” (Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise
Location and Technology Transfer in the CO, 2005). In an audit of its knowledge
management practices the CO was described as a “knowledge intensive organisation
which lack(ed) the culture, process and infrastructure to satisfy its knowledge needs”
(Knowledge Management Institute 2002). Where knowledge sharing did take place,
it was carried out by passionate knowledge workers “as subversive activities in spite
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of management” (Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise Location and Technology
Transfer in the CO, 2005).
Organisational knowledge generated by projects was primarily technical or
engineering based. Knowledge was regarded as project related and not maintained at
business unit or organisational level.

It was constrained in project silos within

business units with the resultant “reinvention of the wheel” within different silos,
“group think” and lost opportunities for collaboration and creativity, and, therefore,
innovation (ibid., Cor4). This in turn led to substantial rework to develop processes
and practices and to recreate engineering knowledge that existed elsewhere in the
organisation but which could not readily be discovered in a timely manner (Cor6).
Knowledge was also lost because of the culture of blame which resulted in high staff
turnover in critical knowledge areas.

Blame oriented, silo thinking mindset
The CO’s culture had three layers which originated in the CO’s predecessor: firstly,
an operationalisation culture responsible for the delivery and production of key
assets; secondly, an engineering culture responsible for the engineering design of
infrastructure assets; and thirdly, an executive culture (FBU4, FBU6, TBU1, SBU1).
The engineering culture was characterised by “problem oriented knowledge
workers…focused on delivering acceptable products to their customers” with those in
executive management preoccupied with “increasing short term shareholder-added
value” (Cor4) at the expense of longer term objectives such as innovation.

The tight management style resulted in a high turnover of line managers.
Unsuccessful innovation attracted the “blame game” with “(h)uge recriminations,
beating of chests” (FBU2/FBU5). “Line managers were generally hired from outside
the organisation, often without (GHLSS) experience but rarely given an opportunity
to learn from their mistakes - one strike and they were out” (Cor4). This blame
orientation fostered a conservative, compliant, risk averse culture which discouraged
innovation within the CO and innovation collaboration between business units.
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With the acquisition and development of new business units came a silo mentality.
Business units had different cultures (Cor1), competing business objectives and
sometimes, unknowingly, competed for the same tender with different alliance
partners (FBU1, TBU4, SBU5). Most of the business units wanted “to stick with
business within their own units and this resulted in conventional and conforming
behaviour. The people who tried and go cross business units were not in the main
encouraged” (Cor1). In addition, there were structural impediments to cross-business
unit collaboration and innovation.

The impact of this silo thinking mentality was expressed as follows:
(W)e don’t encourage people to cross over boundaries. We love the idea of
innovation… but we don’t build up a structure that really respects it or
encourages it, because all of our economic responses for satisfactory
completion are related to our stove pipes and as an organisation, until we can
break that barrier, we’re not going to have significant successes and innovation
outside a single division (FBU1).
4.2.3

Organisational Resources

A strong financial position was one of the CO’s key resources. As one of Australia’s
top 25 privately owned companies it had a low level of gearing. This balance sheet
strength enabled it to diversify its operations from a single GHLSS focused business
unit to eight business units in related and unrelated industries without external
funding or concerns about shareholder reaction or stock market scrutiny (Interview
by national business magazine with the Group Managing Director). The CO was
highly skilled at sourcing resources externally through the acquisition of firms with
complementary or targeted capabilities. Both the First Business Unit (COFBU) and
the Second Business Unit (COSBU) were identified as complementary businesses
and these acquisitions added learning and experience in dealing with GHLSS and
related markets.

While the CO successfully acquired complementary business

entities with appropriate resources, it was less successful in integrating the acquired
resources to maximise their impact within the CO (ibid., FBU1).

Through the technical strength of its workforce and its history of success either on its
own behalf or through its acquired entities, the CO also had a strong partnership with
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the GHLSS Research Organisation (RO). This partnership provided the opportunity
to commercialise technology that either it had developed or had been developed by
others, to develop new GHLSS capabilities and enhance to its innovation capability.
4.2.4

Processes

The CO’s innovation processes were built in a major GHLSS project environment
dominated by a private company command and control executive management
culture. Its associated engineering culture was also developed in this narrow and
highly constrained world. With its diversification into both GHLSS and non GHLSS
arenas the CO became an amalgam of originally independent business units.
Consequently, innovation was inhibited as there was little commonality of
engineering documentation, technologies, systems or processes, even where the
systems or processes were meeting similar business requirements (Cor1, FBU4).

Innovation management processes
In an innovation presentation the Managing Director stated that “innovation is
integral to our approach to business, our organisational goals, our passion, our culture
and is viewed as our fundamental means of differentiation from our competitors” (CO
Innovation Speech by Group Managing Director, 2005). However, he recognised that
there was a “gap between understanding innovation, and actually identifying it and
turning it into a business proposition”.

While there was a strong management

commitment to innovation as an organisation-wide practice there was a significant
disconnect between what was espoused and actual practice.

The CO had no

innovation strategy and “no processes or platforms for employees to share knowledge
across (business unit) silos” or geographic locations within the same business unit
(Report on Knowledge Sharing, Expertise Location and Technology Transfer in the
CO, 2005). In addition, the level of control and micro management impacted on the
organisation’s innovation propensity by constraining freedom of thought, freedom of
interaction across the business and freedom of action (Cor1).

The Managing Director also recognised that “innovation is driven by culture, and the
ability to implement” and that this could be achieved by harnessing the creative
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power of its people and encouraging them to be “opportunistic entrepreneurs who are
constantly looking for new ways of doing business” (CO Innovation Speech by
Group Managing Director, 2005). Despite the General Manager’s own warning that
corporate leadership should “ever be on guard to ensure that this corporation itself
does not become one of the biggest barriers to innovative thought and action” (ibid.),
there was, amongst the interviewees, an overwhelming sense of frustration of the
unrealised innovation potential of the firm due to the ubiquitous knowledge,
structural and business barriers (Cor1, Cor4, FBU5, SBU4, TBU1).

Myopic customer understanding
The single GHLSS client orientation led to the CO having a limited understanding of
customer relationship management and of customer value drivers. One major bid
was lost because the CO “told the customer what it considered they should have,
rather than bidding on what the customer asked for” (Cor4).

Many bids were

impaired because “of inefficiencies resulting from the failure of the command and
control culture to understand time-savings and other benefits to be gained from
effective content management technologies and wouldn't listen when these were
offered. The resultant effect, in responding to tenders, was crisis management rather
than knowledge management” (Cor4). This distance from customers focused the
CO’s initial innovation attempts on technology innovation due to the absence of an
intimate knowledge of customer drivers.
4.2.5

Conclusion

While the CO exercised its leveraging capabilities through the acquisition of many
companies, it did not develop an effective integration capability. There was little
recognition of where the congruencies and complementarities existed across the firm
and limited encouragement for business units to pool their skills and resources with
those of other business units or encouragement of cross-divisional linkages or
interactions with clients to address existing problems or enhance innovation
throughout the organisation.
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The innovation capability will now be analysed within three business units of the CO
to identify the existence of organisational preconditions supporting the innovation
capability. The analysis will initially be based on the framework that emerged from
the literature review. Evidence of other components and interrelationships will also
be sought. Emphasis in the analysis will be placed on routines as fundamental units
of capabilities and drivers for change. The framework emerging from the data will be
compared to that emerging from the literature to understand the dynamism that
underpins an innovation capability and the factors which enable or inhibit that
dynamism.
4.3

The First Business Unit (COFBU)

4.3.1

Introduction 4

Through its predecessors, the CO had an unbroken chain of experience in the
Australian aviation industry spanning eight decades. The history of the COFBU can
be traced to a pioneering aircraft manufacturing organisation. It was purchased by the
CO in the late 1990’s as part of its strategy to broaden its high level security sector
capabilities into related high technology areas and to provide a support capability for
the Australian aviation programs.

The COFBU did not have an innovation strategy or a disciplined repeatable
innovation process (FBU1-5) with innovation being described as ad hoc or happening
unofficially (FBU1, FBU5). The innovation which transpired occurred “because
individuals (found ways) to carry out innovation” (FBU1) or because “(w)e’re
innovative by definition – we’re engineers” (FBU5). Despite the absence of an
innovation strategy, the COFBU encouraged innovation indirectly with innovation
solving specific problems within the context of a project (FBU4, FBU5).

4

The notes inserted in the text indicate where preconditions and components from the case have occurred. The
multiple notes supported the various linkages between preconditions and components in each OIC framework.
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In 2003 the COFBU’s financial performance was unacceptable as one of its acquired
businesses had many poorly performing contracts and its business processes and
procedures were inadequate to run the business effectively.

The COFBU’s

performance was so poor that the CO’s management directed that it be closed.
However, the COFBU’s management argued that it could be turned around by
adopting a new strategic posture and business model (FBU4).

The management of the COFBU recognised that while “history matters” it could not
guarantee its survival and that unless substantive changes were made to the business
focus (called the business model by the COFBU) the business could fail in the short
term. The following two subsections (4.3.2 and 4.3.3) outline the development of the
OIC preconditions within the COFBU and the development of the dimensions of the
capability supported by those preconditions.
4.3.2

Development of the OIC Preconditions

4.3.2.1 Transforming the Business Model through Strategic Entrepreneurship
The COFBU management perceived that with rising manufacturing costs, aircraft
would be purchased from overseas and then fitted to Australian requirements. Its
capabilities would, therefore, not be aligned with the new business environment and
consequently market demand for its services would be low. The strength of this
threat resulted in a decision to retire its aircraft manufacturing capability and so the
challenge which confronted the COFBU was how to maximise revenue from its
capabilities within the Australian aerospace industry.

To identify new opportunities the COFBU looked
beyond its narrow path dependent search horizons
and

problem

solving

competencies.

After

• Strategic entrepreneurship
• Innovation culture – Innovation
leadership
• Innovation pervasiveness – Strategic
innovation (new business model)

gathering and filtering market and competitive
intelligence from inside the firm and across the world, it peered through the fog of
uncertainty and adopted a strategy implemented by a national overseas technology
firm (FBU4). The focus of its new business model was on through-life support
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contracts for the Australian GHLSS aerospace industry as these contracts generated
10 to 20 times the revenue that could be achieved from manufacturing aircraft
(FBU4). For the COFBU, through-life support meant an integrated approach to
ensuring that a major industry infrastructure program such as a fleet of aircraft or
helicopters were supported during their operations5.

The through-life support contracts would be

• Innovation absorptive capacity

secured through the capability acquired from partnering with original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) of aircrafts and aircraft systems without representation in
Australia. These OEMs were usually the suppliers of the major infrastructure to the
GHLSS (FBU4). While the customer would be the same, it would be offered a new
and distinct suite of services.

To achieve this vision, the COFBU proactively
developed three strategies. Firstly, it diverted from
its aircraft manufacturer path and began to develop
new capabilities such as the through-life support
management

capability,

alliance

building

capability and partner specific learning capability.

• Strategic entrepreneurship –
Business model design &
ecosystem shaping
• Alliance building capability –
strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment
• Alliance learning
• Innovation pervasiveness –
Strategic innovation – new
business model

The General Manager said, “In our business,
innovation is improvement in the business model itself. Transforming the business
from what it was before to what it is today” (FBU4). To secure contracts, the
COFBU developed strategic alliances which redefined its ecosystem, accelerated its
capability development and differentiated it from its Australian competitors which
were generally subsidiaries of overseas OEMs.

Secondly, the COFBU became “an industry trend setter” and, building on its
commitment to through-life support, positioned itself as a high level system integrator
with the capacity to act as a project manager for system integration as well as manage

5

While major infrastructure projects include fleets of aircraft, fleets of helicopters or the like this dissertation will
refer to fleets of aircraft for illustrative purposes.
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other lower level or specialist system integrators (FBU6). The third strategic choice
was building new aircraft industry capability.

Capability gaps were generally

identified through industry analysis and engaging intimately with customers to
identify their technical and business needs. Once a capability gap was identified
which aligned with the FBU’s strategy it sought to build that capability - “We like to
develop capability. We prefer to sell capability rather just ideas on paper. Usually
we have to say, ‘This is what we could do if we did this…’ but now we can say, ‘This
is what we can do now’. It’s a much more saleable product” (FBU2, emphasis
added).

This emphasis on capability was essential to the decision to focus on

through-life support and the development of strategic alliances with OEMs.
4.3.2.2 Enhancing Learning and Knowledge through Boundary Spanning
Addressing the silo mentality
A major structural innovation within the COFBU
was the introduction of domains6 to facilitate the
transfer, and transformation of knowledge across
silos.

• Strategic entrepreneurship –
Proactiveness, Entrepreneurial
intentionality
• Innovation culture – Innovation
leadership

In the aviation industry an aircraft

manufacturer was required to comply with a regulatory framework for technical
airworthiness management.

The regulatory framework required two distinct but

related competencies: a competency to review aerospace work and a competency to
approve the work (FBU1).

As a consequence, silos were created as divisions

operated as their own fiefdoms. The silo mentality within the COFBU was also a
legacy from the CO as staff focused on their “own local or functional imperatives”
and did not cross boundaries (FBU5).

The project centric structure reinforced

narrowly defined responsibilities with staff focused on their own needs irrespective of
the detriment to the COFBU or the CO.

6

For the COFBU the domain was a professional community based on a sphere of expert knowledge e.
g. air vehicle structures and design, avionics, software and project engineering, human factors, or
systems engineering. The domain provided professional training, personal support and technical and
academic stimulation (FBU2, FBU5).
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The management of the COFBU recognised that

• Knowledge sharing structures

the silo mentality was affecting its organisational effectiveness and innovation
potential so it redesigned its business structure, architecture and processes. The open
environment and the flat structure facilitated the flow of knowledge up and down the
COFBU and helped minimise the impact of information decay. In addition, the
COFBU had engineering management and domain leader meetings that were
designed to share challenges, problems and solutions which were then communicated
to the domains (FBU2). As a result, the language began to change with senior
management speaking of the implications of activities to the COFBU rather than
“engineering is doing something” or “commercial is doing its little bit in its own
corner” (FBU5).

As a further part of its strategy to promote
boundary

spanning

behaviour

the

COFBU

established “a domain structure as well as a project
structure which (made) it very easy to be flexible
with your manpower” (FBU2). While domains had

• Organisational learning capability Commercially focused boundary
behaviours (Generative learning,
Unlearning)
• Innovation culture - Increasing
employee engagement,
Collaboration
• Knowledge sharing structures –
Innovation experience/memory

existed in an ad hoc manner, they were formalised as
part of the COFBU structural re-design to stress their importance and to achieve its
“fairly aggressive desire and ambition to bring in change to move to best business
practice” (FBU5). This strategy provided a matrix approach to resource management
with the projects, the “vertical stove pipes”, and with the domains, the horizontal tier,
providing the skill sets in engineering or technology (FBU2).

In the domains,

engineers “have their Alma Marta within the organisation which looks after their
training, professional development, fun time… along with professional development”
(FBU2). This resourcing strategy ensured that experience, excellence and expertise
were spread across the COFBU rather than concentrated in a domain or project.
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The Human Factors Domain (HFD) – integrating knowledge and accelerating
innovation
When the COFBU management identified one

• Innovation culture - Increasing
employee engagement, Collaboration

capability gap within the Australian aerospace
market it established the HFD. The HFD had a defined approach to innovation, and,
in particular, “quantum leap innovation” (FBU1), and developed its own innovation
capability and innovation routines.

With increased complexity in the business

environment, the HFD was established as a permanent team based on industrial
democracy principles. It became a “self organising organism” as staff were involved
in setting the terms and conditions of their work and regularly participated in
interdisciplinary work where the team members were empowered to contribute to
defining the scope of their roles within the limit of what they, as individuals,
considered comfortable. There was also a focus on the empowerment of “individuals
and the team substructures academically, intellectually and humanly” and this
empowerment facilitated the flow and integration of knowledge (FBU6).

As the COFBU was an engineering organisation, most of its professional staff were
engineers. However, the HFD team was comprised of people who were not, in most
cases, “traditional engineers” and people “you wouldn’t necessarily put together”
(FBU1). The domain principal explained the unique combination of people and, in
doing so, broadened the traditional definition of an engineer within the HFD:
… there’s probably only one person who started off as an engineer. All of us
have Master’s and PhD’s in relevant areas and are really part of the engineering
area. If you take engineering, as anybody outside Australia would, to be a
scientist who works in the real world and comes up with real world solutions,
we’re all engineers. But we include people who don’t have “traditional”
engineering qualifications. I was originally a medico: there are people who were
originally psychologists, there are people who were originally working in
kinestheseology, there are all sorts of people - one was a design engineer so on.
And we put them all together, and they work together as a team (FBU1).
Even though most team members were participating
actively in one or more projects the HFD team met

• Organisational learning capability Commercially focused boundary
behaviours (Generative learning,
Unlearning)

weekly where open discussion about methodologies,
and project challenges and solutions took place. These meeting were also dedicated
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to learning new skills and processes. This regular interaction continually challenged
the status quo and encouraged effective problem solving, cross-fertilisation of ideas,
knowledge sharing and innovation.

The

team

operated

as

a

pseudo-academic

department to keep informed of the latest thinking.
The challenging intellectual environment facilitated

• Innovation absorptive capacity –
Externally focused innovation
learning structures and processes;
Embedded resource sharing and
external collaboration

the integration and transformation of knowledge irrespective of its source. Domain
members built networks and social capital within the academic community and with
complementary partners. They actively participated in academic forums and made
thought leadership presentations.

The team members respected each others’

intellectual capacities, conducted knowledge generating research projects and shared
honours level literature reviews on pertinent research (FBU1).

This rigorous

intellectual, yet practical, environment was the HFD approach to prepare “for our
future where were developing our own toolkit of tools and techniques which we’re
defining for ourselves” (FBU6).

The driver for innovation in the HFD team was
selecting team members on the basis of their ability
to cross boundaries. Innovation occurred “because

• Organisational learning capability –
Commercially focused boundary
spanning behaviours (Generative
learning, Unlearning)
• Innovation culture – Innovation
leadership

boundaries have been crossed,…when you take
ideas beyond where you’re starting from” (FBU1).

In the HFD team, crossing

boundaries enabled staff to “take a systems approach to the world around them in a
way that very few people actually know how to do” (FBU6) and this provided a
broader view of what was salient to problem identification and resolution and avoided
taking a simplistic view of causality.

One of the key benefits of the HFD was “that often
people learn something in a different domain, a
different area, and apply it in a new way” (FBU1).

• Organisational learning capability –
Commercially focused boundary
spanning behaviours (Generative
learning)
• Knowledge sharing structures

In a typical project, the team comprised representatives from various functions. If a
problem arose the representative with the most appropriate functional expertise would
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be asked to solve the problem irrespective of their capability to do so. Under the
HFD approach, the domain contact person would identify the most appropriate
domain staff member to address the particular problem (FBU6), thus enhancing the
innovation capability.
4.3.2.3 Strategic Alliances – Rapid Capability Acquisition to support Innovation
With the decision to focus on through-life support,
it was essential that the COFBU develop strategic
alliances with aircraft and aviation supplier OEMs
(FBU4) and reach beyond its organisational

• Alliance building capability –
Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment
• Strategic entrepreneurship
• Innovation pervasiveness - Strategic
innovation (new business model)

boundaries to access new resources and develop new capabilities. The aim was that
within three years the COFBU would be different to its competitors because “we’ll
have a much more diverse aerospace business with strong links back into those
OEMs” (FBU4).

The development of alliances with aircraft manufacturers and

suppliers would provide preferential access to expertise and intellectual property
which would enable the COFBU to be a centre of excellence in the South Pacific
Region for an OEM.

The benefit of establishing strategic partnerships
was that the COFBU would rapidly build
capability and achieve heterogeneity in the

• Alliance building capability –
creation of idiosyncratic alliance
resources and capabilities
• Innovation absorptive capacity

technical fitness of its capabilities as most of its “aerospace competitors …(were)
subsidiaries of overseas (OEMs) so their product portfolio (was) limited (to) …what
their parent produces or deals in” (FBU4). This capability heterogeneity and the
barriers to imitation and substitution through multiple exclusive strategic partnerships
enabled the COFBU to achieve a competitive advantage. The COFBU established
key relationships with OEMs from the inception of the new focus to the time of the
research.

This enhanced its alliance building capability and, consequently, its

innovation capability.
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A strategic alliance was also formed by the CO with
the RO which provided the COFBU with the
opportunity to conduct contract research and
development (FBU2). While this approach provided

• Knowledge sharing structures
Innovation experience/memory
• Strategic entrepreneurship
• Innovation absorptive capacity
• Alliance building capability –
Alliance learning

the RO with valuable research, intellectual property and enhanced GHLSS capability,
it was a mutually beneficial arrangement as it also enabled the COFBU to develop
new or complementary competencies and deep partner-specific learning. Through the
strength of relationships developed and innovation demonstrated by the HFD, the
COFBU positioned itself strategically as a trusted adviser and source of problem
solving expertise for the RO (FBU4) so that “when the government has a question
they ask (the RO), and when (the RO) can’t answer it they come to us” (FBU1).
4.3.2.4 Capability Life Cycle
The implications for the business model transformation are reflected in the capability
lifecycle in Figure 4.1 below. This diagram depicts the evolutionary path of the
through-life support capability. The COFBU’s trigger of change was the realisation
that with the GHLSS’s move to acquire aircraft from overseas, its manufacturing
capability would need to be retired. The decision to change the business model is
reflected in the development of the through-life support capability supported by the
COFBU’s regenerative and renewing dynamic capabilities.

Level of
capability per
unit of activity

Trigger of
Change

Retirement of Aircraft
manufacturing capability
Commencement of throughlife support capability
supported by new and
renewed capabilities

Cumulative
Amount of
Activity

Aircraft manufacturing capability
Through-life Support capability

Figure 4.1 Capability Life Cycles within COFBU
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4.3.3

Development of Dimensions of the OIC supported by the Preconditions

4.3.3.1 Innovation Pervasiveness
With the change in business model came the
realisation that the COFBU would need to redesign
its strategic architecture and that its integration and
co-ordination
transformed.

routines

would

need

to

be

• Innovation pervasiveness – Multi
innovation focus (process), Strategic
innovation (new business model)
• Organisational learning capability –
Commercially focused boundary
spanning behaviours (Generative
learning)

Four significant innovation themes

were implemented. Firstly, the COFBU developed new business process architecture
within the context of external and self-imposed constraints (FBU5). In addition, there
was an emphasis on increasing innovation into the design process through elegant
design and rapid prototyping (FBU2, see section 4.3.3.2). The second innovation
driver was the need to solve problems which arose within projects. Through-life
support contracts for aircraft fleets offered sporadic problem solving opportunities
which had long run cost implications (FBU5). The staff’s passionate problem solving
propensity was encapsulated by the General Manager:
The guys go off and say, “How are we going to solve this?”…They will not lie
down and die. We have some excellent people who say, “We can find a solution
for this”. Our guys are very good at it. We have found solutions in some
instances for some of our overseas partners where they just didn’t know what to
do (FBU4).
The COFBU recognised that “ad hoc problem
solving” was not a capability.
introduction
solving

of

domains,

capabilities

Through the

embedded problem

and

• Knowledge sharing structures –
Innovation memory/experience
• Innovation absorptive capacity –
Transformative and exploitative
learning

cross-functional

interaction, the COFBU focused on accelerating its managerial cognition capability
by challenging the assumptions and mental models upon which prior path-dependent
decisions had been made. The third area of innovation activity was in research and
development where activities were limited to those which directly aligned with the
COFBU’s business objectives, met anticipated project needs or built new capability
(FBU5).

Finally, innovation occurred through the reconfiguration of resources

arising from the formal implementation of the domain/project matrix structure.
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With the absence of effective business processes and

• Innovation pervasiveness – Multi
innovation focus (process)

procedures impacting its performance, the COFBU
mapped, streamlined and aligned its business process architecture to its new business
model. “Essentially it is our aim to completely re-do the entire set of process,
policies and procedures of the organisation from top to bottom” to give the COFBU a
business-wide view (FBU5).

One of the key initiatives was to implement the

Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) to integrate its traditionally separate
functions, to continually identify process improvement priorities, to provide guidance
for quality processes and a point of reference for assessing the current processes
(FBU4). However, while the COFBU achieved CMMI level 2, its driver to achieve
level 3 was meeting business and customer needs rather than simply process
improvement (FBU5).
4.3.3.2 Reconfiguration and Integration Capability to support Successful
Innovation
The change from manufacturer to through-life
support business service provider and the delivery

• Innovation pervasiveness - Multi
innovation focus (Product,
Managerial, Process)

of capability required new business, operational and knowledge management models
as the life cycle of an aircraft could extend over 30 years or more. With objectives of
continuous airworthiness and continuous process improvement, the COFBU needed
an intimate understanding of its customer’s operational environment to ensure that
aircraft fleet availability was maximised.

Accordingly, the management of

knowledge within the COFBU was essential to deliver a through-life support program
that satisfied customer expectations. The effective capture, deployment and use of
knowledge would lead to increased innovation resulting in improved airworthiness,
safety and increased availability, profit and employee satisfaction.

Removing obstacles to knowledge sharing and Lessons Learned
Through proactive leadership the COFBU sought a

• Innovation Culture – Innovation
leadership

business model outside of traditional aircraft
manufacturing and its learning boundary (represented by arrow A in Figure 4.2
below). Its boundary spanning extended to functions within domains, within projects,
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between domains, between projects, between business units of the case organisation
and with external alliance partners. Through its new behaviours it developed market
orientation and relationship management dynamic capabilities which would improve
its market sensing, market seizing and learning capabilities (vertical, horizontal,
project and domain) as well as its alliance building capabilities. The COFBU also put
in place structures and processes to learn how to acquire, synthesise and act on
market knowledge better and how to improve their ability to form and maintain
relationships.
Alliance Partner OEMs

A
COFBU’s learning
boundary represented by the
square with the darker outline
Rows within the inner square
represent domains
Columns represent projects
Dotted lines represents
permeable boundaries

Case Organisation

External Partners –
Universities, Research
Organisations,

Aircraft Manufacturing Industry

Figure 4.2 COFBU Boundary Spanning Behaviours
Some subject matter experts were impediments to
sharing expertise but they were replaced with
“those generally younger and more amendable to

• Innovation culture – Increasing
employee engagement, Innovation
leadership, Collaboration
• Knowledge sharing structures –
Innovation experience/memory

change and sharing knowledge” (FBU4). This has resulted in improved knowledge
sharing and ideation for products and innovation. Lunch and learn forums were held
twice every month to facilitate the integration of internal and external knowledge.
Information and learning were shared and ideas presented for discussion and
refinement (FBU2, FBU5). Even though these forums were “in your own time, bring
your own lunch” style of meeting, the COFBU has “a never ending stream of people
coming and attending” (FBU2).
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Lessons from a legacy acquisition provided business
clarity and managerial innovation resulting in the

• Knowledge sharing structures –
Innovation experience/memory

focus on through-life support contracts (FBU4). However, at the project level the
COFBU had a “minimalistic lessons learned process” (FBU5).

Lesson learned

routines were carried out on a project basis with opportunities for improvement and
the avoidance of project errors identified. However, while lessons learned project
reports were generated and shared with middle managers, lessons learned routines
were inconsistently applied within the COFBU (FBU5).

Problem solving and rule breaking as catalysts for innovation
Problem solving, either of a specific challenge or a

• Innovation culture – Increasing
employee engagement

serendipitous project need, was a core capability of
the COFBU. While the entitlement culture encouraged conventional and conforming
behaviour a new cultural paradigm was introduced which no longer accepted the
status quo (FBU4).

The COFBU problem solving capability was
enhanced by staff who encouraged people to

• Organisational learning capability –
Commercially focused boundary
spanning behaviours (Generative
learning, Unlearning)

persistently ask questions and to critically examine
what they did (FBU1, FBU2). A young production manager in a south coast hangar
facility was concerned with the efficiency of his work area. His persistence in asking
“why” questions led to a review of the procedures and the streamlining of the work
practices. His initiative and his unwillingness to accept the status quo led to a
reduced turnaround time for the project, a much happier workforce and a delighted
customer (FBU2).

Elegant Design and Rapid Prototyping
One of the key routines that the COFBU developed

• Innovation pervasiveness - Multi
innovation focus (Process)

was called “elegant design”. This process ensured
that the object designed not only achieved what it was intended to do but also did it
“efficiently and effectively” taking into account the environment in which the
equipment would be used, the materials from which it would be manufactured and
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how it would be maintained (FBU1, FBU2).

Because of its emphasis on the

integration of multiple disciplines, elegant design required engineers to view the
design brief holistically.

It required the ability to see relationships between

seemingly unrelated fields, to detect patterns of activity and to achieve innovation by
combining elements in new ways. Accordingly, “when you start thinking about what
elegant design is, then you’re going to actually deal with innovation in one way or
another, be it sequential or be it quantum leap” (FBU1).

The HFD team also established a rapid prototype

• Innovation pervasiveness - Multi
innovation focus (Process)

routine to accelerate and reduce the cost of
development. Typically, most aerospace designs comprised highly developed and
detailed plans and specification even though a prototype had not been developed to
test the design. The high workload and cost involved in developing the plans and
specifications encouraged personal and economic attachments to the plans. There
was consequently a reluctance to change plans even though the change would have
produced a superior outcome. The importance of rapid prototyping to “getting it right
the first time” (FBU4) is stated below:
In a rapid prototype environment, what you’re doing is you’re actually
developing and testing your prototypes, prior to putting them on paper. You’re
keeping a record, but the record isn’t a paper record, it’s an electronic and
visual, and so we’re actually able to significantly evaluate the success of a
product, in the lab, prior to it officially being designed. And that of course
means that we’re nearly there by the time we’ve actually put in down onto
paper. And we’re nearly there in a way that succeeds in engineering terms.
(FBU1)
4.3.3.3 Creating a Dynamic Innovation Culture
The General Manager said “the biggest challenge”
was to change the culture from an entitlement

• Innovation culture - Innovation
leadership, Increasing employee
engagement

engineering culture with an orientation towards analysis, the centrality of technology
and following institutional rules to a pragmatic performance based culture (FBU1,
FBU4). Many of its staff came from the GHLSS and had an expectation that they
had a job for life. Others from the predecessor organisation had the same expectation
because of its entrenched hierarchical career path which emphasised “training and

101

developing people over 30 to 40 years” (FBU6). The staff were accustomed to highly
formalised rules with detailed procedures leaving little opportunity for initiative. The
narrowly defined job descriptions meant that there were low levels of responsibility
resulting in staff only doing the minimum work. People also tended to be risk averse
with creativity and innovation sacrificed for security and consistency (FBU4).

The culture was “keep working until you get the job
done” irrespective of the contract requirement or

• Innovation culture - Increasing
employee engagement, Innovation
leadership, Performance results based
culture

commerciality of such an approach, and “all care,
no responsibility” with a strong blame element (FBU4). There was “a tendency with
our engineers who like to be perfectionists to just keep doing things and we’ve found
that we’ve moved completely away from the (contract) baseline…”. “We had to
change the culture to a ‘can do’ approach”, “a results oriented culture, rather than a
hard work culture, where people are held accountable…” The General Manager
consistently built trust by demonstrating his own accountability: “If I’ve said “I’ll do
this for you”, I’ve done it...That’s when people give you their trust” (FBU4).

The need to ensure that the business not only survived but was well positioned for
growth resulted in a new approach. As the General Manager said, “we’ve been able
to change that pace. We operate as if there’s no tomorrow and operate as though
we’re constantly in a recession” (FBU4). The transition to a performance culture was
achieved by ensuring that the staff of the organisation supported the corporate vision.
“(I)f we found people who weren’t going to change we helped them to move on. So
we’ve brought in quite a new regime now. It has been done quite intelligently as we
didn’t just throw the baby out with the bath water” and “we captured intellectual
property that those leaving held”. In recruiting new employees, the COFBU targeted
staff who had a record of achievement and who had a “can do” attitude, “Not people
who just say, ‘We work bloody hard’” (FBU4).

In the COFBU’s culture there was a lack of
decision

making

capability

and

• Innovation culture - Increasing
employee engagement

initiative,

particularly in middle management, as the price of failure was blame and rejection.
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In the new culture greater accountability was balanced by increased empowerment
with staff being “given a fairly free hand to go off and do things within the
constraints of our contractual obligations. So no one’s stopped from doing things” as
long as its “ethical and in the interests of the company and shareholder” (FBU4).
Leadership training and the introduction of improved business systems provided
better and increased information for decision making. An incentive scheme, aligned
to performance, was introduced for the management team with rewards for achieving
agreed business results (FBU4).

One of the other major changes to promote

• Innovation culture - Increasing
employee engagement, No blame

innovation was the acceptance of failure. While
the CO had a blame culture which had infected most of its business units, the COFBU
recognised that “if you make a decision you are either right or wrong. So we don’t
punish those who make wrong decisions. My view is that if you deliberately break
the rules twice then that’s trouble. I’m sure there’s an exception but we don’t want to
make rules to control the minority, the 2%” (FBU4). The capability extended to,
where appropriate, abandoning existing rules and finding or developing an alternative
practice or process which was better than the existing practices and processes
(FBU1).

Another factor which helped change in culture was
the change of premises.

The previous “hard

• Innovation culture – Innovation
leadership, Increasing employee
engagement

work/long hours” culture was aided by the availability of free parking. The move to
the new premises facilitated a “results oriented culture” as “people plan their work
better and catch the train. So if you walk down at 6.30 or 7.00 pm you can shoot a
cannon and no one’s there. But I think they have a better work/life balance” (FBU4).

The former culture was characterised by a lack of vitality, energy and passion. The
General Manager stated that when he first toured the COFBU there were “just staring
eyes and as you keep walking, they keep following you around. When I told them
these were the things we were going to do they just looked at you in disbelief”. As a
result of the changes, employee engagement rose from 25% to 44% (in an eighteen
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month period) and there is a lot more life and energy as “people feel they can do a lot
of things that they thought previously they couldn’t do” (FBU4, words in parenthesis
added). The new life that emerged in the COFBU stimulated innovation as staff were
passionate about their work and encouraged “to practice their calling i.e. allowing
engineers to engineer” (FBU2). This understanding of the people-centeredness of
organisational performance as well as innovation has borne results as customers can
now see a visible change in the COFBU’s operations and this has, in turn, created
stronger customer relationships (FBU4).
4.3.3.4 Innovation Absorptive Capacity and Knowledge-sharing Structures
As the new business model was based upon intimate engagement with overseas
OEMs, the innovation absorptive capacity is inextricably linked to the externally
focused boundary spanning behaviours which resulted in the acquisition of
complementary knowledge and to the alliance building capability (see sections
4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3).

The knowledge sharing structures (principally the

domain/project matrix structure) have also been described at length in the former
section.
4.3.4

Conclusion

With the GHLSS sourcing aircraft from overseas the COFBU changed the primary
focus of its business model to seek leadership in through-life support for the
Australian GHLSS aerospace industry. In this major organisational shift, the COFBU
recognised that it was not trapped by its history and that it could shape its business by
investment choices and identifying and implementing new strategic priorities. The
key to the COFBU’s success was the ability of its entrepreneurial management to
perceive the discontinuity between its former and new environments and the
identification and development of appropriate dynamic capabilities to calibrate the
new business model to the new environment.
The three COFBU’s OIC preconditions – strategic entrepreneurship, organisational
learning capability and alliance building capability – are depicted in Figure 4.3
together with the underpinning constructs.

The preconditions were essential
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antecedents for the formation of the COFBU’s OIC. The framework demonstrates
the centrality of strategic entrepreneurship as it provided the impetus for the
organisational learning and alliance building capabilities as well as focusing the
COFBU’s attention on acquiring relevant external knowledge. These capabilities are
dynamic as they support continual learning as well as changes in the processes,
behaviours and structures that define them.

They facilitated multi-directional

learning - vertical, horizontal, project and domain – and accelerated the development
of absorptive capacity routines for the acquisition of alliance partner knowledge as
well as enhancing the breadth and depth of firm and individual absorptive capacity.
Adaptive learning
Organisational learning
capability

Commercially focused boundary
spanning behaviours leading to
adaptive learning, generative
learning and unlearning (See
Figure 4.2)
Business model design &
ecosystem shaping
Entrepreneurial intentionality

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk taking propensity
Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment

Alliance building
capability

Alliance learning
Creation of idiosyncratic alliance
resources and capabilities

Figure 4.3 COFBU Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs
Strategic entrepreneurship is linked to the business unit’s organisational learning
capability through the COFBU’s extensive search process to identify alternative
business models and the dynamic learning in the iterative process of information
gathering, information processing and further information search.

The primarily

outward focus of the inquiry and its focus on strategic alliances provided the linkage
to the alliance building capability and innovation absorptive capacity. The business
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model transformation involved strategic alliance partner identification, assessment
and the subsequent creation of idiosyncratic alliance resources and learning
capabilities.

The breadth of the business transformation created the need for

proactive decisions in relation to innovation pervasiveness and the need for the
development of knowledge sharing structures to ensure that acquired knowledge was
shared, transformed and exploited.

The external focus of the alliance building capability stimulates and supports the
innovation absorptive capacity component through alliance learning.

Building

innovation knowledge was the primary driver for the establishment of the
relationship, and learning how to facilitate this knowledge flow fed back into
reconfiguration of the business unit’s organisational learning capability. The four
components of the OIC framework - innovation absorptive capacity, innovation
pervasiveness, knowledge-sharing structures and innovation culture – are depicted in
Figure 4.4 (see page 107).

Innovation within the COFBU was pervasive and this component is linked to all three
preconditions.

Innovation was driven through strategic entrepreneurship and

captured within the new business model.

As a consequence of a dynamically

changing organisational learning capability, new business-wide process architectures
were developed, and the project/domain matrix structure established to ensure that
knowledge within the organisational memory was shared and developed. Innovation
pervasiveness also expanded as a consequence of increasing the number of external
partners with whom it shared, acquired and developed complementary knowledge
(i.e. its alliance building capability).

Finally, components of the unit’s innovation absorptive capacity and knowledgesharing structures emerged as a consequence of the dynamic properties of the
COFBU’s organisational learning capability. These dynamic changes were driven by
the strategic objective to acquire external knowledge from alliance and other
complementary knowledge owners, and to capture and reuse the innovation
knowledge and experience to facilitate learning and optimise the sharing of that
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knowledge. Underpinning the organisational learning capability was the business
unit’s innovation culture.

Through innovation leadership a performance-based

collaborative culture was introduced, and this provided the impetus to challenge the
status quo and for the acceptance of failure in innovation without blame.

Preconditions

OIC Components
Externally focused
innovation learning
structures and processes

Organisational learning
capability

Innovation absorptive
capacity

Embedded resource sharing
external collaboration
Transformative and
exploitative learning

Innovation
pervasiveness
Strategic
entrepreneurship

Multi-innovation focus –
Product, Managerial, Process

Strategic innovation – new
business model
Innovation experience
Knowledge-sharing
structures

Innovation memory
Innovation leadership

Alliance building
capability

Collaboration

Innovation culture

No blame
Increasing employee
engagement
Performance results based
culture

Figure 4.4 Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from
the First Case Analysis
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4.4

The Second Business Unit (COSBU)

4.4.1

Introduction

This embedded case study focuses on the transformation of the COSBU from an
enterprise with primarily one large GHLSS client to a business which was
diversifying its reach in clients and technologies. This expansion into the commercial
sector and other security-conscious Government organisations was accelerated by the
increased emphasis on national security following the events of September 11. The
transformation from entrepreneurial adhocracy to strategic entrepreneurship ensured
that innovation was at the forefront of the COSBU’s operations, and confirmed
strategic entrepreneurship as a precondition driving innovation capability change.
The following two subsections (4.4.2 and 4.4.3) will outline the development of the
OIC preconditions within the second business unit and the development of the
dimensions of the capability supported by those preconditions.
4.4.2

Development of the Preconditions

4.4.2.1 Transforming the Business Focus through Strategic Entrepreneurship
With the changing focus of its major client to the
engagement of overseas contractors, and with

• Strategic entrepreneurship – Business
model design
• Business-wide strategic innovation –
new business model

limited project and tender opportunities, the
COSBU’s management reviewed its strategy and developed a Strategic Technology
Roadmap (the Roadmap) to provide it with a new direction.

The COSBU’s

leadership understood the impact of path dependencies by recognising that its
position was the result of its formation as an entrepreneurial engineering firm (the
original firm) with primarily a GHLSS client base and its subsequent purchase by the
CO. As the General Manager stated: “It was important for us not to let our past
successes limit our future approach to innovation. Don’t let the past get in your
eyes!!” (SBU8). The COSBU’s new strategies demonstrated that “history matters”
and that changes were required to its organisational routines to ensure that the
constraints of its history and the investments that its predecessors had made in its
repertoire of routines did not impair its innovation capability.
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Following its scanning of the environment and the assessment of changing
opportunities and competitors, the COSBU took definitive steps to broaden its
historical path of selling primarily to the GHLSS. It exercised its integration and coordination capabilities to expand its focus to the sector of the (commercial high level
security sector) CHLSS which had similar needs to the COSBU’s existing client base
(SBU1).

The new strategy had three planning horizons. The

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial intentionality

major third horizon objective was for non GHLSS
revenues to match revenues from GHLSS sources. In the strategy, management
recognised the need to place innovation at the forefront of its operations and, in doing
so, provided a clear reference point for all decisions. This common understanding
facilitated better communication and strategic alignment across the lines of business,
disparate teams and organisational boundaries.

The Roadmap identified key

synergies within and across the lines of business, interdependencies in regard to
technologies and capabilities, and gaps in COSBU capabilities and within the product
and solution portfolio.

The Strategic Technology Roadmap provided

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial discipline

strategic innovation practices to move the COSBU
from its ad hoc entrepreneurialism and its project oriented GHLSS dominated path
dependency (SBU4). The aim was to provide deep co-specialisation between parts of
the COSBU innovation system and tight co-ordination across sub-systems. These
practices included a portfolio approach to product and capability development, a
product pipeline framework with a Stage-Gate based process, management
commitment to the provision of innovation resources and a cultural shift towards a
product mindset. The COSBU also implemented strategies to calibrate the strategic
goals with the organisational structure and routines pertaining to idea capture and
management and the personnel required to ensure the goals were achieved (SBU1).
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4.4.2.2 Achieving Entrepreneurial Fitness through Strategic Entrepreneurship
One of the key approaches adopted by the COSBU
to reshape its path dependencies was to improve its
entrepreneurial fitness. Its management recognised

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial intentionality,
Entrepreneurial discipline,
Proactiveness
• Innovation culture - Facilitative
leadership

the need to be more strategic in order to achieve the
value enhancing orchestration of assets within its own boundaries, and between
enterprises and other institutions within its business ecosystem. The COSBU had an
entrepreneurial philosophy which could be traced to the firm’s founder. He was
technically creative but also understood that research was needed to achieve business
goals (SBU7). However, entrepreneurship was ad hoc and needed discipline and
focus to achieve its business objectives (SBU1, SBU8).

The entrepreneurial philosophy was enhanced by
the firm’s collegiate culture (SBU7, SBU6, SBU5)

• Innovation culture - Facilitative
leadership, Collegiality, No blame
• Strategic entrepreneurship – Risk
taking propensity

which recognised the “people-centredness” of
innovation. It was characterised by the sharing of information, acceptance of failure,
ease of access to management, “working hard, (and) solving difficult problems”
(SBU6). In addition, “you did what you had to do”, “were free to think and put up
ideas” and staff felt comfortable working in “an entrepreneurial environment, where
risks were taken” (SBU5). The open access to management and the “freedom to get
up and walk around, talk to one another” promoted information sharing and also
reduced the impact of information decay (SBU3).

The culture was symbolised by the beer fridge.

The founder was a traditional

engineer where beer was a part of the culture so the fridge became “a meeting place
where guys could just have a beer and sit down around the table and discuss anything
from technical problems to the projects they were working on” (SBU6, SBU1). It
continued to be part of the culture in the COSBU (SBU1).
The imperative for action and the entrepreneurial

• Innovation culture – Facilitative
leadership, No blame

culture in the original firm, was encapsulated in the
frequently quoted maxim -“Seek forgiveness, not permission but don’t be suicidal”
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(SBU1, SBU5, SBU7). This approach was exemplified by the founder’s reliance on
the heroics of individuals and their ability to achieve the right results for the business.
“He gave you a pretty blank canvass…(and the) freedom to bring whatever you
thought was right to the table” and wanted staff to “(g)o out and do things” (SBU7).

The leadership was proactive in focusing the entrepreneurial drive of the COSBU on
strategic and disciplined innovation. The General Manager said:
As leaders we need to be constantly generating, otherwise at best we will sustain
the business at its current level or worse, it will decline. The requirement to
“generate” is intimately linked to the process of innovation and it must become a
core competency throughout the organisation, not just within an R&D group or
isolated within one section of the company. It needs to pervade the way we do
business (SBU1, emphasis added).
The Roadmap provided the analytical framework
for innovation and focused on the COSBU’s

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial discipline
• Systematic innovation – Innovation
Management System

Innovation Management System – ideation, product
evaluation and selection, product development and product commercialisation. The
General Manager recognised that new routines were required to expand absorptive
capacity to effectively and efficiently transfer, translate and transform the new
knowledge acquired from the new relationships formed (see strategy 2 below in
Figure 4.5 on page 112).

In order to “generate” the required innovation,
build on the COSBU’s ad hoc innovation processes
and develop a sustainable competitive advantage,
the COSBU leadership team implemented three
strategies (SBU8). The impact of these strategies

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial discipline,
Proactiveness
• Innovation culture – Facilitative
leadership
• Alliance building capability Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment
• Innovation Absorptive Capacity

on the COSBU’s Innovation Management System is
depicted in Figure 4.5 below.
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Strategy 1
“Create the right innovation environment”
Challenge the status quo, passion for solving
difficult problems, encouragement of risk
taking, lessons learned,
“failing forward”
Innovation learning capability

Organisational Culture (Collegiate)
Innovation Management System

Innovation Ideation

Product Evaluation
and Selection

Product
Development

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

“Form the right Relationships”
Alliance building capability

“successful in strategic focus, project
delivery and product commercialisation”
Strategic entrepreneurship

Product
Commercialisation

Figure 4.5 Innovation Management System Strategy Impact
The first strategy was to create the right environment for innovation (Enhancing the
Innovation Culture section 4.4.3.4). This required a commitment to innovation at the
leadership level and the commitment of time and resources even though immediate
revenue targets were of primary concern. The COSBU appointed a Product and
Innovation Manager with responsibility to manage and champion the innovation
process. The Manager reported to the General Manager and was a member of the
Management Team.

The Roadmap created a shared understanding of the COSBU’s objectives and
accelerated the innovation process through the prioritisation of products and solutions
and the development of capabilities aligned to the Roadmap.

The second key initiative was to form the right relationships with external research
organisations, customers, partners and, where appropriate, with competitors to gain
access to research, intellectual property and complementary knowledge (SBU7)
(Developing an Innovation Absorptive Capacity, section 4.4.3.1). The third strategy,
to be successful in project delivery, product commercialisation and strategic focus
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(this section), recognised “that innovation was ineffective unless it could be
converted to a business outcome” (SBU8).
4.4.2.3 An Organisation-Wide, Generative Learning Capability supporting a
Problem Solving approach to Innovation
The importance of learning to the COSBU can be
readily inferred as its organisational values and

• Innovation learning capability –
Generative learning
• Innovation culture – Facilitative
leadership

problem solving capabilities support a strong
learning orientation (SBU7). One of the key elements of the COSBU’s Vision was to
“solve difficult problems” and this was supported by its people-centered employment
value proposition crafted around the understanding that its staff were passionate
about technology, highly intelligent and committed to solving difficult and unique
problems. Staff were “challenged to do something that someone else hasn’t been able
to do or no one else has done before which is going to stretch them as well and take
technology to a new level or take design to a new level for them. That’s what they
get turned on by. That’s what they think is exciting and good fun” (SBU7).

The COSBU employed highly skilled staff and
fostered an environment of trust (SBU1).

• Systematic Innovation– Innovation
Management System

This

environment allowed staff to feel comfortable about failing in their quest for the next
innovative product or solution. The COSBU introduced a reward and recognition
scheme and key performance indicators for its line of business managers related to
their involvement in and support of the innovation process to ensure they provided
their staff with the necessary “thinking time” away from projects to be innovative
(SBU1). This allocation of time for ideation and innovation was critical as there was
pressure to ensure that all employees were engaged in paid project work (SBU5).

The COSBU’s learning capability was reflected in
the

desire

of

its

staff

to

“challenge

• Innovation learning capability –
Generative learning

old

assumptions”. This generative, double-loop learning approach enabled the COSBU
to “change its view of the world” and solve difficult and novel problems (SBU1).
The COSBU had formal and informal learning routines to facilitate knowledge
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sharing and socialisation. “Lunch and Learn” was a regular forum where 50-100
people heard about lessons learned from project successes and failures, innovative
research or interesting technology developments from internal or external speakers
(SBU1, SBU3, SBU5, SBU6).

These information dissemination sessions also

provide opportunity for discussion about technical and co-ordination issues and
difficult challenges within projects.

Most sharing of technical knowledge took place at
the

monthly meetings

of

the

Product

and

Innovation Group where representatives from each
line of business shared project-related technology

• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
experience/memory
• Innovation absorptive capacity Externally focused innovation
learning structures and processes
• Innovation learning capability

developments, identified opportunities for collaboration or joint projects and
transferred, translated and transformed knowledge gained from customers and
external sources.

This Group sponsored forums and some informal networks

(SBU1). The COSBU also shared knowledge in the various engineering communities
of practice. All of these knowledge acquisition and sharing routines facilitated the
integration and assimilation of learning so that it could be applied and implemented
in new projects, and in doing so, facilitated innovation.
4.4.2.4 Alliance Building Capability
The COSBU’s second key initiative was to form the right business relationships. As
with the COFBU case study, there is a strong correlation between this capability and
the innovation absorptive capacity. These two capabilities are described together in
more detail in section 4.4.3.1.
4.4.2.5 Capability Life Cycle
The capability life cycle implications of the business focus transformation are
reflected in Figure 4.6 below. The GHLSS capability was an established capability
of the COSBU and CO. The trigger of change was the realisation that the GHLSS
was primarily focused on the engagement of overseas contractors and that, as a
consequence, the COSBU would need to broaden its capabilities in order to survive
(SBU1). The decision to expand the business focus is reflected in the development of
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a CHLSS capability which is depicted as starting with a low degree of maturity
relative to the COSBU’s capability in the GHLSS.
Level of
capability per
unit of activity

Trigger of
Change
GHLSS Capability

Development of
CHLSS Capability
Cumulative
Amount of
Activity
GHLSS capability
CHLSS Capability

Figure 4.6 Capability Life Cycles within COSBU
4.4.3

Development of Dimensions of the OIC supported by the Preconditions

4.4.3.1 Developing an Innovation Absorptive Capacity
Inside-Out Path Dependency
The technical project orientation of the COSBU resulted in insular management
practices and a limited understanding of customer drivers (SBU3). In the GHLSS
environment any compromise could endanger lives, so the highest level of technical
capability was utilised irrespective of the cost, so engagement with the COSBU was,
therefore, frequently based around the technology and the technical capabilities of its
personnel. In contrast, the commercial business environment balanced the cost of
achieving technical excellence with the benefit or desirability of achieving that level
of excellence.

The research and development work of the COSBU tended to be opportunistic
technical projects with limited time frames and budgets. When a tender was won it
was a long term project with a highly technical orientation.

While customer

relationships were of some importance the technical outcome of the project was the
predominant consideration so a mindset developed which was “driven by schedules
and costs” (SBU6). While this mindset did not inhibit innovation in the original firm,
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it was a barrier in the COSBU because of its inherited project behaviours. The focus
was a major inhibitor of innovation as “We don’t necessarily have any room to do
anything on standard projects other than that which was originally planned” (SBU6).

Outside-In Approach
The key elements of the outside-in approach were
firstly, to “form the right relationships” with
external parties who could enhance the quality and

• Innovation absorptive capacity Form the right relationships,
Transformative and exploitative
learning
• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
Management System

relevance of the ideas submitted to the ideation
process; secondly, to re-structure of the COSBU to reflect the new external business
focus; and thirdly, to import knowledge through the introduction of new staff who
had experience in the markets the COSBU was targeting.

Forming the right relationships was intended to
facilitate outside-in innovation and energise the

• Innovation absorptive capacity Form the right relationships,
Transformative and exploitative
learning

product ideation process and cross-fertilised teams
that collaborated across lines of business (SBU7). To limit its dependence on the
GHLSS, the COSBU engaged more broadly with the science and technology
community (co-operative research centres, universities specialising in key technology
areas which enhanced its technical capabilities and expertise). Regular forums were
convened to share technical and innovation knowledge, and intellectual property, and
to identify opportunities for idea prototyping, solution development or collaborative
research (SBU7). This proactive engagement with customers was essential to gain
insight into their articulated and latent needs.

The COSBU’s strategic management focus was not
limited to technology innovation. It extended to
managerial innovation in all parts of the business.
The Outside-In approach helped the COSBU
appreciate that it did not have a product and sales

• Business-wide, strategic innovation
• Innovation learning capability –
Generative learning
• Innovation absorptive capacity Transformative and exploitative
learning
• Innovation culture – Facilitative
leadership

focus and this recognition provided the impetus to change the COSBU structurally
(SBU1, SBU3). The COSBU recognised that its knowledge was limited primarily to
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dealing with GHLSS and that this would constrain its ability to implement its product
and market development strategies. It recognised it “didn’t have anyone that had an
understanding of the market and the sales process for products” and so appointed a
business development manager with expertise in the GHLSS and experience and
established relationships in the CHLSS. This manager brought understanding of the
CHLSS, new selling skills and knowledge of channel management, and accelerated
the assimilation of external knowledge (SBU1).

Systematic Stakeholder-focused Ideation supported by an Innovation Absorptive
Capacity
Innovation ideas were generated spontaneously by
staff, by planned and unplanned customer needs
identification activities or through the development
of “the right relationships”. In addition, ideas were

• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
Management System, Innovation
experience/memory
• Business-wide, strategic innovation
– multi innovation focus
• Strategic entrepreneurship –
Entrepreneurial intentionality

also captured in relation to process and business
improvements (SBU1). These ideas were screened based on established criteria such
as market attractiveness and strategic alignment with the strategy of the business unit.

The COSBU was proactive in its attempts to
acquire

specific

knowledge

from

customers,

• Innovation absorptive capacity Transformative and exploitative
learning

competitors and from other generators of knowledge pertinent to its technology
roadmap. This emphasis was directly related to the COSBU’s unsuccessful attempts
to commercialise technology where it “innovated so much, we cost ourselves a
fortune, because it was bleeding edge instead of leading edge” (SBU3, SBU7). In
many cases the COSBU ignored market requirements and were “developing
something and being innovative for the sake of it” (SBU3).

These experiences

reinforced the learning that “(a)ny innovation has to be done within the framework
and the context of the market” (SBU3).

The COSBU also collaborated with

competitors who had “part of the puzzle” which could help it to achieve a technology
or solution objective (SBU7).
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Part of the COSBU’s strategy in building closer
relationships

with

customers,

particularly

• Innovation absorptive capacity Externally focused innovation
learning structures and processes

commercial customers, was to appoint business development managers with
experience in working in the CHLSS (SBU3). It also appointed a manager of sales
and marketing for “product” in order to inject commercial reality into the R and D
process (SBU3) to ensure that “at the end of the day, if one of these ideas did get
up… there is always an assurance that it gets justified against market demand”
(SBU1).
4.4.3.2 Business-wide Strategic Innovation
Evidence supporting the notion of business-wide strategic innovation includes the
sourcing of ideation from all areas of the business unit as well as from external
partners, the systematic innovation referred to in the following section as well as
managerial innovation.
4.4.3.3 Systematic Innovation through Portfolio Management and the New
Innovation Process
From Ad Hoc Product Development to Portfolio Management
The original firm had such a small number of employees that “(e)veryone else knew
what was going on” (SBU6). Product development was ad hoc as products were
developed based on GHLSS’s perceived or articulated needs and often isolated and
costly capabilities were built irrespective of the firm’s ability to leverage such
capability.

These unstructured innovation processes were transferred from the

original firm to its successor and also existed for a period in the COSBU (SBU4).
Accordingly, project selection decisions were often ineffective as decisions were
made without reference to any strategic framework.

There was also a strong

reluctance to kill projects even when they were unlikely to be successful (SBU5,
SBU8).

The aim of the portfolio approach was to provide
strategic focus and assist the COSBU achieve its

• Systematic Innovation– Innovation
Management System, Innovation
experience/memory

business goals, including winning projects, developing and selling products,
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developing adjacent markets, enhancing capability, and developing strategic
relationships (COSBU Strategic Technology Roadmap). Portfolio management was
critical to innovation in that it provided a balance of activities between the
competitive tensions of short and long term priorities, across lines of business and
also of the type of activities undertaken. Portfolio management required sufficient
levels of activity at each stage of the technology maturity continuum aligned with the
strategic goals of the COSBU.

The implementation of the portfolio approach

generated more targeted innovation opportunities with the intention of increasing
financial performance without increasing the amount spent (SBU1, SBU4).

Capability development was also a key priority.
With key capabilities mapped in the Technology
Roadmap, the COSBU identified opportunities for

• Strategic entrepreneurship Entrepreneurial intentionality
• Alliance building capability Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment

capability enhancement through the winning of key projects or the building of
external alliances; or capability development, where the capability did not exist
within the COSBU. The focus was on developing capabilities which could be applied
in multiple contexts to increase the probability of success (SBU1). Even where the
technology itself may not have achieved a favorable business outcome for the
COSBU, opportunities for capability development were identified and delivered
competitive advantage by securing profitable new projects and business opportunities
based on that capability (SBU7).

From Ad Hoc Idea Management to Disciplined Product Pipeline
The COSBU established infrastructure for the
capture and evaluation of ideas for product

• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
Management System, Innovation
experience/memory

innovation and process improvement. The systematic process for idea evaluation was
essential as the CO required a “convincing business case to demonstrate that the idea
(was) worth investing in” (SBU7). To provide this discipline, the COSBU developed
a “repeatable mechanism by which you could document an idea and develop a
business case for it” (SBU7).
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The COSBU used the NASA Technology Readiness Level framework to assess the
maturity of its evolving technologies.

Most of the innovation activities of the

COSBU were in the Early Stage R and D/Concept Development and Prototype
Development/Concept Proving stages.

External projects tended to be small to

medium in size and attracted margins typically of 10%. However, margins in excess
of 30% were required for product and business sustainability (SBU4). The challenge
for the COSBU was to select product opportunities that could be successfully
transitioned from the prototype stage into mature products with well-defined routes to
attractive markets.

The COSBU leadership team recognised that “crossing the

chasm” was difficult and usually required a strong market pull. Hence, a key success
factor was a greater focus on an outside-in approach to understanding its customers.
To solve this challenge the COSBU developed a series of key themes within which it
categorised new product ideas and only funded one or two projects within each theme
(SBU8).

The need to prioritise financial and intellectual

• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
Management System

resources to efficiently manage product ideas was
a major challenge so the COSBU implemented a structured framework based on
Cooper’s Stage Gate process (Cooper 2002) (SBU4).

By establishing objective

criteria on which go/kill decisions in the stage gate process could be made, the
COSBU improved the quality and timeliness of decisions, improved prioritisation
within the Product Portfolio and managed resource allocation more efficiently. The
General Manager stressed the importance of the process as follows:
The lesson for us has been to try and drown those puppies that don’t stack up
in the early stages of the business case, and focus on just a few key products
in the pipeline. Initially, we tried to do too many things at once, and ended up
starving a bunch of puppies to death over a long period of time (SBU1).
4.4.3.4 Enhancing the Innovation Culture
COSBU management was committed to providing

• Innovation culture

a challenging innovative work environment to the extent that “if we don’t give you
what we say we’re going to give you then you come and kick us in the head and tell
us we’re not doing it...That’s where we can differentiate as an employer because you
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work on really interesting innovative jobs” (SBU1).

The COSBU’s recruitment

policies also reinforced the employee’s desire to solve difficult problems with
recruitment targeted at “the top 10% of graduates – very bright and highly motivated
- who are really passionate about technology”. So over a beer or coffee “the ideas
tend to get the better of them and they start to run away with themselves and get
enthusiastic and imaginative. That sort of culture breeds ideas so the collegiate
environment helps the idea generation process” (SBU7).

The COSBU had a culture amendable to learning
through its “open-mindedness” and its collegiate

• Innovation culture – Collegiality
• Innovation learning capability –
Generative Learning/Unlearning

culture (characterised by egalitarian knowledge sharing and problem solving around
the beer fridge). Unlearning was also implicit in some of the structural changes
within the COSBU.

With path dependent knowledge largely relating to the

COSBU’s interaction with the technical projects for the GHLSS, there was an
imperative to develop new learning routines for engaging with commercial customers
and the sale of technology products and solutions.

The responsible risk seeking propensity was
balanced by the acceptance of failure. The General
Manager said, “You’ve got to just push the

• Innovation learning capability
• Innovation culture - No
blame/failing forward
• Systematic Innovation - Innovation
experience/memory

boundaries and by pushing the boundaries you will at times fail” (SBU1). His role
was to create the “environment to allow people to feel comfortable about failing …
and giving them the framework in which to fail comfortably and feel that that’s not
career limiting for them”. By providing this psychological safety, a no blame culture
was promoted with a focus on “failing forward” - learning from the failure, analysing
why it went wrong and sharing the lessons (SBU1).
4.4.4

Conclusion

The changing focus of the GHLSS in engaging overseas prime contractors rather than
local system and technology integrators resulted in a significant loss of revenue for
the COSBU.

While its path dependent success could have limited its vision,

management recognised the importance of not being constrained by its history. Like
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the COFBU’s OIC, this OIC had three preconditions - strategic entrepreneurship,
innovation learning capability, alliance building capability - which emerged from the
case analysis of the COSBU. These are depicted in Figure 4.7 together with their
underpinning constructs.
Adaptive learning
Innovation learning
capability

Generative learning
Unlearning
Business model design &
ecosystem shaping
Entrepreneurial discipline

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurial intentionality
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk taking propensity
Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment

Alliance building
capability

Alliance learning
Creation of idiosyncratic alliance
resources and capabilities

Figure 4.7 COSBU Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs

The case analysis identified the pivotal role of strategic entrepreneurship through the
COSBU management’s orchestration and co-alignment of assets and resources to
meet its changing environment. An essential element of its transformation was the
purposeful transition from entrepreneurial adhocracy to a strategic entrepreneurship
which added discipline, structure and focus. Strategic entrepreneurship established
the critical role in successful innovation of systematic approaches to capturing and
synthesising knowledge generated internally and through alliance partners
(innovation learning capability, alliance building capability and systematic
innovation). Through proactive leadership, the COSBU introduced an outside-in
approach by leveraging and building social capital and forming the right relationships
with external partners who could enhance the quality and relevance of the ideas
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submitted to its ideation process (alliance building capability and innovation
absorptive capacity). This provided a continuing stimulus for innovation.

These preconditions were complemented by four components - innovation absorptive
capacity, business-wide strategic innovation, systematic innovation and innovation
culture – which are depicted in Figure 4.8 together with their supporting constructs.
The COSBU’s goal to acquire complementary knowledge and innovation experience
from external knowledge providers and to exploit that knowledge to commercial
advantage, stimulated the development of changes to the business unit’s innovation
learning capability, alliance building capability and innovation absorptive capacity.

Preconditions

OIC Components

Form the right relationships

Externally focused
innovation learning
structures and processes
Innovation learning
capability

Innovation absorptive
capacity
Embedded resource sharing
external collaboration
Transformative and
exploitative learning
Business-wide, strategic
innovation

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Multi innovation focus –
Product, Managerial, Process,
Strategic innovation - new
business model
Innovation Management
System

Systematic innovation

Innovation experience
Innovation memory

Alliance building
capability

Facilitative leadership
Innovation culture

Collegiality
No blame/Failing forward

Figure 4.8 Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from
the Second Case Analysis
The business-wide, strategic innovation resulted from the firm’s strategic
entrepreneurship. It encompassed an extension in the business model to the CHLSS
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and widespread changes in innovation processes and routines to add structure and
discipline (Entrepreneurial discipline and intentionality). All of these management
decisions were underpinned by the COSBU’s collegiate culture, and the willingness
of the staff to solve difficult problems and to challenge the status quo. The dynamism
of these capabilities is evidenced through the continual learning and change in the
processes, behaviours and structures that defined them.

Like the COFBU, the relationship between the alliance building capability and
innovation absorptive capacity was readily apparent as the COSBU’s strategy
involved a high level of proactive engagement with external knowledge providers and
partners.

The strong emphasis upon generative learning (stemming from the

collegiate culture and willingness to challenge the status quo) provided the basis for
continuous learning and the renewal of innovation infrastructure and business
processes (business-wide strategic innovation and systematic innovation) to build
congruence and complementarities among and between those processes.
4.5

The Third Business Unit (COTBU)

4.5.1

Introduction

The Third Business Unit (COTBU) was established in 2002 when the CO leveraged
the resources of the COSBU and established a business unit to commercialise a suite
of IT security products based on intellectual property developed by the COSBU for
the RO. The resources transferred to the COSBU included the IT security product
suite, GHLSS brand, intellectual property, a key technical security researcher and the
ability to leverage the reputation, alliances and relationships of the COSBU and the
CO.

The COTBU claimed to be a world leader in the provision of secure information
management solutions to both government and private enterprise clients. Its products
facilitated the secure transfer of information between separated IT networks of
different classifications whilst maintaining the integrity and availability of both the
network and the information transferred. A critical element of the value proposition
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was that the product suite was independently certified through a costly and detailed
examination of its security features to ensure that it met the claims of the vendor.

The COSBU had developed the intellectual property and secured the early sales.
When the COTBU was established there was resentment even though the COSBU
was contracted to continue the development of the product suite. The relationship
between the COSBU and the COTBU was not a normal commercial relationship
(described as “a working relationship”) (TBU4) as the business units in the CO were
organisational silos with little co-operation or knowledge sharing between them.
Even though the COTBU was the COSBU’s customer, it had little influence on the
product development timetable as the COSBU had limited time for non-scheduled
enhancements or, when time was available, it was generally some time in the distant
future (TBU2). Because of its previous project focus, the COSBU also had limited
understanding of commercial customer needs or time priorities and so were unwilling
to change schedules to reflect customer imperatives (TBU4).

The silo mentality was also evident between
functions in the COTBU. Despite its small size most

• Innovation culture (Negative) –
Collaboration
• Knowledge sharing structures
(Negative)

discussions took place within the specialised
functional groups. The COTBU culture, which still existed to a degree, “suggests
that people had defined roles and job descriptions and if innovation was not part of
your job description then you were not part of the innovation process. It’s related to
knowledge and who perceives they have the actual knowledge or access to the
knowledge in the environment” (TBU4). Those at lower levels within the firm who
worked in isolation from customers had ideas about product innovation, but had not
been empowered to share their ideas (TBU4).

Unlike the COFBU and COSBU, which were the outcome of the CO’s acquisition
capabilities, the COTBU was formed as a stand-alone businesses unit. In contrast to
those business units, which tendered for major high value GHLSS infrastructure
projects, the COTBU sold a product suite in the commercial market as well as the
GHLSS. While it had established customers in the GHLSS, the COTBU’s goal was
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to drive sales in the Australian CHLSS and in overseas commercial and GHLSS
markets, particularly the United States. While the COFBU and the COSBU brought
with them the paths, positions and processes of their predecessors, the COTBU
followed the paths of its parent. Accordingly, this case differs from those of the
COFBU and COSBU and provides a contrasting negative case and perspective of the
formation of an OIC.

The CO’s decision making and problem solving frameworks were developed for high
value long term GHLSS projects and were inappropriate for the dynamic
environment of commercial markets. In addition, while the COTBU and COSBU
adapted to a rapidly changing external environment and developed dynamic
capabilities which enhanced their innovation capability, the COTBU was
unsuccessful in its entrance into the CHLSS market in Australia and in its expansion
efforts (TBU1).
4.5.2

Developing a New Business

Having a ten year exclusive license of the IT
security product suite (initial license was granted to

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative) - Generative learning,
Unlearning

the original firm in the mid 1990’s), and after successful initial sales to a select part
of the GHLSS by the COSBU, the CO considered other sales opportunities within
Australia and across the globe. It commissioned a consultant to examine market
opportunities for the IT security product suite and also market research from a
leading IT research organisation. On the basis of this research, which it accepted
without questioning the assumptions upon which it was based, the CO decided to
target other participants in the GHLSS as well as the CHLSS (TBU5).

As the technology was unique the COTBU had first mover advantage with high
barriers to entry. The major challenge in making sales to the CHLSS was that the
products were based on an IT security architecture that was rarely found outside the
GHLSS. While the architecture offered much greater security there was a significant
trade off in terms of accessibility and flexibility. Accordingly, a large part of the “go
to market” effort was directed at customer education as failure to develop broad
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market acceptance would limit product uptake and, therefore, the success of the
COTBU (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan, 2002/2003).

The new paths developed by the COTBU were highly divergent from the paths of the
CO in the following ways:
•

Solution Sale: Firstly, in the CHLSS the COTBU would be selling an IT
security solution to satisfy an undefined and often unarticulated client need
where in GHLSS there was a specific need defined in detail through the
tender process;

•

Entering New Markets: Secondly, the CO and COSBU had been engaging in
known and familiar GHLSS markets where now the COTBU would be
competing in unknown and unfamiliar markets in Australia (CHLSS) and
internationally (CHLSS and GHLSS), either directly or through unfamiliar
channels.

•

Managing Distributors and Value Added Resellers: Thirdly, the CO
generally secured projects by a tender process with a known customer and
specified deliverables. When successful the CO became the prime contractor
managing a large long-term, high value, Government infrastructure project
controlled by project managers with an engineering and technical orientation.
The sale of the IT security product suite involved the sale of product, in large
quantities but at a fraction of the price of a major GHLSS project, on a
continuing basis either directly to the GHLSS or indirectly through
distributors and value added resellers to the GHLSS or the CHLSS.

The Solution Sale in Commercial Markets
To demonstrate the attractiveness of the new market for value added resellers, the
COTBU needed to engage directly with commercial buyers whose buying
propensities were largely unknown. Even though the US GHLSS market was similar
to the COTBU’s Australian market, it was more complex, highly parochical and wary
of new vendors. In competing in the CHLSS, the COTBU adopted a solutions-based
approach to satisfy an undefined client need. For the COTBU, this required the
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development of a level of customer intimacy to which it was unaccustomed and for
which it was ill-equipped.

The COTBU benefited from the reputation of the
CO and the COSBU as major Australian GHLSS

• Innovation absorptive capacity Transformative and exploitative
learning

contractors and the strength of their relationship with the RO. However, while the
CO brand was strong in Australian Government procurement its brand strength did
not transfer to commercial IT markets. To enhance its selling capability to industry
sectors in the CHLSS, business development managers were hired to target specific
commercial sectors (utilities, health, banking and finance) that were considered to be
more susceptible to education about the increasing importance of IT and information
security.

Hiring industry specialists was designed to increase understanding of

commercial customer product selection drivers.

Entering New Markets and Managing Distributors and Value Added Resellers
The COTBU was committed to developing its capability to enter new markets both in
Australia (the CHLSS market) and overseas (the CHLSS and GHLSS markets). The
initial demonstrable market was anticipated to be from the GHLSS which was
familiar with the network-separation architecture. The largest of these targets was the
US GHLSS, followed by GHLSS agencies in the UK, Canada and other NATO
countries, which had formal certification requirements for IT products connected to
government networks (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan for 2002/2003).

The major challenge for the COTBU was that the product suite was in a new product
category as everybody “trusted their operating system” and there were insufficient
incidents to warrant commercial organisations increasing the level of security
(TBU5). The development of the end user market was a necessary condition to
stimulate a distributor and Value Added Resellers (VARs) interest as they would
provide access to high volume commercial markets as they had strong customer
connections. Tapping into this network was intended to give the COTBU a multiplier
effect providing potentially hundreds of front line sales staff marketing the IT
security product suite. However, the COTBU had little experience in engaging with
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these top tier distributors as a supplier and little understanding of its target markets.
As a consequence, the COTBU sought to enhance its alliance management capability
and by extending its existing partner learning capabilities into new areas.

By

developing these capabilities it hoped to improve its understanding of customer needs
and drivers (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan for 2002/2003).
4.5.3

The Unsuccessful Business Outcome

The COTBU was largely unsuccessful in its
attempts to enter the commercial market in

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative) – Generative learning,
Unlearning

Australia and the GHLSS markets in the US and UK. While the COTBU identified
reasons for the failure as the absence of the mainstream adoption of the separated
networks methodology, the lack of global distributions channels in place and the
inability to achieve commercial sales (COTBU Five Year Strategic Plan, 2002/2003),
the lack of success was attributed by interviewees to its failure to move from its
engineering focus, its failure to understand customer drivers and failure to adapt its
value proposition to reflect customer needs (TBU1, TBU3).

In its first two years commercial sales were low
with three of the four Australian based CHLSS

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative) – Generative learning,
Unlearning

business development managers failing to make a sale. “(T)he appropriate market
research of the customer base hadn’t been done to a degree and a level that was
required” (TBU1) and “we didn’t study or understand the market enough” (TBU3).
While product trials were offered to customers there “have been times where we’ve
thrown the (IT security product suite) ‘over the fence’ to the customer and said, ‘You
guys test it and come back to us with a purchase order’” (TBU2).

The COTBU failed to learn from its lack of success
due to the technically oriented information barriers

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative) – Generative learning,
Unlearning

it unconsciously held. As one interviewee expressed it, “failure has been accepted for
a long time. We are one big failure or one succession of failures” (TBU3). The
reliance on its parent’s knowledge caused the COTBU to adopt a product push focus
with emphasis on the technical merits of the product rather than looking at value and
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benefits from a customer’s perspective.

The limited absorptive capacity and

information barriers led to the misguided assumption that “if we build a better IT
security product suite the world will come knocking at our door and that we would
sell thousands of seats to organisations such as Telstra” (TBU3).

These information barriers led to the COTBU’s
failure to assimilate customer feedback and
marketing practice which would have guided

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative) – Generative learning,
Unlearning
• Organisational learning capability Adaptive learning

customer engagement. The General Manager said, “There weren’t major strategic
changes.

There were more subtle incremental changes which eventually led to

abandoning the approach to the commercial market. I don’t think there was one
major strategic change” (TBU1).
4.5.4

Capability Life Cycle

An example of the capability development life cycle for the COTBU is depicted in
Figure 4.9 below.
Level of
capability per
unit of activity

Proposed Dynamic
Capability
Development Path
Trajectory

Actual Dynamic
Capability
Development
Path Trajectory
Trigger of Change
(Capability revision)

D

Commencement
of COTBU
operations

B
C

A
Initial capability
development

Revised capability
development

Cumulative
Amount of
Activity

Figure 4.9 Capability Life Cycles within COTBU
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The COTBU projected the trajectory of the change capability it was building to
facilitate its entrance into the CHLSS (depicted by the dotted line AB). However, its
trajectory (AC) was inhibited by the COTBU’s path dependence and lack of
managerial perception, and so the capability failed to reach the projected level. With
its lack of success, the change in management and the realisation of the inadequacy of
its capabilities the COTBU renewed its strategies by implementing new capability
initiatives resulting in a proposed new trajectory of CD.
4.5.5

Capability Renewal

After several years and a change in senior management the failure to achieve success
in the commercial market place forced the COTBU to adopt new strategies and
develop new capabilities.

The Boundary Spanning Approach
In 2006 the Australian Region of the COTBU
appointed

a

technical

manager

manager”) from the GHLSS.
knowledge

and

understanding of

contacts,
high

level

(“the

new

He brought new
and

a

security

broader

• Organisational innovation intensity
– Multi innovation focus
(Managerial)
• Innovation Culture - Facilitative
leadership
• Innovation absorptive capacity Transformative and exploitative
learning

sector

customer needs. The manager was experienced in product certification and, more
importantly the accreditation of systems in which the IT security product suite would
be embedded, and understood both the engineering and political issues within
GHLSS. Accordingly, he was “able to build something or conceptualise something
that he knows is going to address the concerns and issues” in the Australian and
international GHLSS (TBU1).

From a business perspective he was “imported

innovation” (TBU3).

The new manager also became a catalyst for

• Organisational learning capability –
Generative learning, Unlearning

change:
I’ve been a change which has made it possible for other changes to take place in
the organisation. So any time you get new blood opens up some of the old
wounds or can of worms with regard to things. When I come in I’m allowed to
ask the stupid questions. I am allowed to ask the “why” question whereas a lot
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of people after they’ve been there for a period of time feel that they can no longer
ask that question (TBU4).
As a result staff “are starting to ask questions about
why things are occurring…and we’re starting to see

• Innovation culture – Collaboration
• Innovation absorptive capacity –
Externally focused innovation
learning structures and processes

some major changes over the last six months”,
particularly with the discussion of innovation more on the agenda than what it had
been in the past (TBU4). The COTBU looked to enhance its absorptive capacity by
scanning within the industry for complementary knowledge and also engaging
academia in the information security area to understand the latest developments. The
appointment of the new manager was also part of the strategy to import new and
diverse knowledge and to introduce external knowledge and knowledge sources.

The COTBU began to improve its innovation
process and the way it progressed from ideation to

• Organisational innovation intensity
– Multi innovation focus
(Process/Product)
• Innovation culture - Collaboration

business case to product development to product
commercialisation. The requirements gathering process was identified as of prime
importance to ensure product development reflected real customer needs (TBU4).
Associated with these changes were changes in the innovation ideation process both
within the COTBU and from external sources (TBU1, TBU5). These new ideation
collection routines were implemented to provide a degree of discipline and strategy to
the ideation process.

While the sources of ideation had been limited to a few

technical specialists, ideas were now welcomed from all parts of the organisation
“making sure that it’s all inclusive”. Some of the best ideas “emerged from people
who in the past thought that they didn’t have much to add or contribute but they have
been sitting on a bit of a gem” of an idea. Tentative steps have been taken to keep up
to date on current research and development trends in information security (TBU4).

Increased Customer Engagement and Understanding
Despite the COTBU’s adaptive approach to

• Organisational learning capability –
Generative learning, Unlearning

learning, one business development manager
recognised that “(u)nless you can add value there’s no point in proposing something
to a customer…”. He realised that the IT security product suite’s technical merits
132

were the qualifier for consideration by the customer and not the primary determinant
for purchase and refined the value proposition to focus on business efficiency and
productivity (TBU3).

Managerial innovation also took place in regard to
partner identification.

The COTBU had been

focused primarily on identifying channel partners

• Organisational innovation intensity
– Multi innovation focus
• Innovation absorptive capacity Externally focused innovation
learning structures and processes

who were suppliers of IT security products. With a greater understanding of its
business as a solution provider, the COBTU identified companies that worked in the
same IT security domain or provided products or services that were complementary
to its own. In doing so it gained additional industry knowledge and identified areas
where it can “get effective multipliers by working together in greater partnership with
other companies or organisations” (TBU4).

Creating an Innovation Culture
The new leader of COTBU stated that “The big

• Innovation culture – Facilitative
leadership, Collaboration

thing is that we’re trying to bring in cultural change.
Trying to create an environment where, at least, the discussion of innovation is more
on the agenda than what it has been in the past” (TBU4). Routines which created this
environment included more open communication, wider sources of ideation within
the business unit and new knowledge sharing routines both within and between
functions (TBU4).

In the COTBU, communication had been along
functional lines with limited communication between

• Innovation culture – Collaboration
• Knowledge sharing structures –
Innovation experience/memory

groups either locally or regionally. With the focus on innovation the technical group
gained a greater appreciation of its role as an internal service provider to the sales
group. New innovation knowledge sharing routines were developed which facilitated
sharing of details of its technical projects and product enhancements. This insight
provided the sales group with an understanding of the impact of project schedule
changes and enabled them to prioritise needs more effectively (TBU4).
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• Innovation culture – Collaboration

Through these new routines the culture began to
change.

“There’s an atmosphere that things are happening; things are moving

forward. There’s this general feeling that the openness of sharing ideas from all parts
of the organisation is less of a problem that what it was in the past…” (TBU4). The
new openness and flexibility provided better job satisfaction as the engineers feel
good about themselves as they have a direct influence on the success of the company
and this gives them the motivation to be more innovative (TBU2).
4.5.6

The Development of the OIC Preconditions

The COTBU case study provided little evidence of the two preconditions
(entrepreneurial intensity and organisational learning capability) derived from the
literature.

While the formation of the COTBU was in itself an act of

entrepreneurship, little entrepreneurship was demonstrated thereafter. The COTBU’s
leadership was not proactive and failed to promote innovation as a corporate-wide
task. As a result “the culture wasn’t one which actively promoted an environment
where innovation could come from anywhere” (TBU4).

The

COTBU

had

no

innovation

strategy.

Innovation was narrowly defined and largely
limited to incremental product innovation: “We are
reactive.

• Organisational innovation intensity
(Negative)
• Strategic entrepreneurship
(Negative) – reactive
• Organisational learning capabilityAdaptive learning

Everything we’ve done has been

incremental. There have been no giant leaps forward” (TBU2). Apart from technical
innovation directly pertaining to the IT security product suite, innovation routines
were ad hoc with innovation “primarily left up to the individual” who had to sell the
idea themselves, establish a business plan, and justify the concept before they could
move the idea forward (TBU1, TBU5).

There was a “short term business

orientation” focused on the “here and now” (TBU3).

Within the COTBU there was no formal process for
gathering

ideas

from

staff,

customers

• Strategic entrepreneurship (Negative)
– reactive

or

competitors. Ideation was ad hoc and serendipitous: “We don’t go and solicit ideas
but sometimes the sales force comes back with suggestions about ways to improve
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the products” (TBU3). Customers, of their own initiative, generated many of the new
ideas and identified “different things that we haven’t thought of applying our product
to” and, in these cases, the COTBU looked at ways to build a solution around its
products to meet those requirements (TBU2).

The COTBU’s learning was adaptive and, generally
in response to a business crisis. The COTBU, like

• Organisational learning capability
(Negative), Unlearning, Adaptive
learning

the CO, had a highly technical focus. While market research was gathered, it was
conducted without reference to commercial customers or their buying propensities.
The COFBU “had a 'rose colored glasses' culture at the time” and was “committed to
innovation but not committed to adding value”. The COTBU management assumed
that the fledgling technology from the GHLSS would be rapidly adopted in the
commercial world but had little understanding of commercial customers (TBU3).

Adaptive learning was applied consistently when generative learning and unlearning
were required to overcome deeply ingrained assumptions, information filters, and
problem solving strategies that made up its largely inherited world view.
Accordingly, due to the absence of renewal in behaviours and routines, no
organisational learning capability could be identified in the case study. Despite its
continued lack of sales and innovation success, it failed for several years to identify
the need for change and, consequently, failed to formulate a response or implement
alternative courses of action. Its learning approach can best be characterised as crisis
reactive adaptive learning.

The absence of effective preconditions demonstrates that the innovation capability
within the COTBU was not dynamic and was merely a function of a new product
development process and individual innovation champions. This case demonstrates
that the preconditions derived from the literature are critical to building an
organisation-wide innovation capability where emphasis is placed on continued
renewal of the capability through firm-wide commitment to innovation and ensuring
that the capability is constantly renewed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of its stakeholder perspective and the commitment of staff to innovation.
135

4.5.7

Developing the Dimensions of the OIC

The OIC experience of the COTBU can be segmented into the period before and after
the appointment of the new manager 7. Before the appointment, the COTBU business
activities, particularly those which focused on the CHLSS, were unsuccessful due to
the absence of the preconditions identified in the literature. The transition from the
GHLSS to the CHLSS required the COTBU to understand the significant differences
between these markets, the nature of the distribution channels to reach the CHLSS
and the difference between a project and a solutions market. Its product-push focus
promoted the technical merits of its product suite without regard to the customer’s
needs or it’s entrenched IT security platforms and supplier relationships. As a result
of the absence of a generative learning approach and the bounded rationality of the
management of the COFBU and CO, the COFBU had a low innovation intensity
(limited primarily to adaptive technical innovation), limited absorptive capacity and
innovation leadership.

Around the time of the appointment of the new manager the COTBU attempted to
develop new capabilities. The employment of this manager, with new synergised
customer and technical knowledge and broad business and technical contacts, brought
learning, relationships and experience to the COTBU and facilitated organisational
change and innovation. His experience enabled the COTBU to achieve broader and
proactive engagement with customers to better define their solution requirements.

Change began to occur as a result of this appointment with increased innovation
leadership, knowledge sharing and collaboration. The framework which emerged
from this case study after the appointment of the new manager is depicted in Figure
4.10 below.

The preconditions and components of the OIC had begun to emerge at the time of the
research but had not reached any degree of maturity. Limited evidence was provided

7

It is recognised that the catalyst for change is the result of several factors. The selection of the appointment of
the manager has been selected as a major trigger for change due to the multiple impacts that his appointment had
upon the COTBU.
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in terms of its effective implementation. While other components of an OIC were
present in the case study they did not have sufficient strength, intensity or frequency
to warrant inclusion in the COTBU OIC framework.

Preconditions

OIC Components

Organisational innovation
intensity
(Product Focus)
Crisis reactive adaptive
learning
Innovation leadership

Figure 4.10 Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from
the Third Case Analysis
4.5.8

Conclusion

While the COFBU and COSBU provided different but interrelated OIC frameworks,
the COTBU provided a compelling negative case. The absence of any definitive
evidence to support the presence of the two preconditions identified in the literature,
entrepreneurial intensity and organisational learning capability, limited the business
unit’s ability to build an OIC.

The absence of generative learning enabled the

COTBU’s inherited innovation barriers to remain unchallenged.

Following the appointment of the new manager, the COTBU attempted to develop
new capabilities to address its poor performance. New innovation behaviours began
to appear (collaboration, innovation leadership, a broader view of organisational
innovation) and, as a result, a third OIC model began to emerge.
4.6

The Cross-Case Comparison

4.6.1

Introduction

The previous sections of this Chapter focused on the within-case analysis of three
business units within the CO. The focus of this section will be a cross-case analysis
between the three business units to identify similarities and differences in the OIC
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frameworks.

As demonstrated already in this Chapter, the three business units

inherited path dependencies from the CO.

For the COFBU and COSBU, these

dependencies were blended with those inherited from their predecessor organisations.

An essential element of the case comparison is the emphasis on how the management
of each business unit recognised the existence and impact of path dependent
behaviours and took steps to counter the constraints of those dependencies and build
an OIC to achieve environmental fitness with their new business environment. The
cross-case analysis reveals the key triggers of change within each business unit and
the leadership and process dimensions which were preconditions for the change
within the business unit. Following this analysis, the culture change to support the
new capabilities is identified together with the key components of the OIC framework
which emerged from the case analysis.
4.6.2

Triggers of Change

The COFBU and COSBU were both faced with the possibility of an exogenous shock
– the decline in income as their principal client, the GHLSS, transferred all (in the
case of the COFBU) or part (for the COSBU) of its contracts to overseas suppliers.
For the COFBU, the move to purchase aircraft from overseas meant it would be
unlikely to survive without changing its business model and operating routines as
these routines would become core rigidities. While the situation for the COSBU was
not as severe, it was likely that it would lose significant revenue with the GHLSS
largely contracting with overseas prime contractors.

The COFBU and COSBU management both recognised that they were not trapped by
their history and that they could shape their businesses through strategic renewal. For
the COFBU the market was more dynamic than for the COSBU and COTBU with the
outcome of the GHLSS changes predictable in terms of its impact of revenue but
unpredictable in regard to the likely or most profitable alternative revenue
opportunities available.
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Unlike the COFBU and COSBU, the COTBU was a new business unit. Despite its
lack of experience in the sale of products and in dealing with commercial firms, the
COTBU anticipated high demand based on the world-leading technical merits of its
product suite.

The COTBU encountered a relatively stable environment with a

limited degree of dynamism. The market boundaries and key players (customers,
competitors) as well as the accepted IT security systems and routines were well
defined. Changes to systems and routines were slow as in IT security first mover
advantage was not considered desirable. However, the COTBU’s product suite was a
disruptive technology. While this could have been a significant trigger of change for
the COTBU, its management failed to perceive the implications of the disruption. Its
lack of success in the CHLSS (both in Australia and the US) and the slowness of its
adoption in the US GHLSS ultimately provided the trigger for change.
4.6.3

Higher Order Capability Building as Preconditions of Change

The development of higher order capabilities through which a OIC could function
was critical for all three business units as they were each entering new markets. In
the cross-case analysis, the data demonstrated that three higher order capabilities
were important as preconditions to the effective operation of an OIC: the
development of a strategic entrepreneurial capability, an organisational learning
capability and a strategic alliance capability. The absence of these preconditions in
the third case prohibited the development of an OIC beyond isolated actions.
4.6.3.1 Building a Strategic Entrepreneurship Capability
When the COFBU and COSBU were confronted with a threat to their survival,
management scanned their respective environments to identify the capabilities
required to achieve environmental fitness. The COFBU and COSBU were intentional
in their commitment to developing an operation-wide entrepreneurial business unit
through strategic renewal. They were proactive in risk taking and in disciplined and
informed exploration and both had strong senior management commitment to and
visible support for innovation. While the COSBU’s business model transformation
was incremental, the transformation for the COFBU was related to but beyond its
existing suite of capabilities.
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The COSBU demonstrated its entrepreneurship through its proactive transformation
from an enterprise with one GHLSS client to a business which was diversifying its
reach both in terms of clients and technologies. A key element of its transformation
was the transition from the entrepreneurial adhocracy of the original firm to strategic
entrepreneurship, which added discipline, structure and strategic focus and ensured
that innovation was commercialised “within the context of the market” (SBU3). The
COSBU management also demonstrated a strong and consistent commitment to
innovation. It developed a Strategic Technology Roadmap which provided a shared
understanding of its increased focus on business and customer outcomes and enabled
the COSBU to determine what products, solutions and capabilities to develop and
which projects to prioritise in the tender process.

The strength of strategic entrepreneurship in the COSBU can be attributed to the
shared entrepreneurial vision inherited from the original firm as well as the continued
articulation of that vision and the characterisation of innovation failure as “failing
forward”. The latter approach is consistent with Hamel and Prahalad’s “mandate to
learn when inevitable setbacks occur” (1991) and reinforces the relationship between
strategic entrepreneurship and organisational learning.

While entrepreneurship per se was not mentioned in the case analysis of the COFBU,
the approach of management in anticipating the exogenous shock and in taking
decisive, yet risky and measured, steps to preempt its impact is entrepreneurial in
nature.

To achieve its commercial and results-oriented emphasis, the COFBU

focused on internal and external boundary spanning behaviours.

There was

recognition within the COFBU that silo thinking was a major problem in the CO and
between and within the business units (FBU6). Through proactive leadership the
COFBU conducted a global search and identified a new business model outside of its
traditional learning boundary. It developed a considered strategy to become the
leader in through-life support for the Australian GHLSS aerospace industry. In this
major shift, the COFBU recognised that despite the risk of entering what was for it an
untested and untried business, new strategic alliances would provide a mechanism for
quickly achieving competitive advantage through acquiring new capabilities.
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By contrast with its peers, the COTBU was limited by the technical orientation of the
CO.

The COTBU reflected the view of its parent organisation with innovation

purportedly being important but, with little support from senior management, there
was a mismatch between the espoused theory and theory in use. Innovation was
generated by individual action or occurred as result of customer initiative. The
organisational myopic focus was on the technical merits of the product (TBU3).
Functional and disciplinary separation was evident. Management reinforced, rather
than challenged existing, entrenched mental models which were a barrier to
knowledge acquisition and sharing, proactive risk taking and open communication
(TBU4).

Where there was a strong (COSBU) or a moderate/strong (COFBU) level of strategic
entrepreneurship, the dynamic components of the OIC were generally of comparative
strength. Similarly, the COTBU, with no strategic entrepreneurship, provided an
example of a negative case. The weakness of the intensity resulted in the COTBU’s
innovation activities being ad hoc. Its strong technical orientation and associated
information barriers ensured that any learning was adaptive. The need for significant
marketing innovation, because of its failed sales strategies, was not recognised. The
dynamic components of the OIC were largely non-existent or, where they existed,
were weak or ineffective.
4.6.3.2 Building a Learning Capability
Organisational learning capability was common to the OICs of the COFBU and
COSBU. The COSBU, because of the greater maturity of its business, focused its
organisational learning on innovation learning while for the COFBU organisational
learning was broader because of the novelty of its business. The framework for
building the organisational learning capability differed between the COFBU and
COSBU. While the COFBU transformed its learning capability through a change in
organisational structure, the COSBU used its collegiate culture and recruitment
strategy as the foundation for innovation learning.
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The COSBU’s culture was a learning culture characterised by its “open-mindedness”,
its appreciation of the importance of “failing forward”, and its willingness to
challenge the status quo.

It also recognised that failure to refresh its existing

knowledge base could result in organisational insularity and so it developed new
learning routines for engaging with commercial customers and for the sale of
technology products and solutions. This business focused learning arose from the
lessons learned from previous failures in developing “bleeding edge” technologies
which were often innovative for the sake of it (SBU3, SBU7). The learning culture
was also reinforced by formal and informal learning routines to facilitate the
socialisation, absorption and integration of the acquired knowledge (SBU1, SBU3,
SBU5, SBU6) so that it could be applied and implemented in new projects, and
consequently facilitate the commercialisation of its innovation.

The COFBU’s learning focus was on boundary spanning behaviour across silos,
projects and teams, between CO business units and complementary entities external to
the organisation. Its matrix approach provided the overlap between projects and
domains to facilitate interaction, knowledge sharing and learning between individuals
or groups in a strategic and disciplined manner (FBU2). This restructure leveraged
the use of organisational memory and experience pertaining to innovation, and
provided access to complementary knowledge from customers, partners and research
organisations. This increased its absorptive capacity and improved the efficiency of
knowledge sharing and acquisition, and utilisation as well as encouraged the sharing
of relationships and insights.

While the COFBU and COSBU were committed to advancing their learning
capability through a generative approach, the COTBU’s organisational learning
culture was adaptive and characterised by a resistance to unlearn its embedded
technical orientation or to challenge the mental models which constrained its business
approach. It was not until the new technical manager was appointed that it began to
integrate new customer specific knowledge and to share that knowledge across the
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organisation with the introduction of the new manager improving the capabilities of
all staff (Penrose 1995, p. 47).

The knowledge-questioning values in relation to the market, while of critical
importance to the business units, were only part of the learning that was required
(Slater and Narver 1995, p. 63). Accordingly, this position is consistent with the
view that market-focused learning is a subset of the overall learning activity
(Weerawardena 2003, p.411; Slater and Narver 1995, p. 67) and that “a superior
learning environment will leverage the use of all resources” (Baker and Sinkula 1999,
p. 411). In these case studies, the evidence supports the view that the priority placed
on a market perspective and its use in the strategic planning process was a function of
the strategic entrepreneurship of the business unit rather than a lower order market
orientation (see Baker and Sinkula 1999, p. 412; Slater and Narver 1995, p. 63).
4.6.3.3 Developing an Alliance Building Capability
An alliance building capability was essential to the rapid acquisition and integration of
knowledge. Alliance building was the foundation of the COFBU’s business model
transformation as it placed the COFBU on a related, although divergent learning, track
aimed at increasing its knowledge breadth. This higher level of alliance learning was
essential for the COFBU because an incremental variation to its business model or
simply increasing its knowledge depth would not have been sufficient for its survival.

Once the COFBU’s new business model had been implemented, the COFBU’s
alliance building focus was on increasing the depth of its knowledge base.

It

developed inter-organisation routines to facilitate alliance-based knowledge sharing
and collaboration based on common objectives. It expanded its alliance building
capability by establishing multiple relationships within the RO to gain broader
insights into customer needs.

While the COTBU made attempts to establish meaningful external alliances with
prospective channel partners when it first entered the CHLSS, its lack of alliance
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development skills and experience in both the GHLSS and CHLSS, and its adaptive
learning approach, meant the COTBU failed to understand the best ways to establish
meaningful alliances with Tier 1 distributors both in Australia and in its key target
market.
4.6.4

Changing Culture to support New Capabilities

4.6.4.1 Changing Mental Models
The COFBU’s objective was stated emphatically by the General Manager: “(w)e
don’t accept the status quo. We have got to have a paradigm change” (FBU4). The
COSBU’s move to strategic entrepreneurship ensured that the new behaviour was
entrenched in its innovation infrastructure and routines. Sharing across boundaries
ensured that information was widely utilised and applied in the product development
process. While both the COFBU and COSBU sought to move from the CO’s mental
models through cultural change (acceptance of failure, knowledge sharing, and
collaboration) and proactive strategic entrepreneurial leadership, they did so in
different ways. The COSBU’s mental models were continuously scrutinised as a
consequence of hiring staff that challenged the status quo and were passionate about
solving difficult problems. While the COFBU aimed to achieve a similar outcome,
its focus was on implementing a matrix structure to facilitate knowledge
development, sharing and utilisation in and across functions, projects and domains.

The mental models of the COTBU reflected those of its parent. As the COTBU had
an adaptive learning orientation its mental models remained unchanged and
unchallenged. This led to its failure to effectively assimilate customer feedback or
explore alternative marketing strategies.
4.6.4.2 Changing Attitude to Risk
The CO had a “risk averse”, narrowly defined customer culture, characterised by
defensive reasoning, low levels of freedom of choice and when things went wrong,
the “blame game” with “(h)uge recriminations, beating of chests” (FBU2/FBU5).
This culture was evident in the COFBU and the COTBU (FBU5/TBU4) and it
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fostered conservative, compliant, risk averse behaviour which discouraged innovation
within the CO and within and between business units.

The COFBU’s blame culture originated from in its predecessors and was reinforced
when it was acquired by the CO. However, its management was aware of the impact
of the “blame game” upon innovation, and so there was, at the time of the change in
business model, a focus on reducing blame and increasing personal responsibility and
accountability (FBU1, FBU5). This change was reinforced by the introduction of a
participative performance-based culture with acceptance of failure as integral to
innovation.

The COSBU’s risk taking propensity was part of the entrepreneurial ethos of the
original firm where the General Manager was a risk taker and encouraged responsible
personal initiative (SBU6). While the COSBU had, amongst the CO business units, a
relatively high risk taking propensity, its level of risk taking was lower than within
the original firm as its behaviour was modified by the risk averseness, blame culture
and the organisational impediments to personal initiative of the CO (SBU7).

While there was no discussion in regard to risk by any of the COTBU interviewees
the entrance into the CHLSS market in Australia and the US involved risk-taking
behaviour. However, the high level security nature of the product and the high cost
involved in making any changes meant that risk taking behaviour was not encouraged
or supported.
4.6.4.3 Culture Change Drivers
The COFBU and COSBU were committed to culture change to facilitate their
transition to the new competitive environment although the degree of change required
varied. For the COFBU, its generative approach reflected management’s desire to
shift from the entrenched entitlement mentality to a results-oriented culture. It sought
to improve employee engagement in the belief that engaged employees were more
committed, involved and enthusiastic about their roles.

This focus on personal

performance, responsibility and accountability resulted in a significant increase in
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engagement in 18 months (FBU4). The COSBU had an engaged workforce with an
engagement score double that of the COFBU, so its approach was adaptive. It sought
to build on its collegiate culture by increasing the systematisation of its innovation
process but without losing the spontaneity and willingness to challenge of its staff.

Initially, the COTBU’s management was unaware of its cultural impediments to
innovation.

It was not until there had been a continued lack of success in the

commercial sector that the new technical manager was appointed, and his
appointment became a catalyst for change (TBU4).

These changes included

increased collaboration across functions, increased facilitative leadership and the
encouragement of ideation from all parts of the business unit.
4.6.5

Innovation Infrastructure and OIC Renewal

The three business units did not have a defined and documented innovation strategy
(FBU4, SBU1, TBU1). However, both the COFBU and COSBU recognised that
structural change was an important enabler of behavioural and innovation system
renewal and initiated the appropriate change within their organisations.

The

difference in approach to innovation infrastructure renewal should also be noted.
While the COFBU’s focus was on using organisational structure (project and domain
matrix) to facilitate innovation learning and knowledge sharing, the strategy for the
COSBU was to establish disciplined innovation processes and an innovation portfolio
planning approach. In contrast to the COFBU and COSBU, the COTBU had little
innovation infrastructure or the capacity to renew its infrastructure.

Innovation,

where it did occur, was limited to the technical experts. Its product development
process was described as “infantile” and it had no formal ideation capture process or
innovation strategy (TBU4). As a consequence of its lack of market success, the
COTBU’s management began to increase knowledge sharing and collaboration
through increasing interaction between the functions and to develop a more structured
innovation process.
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4.6.6

Organisational Innovation Intensity

The COSBU had a high innovation intensity (called business-wide innovation).
There was recognition that in order to grow and be competitive, the COSBU needed
to develop a strong framework of innovation that encompassed “all of its business
model” and was a “core competency throughout the organisation” (SBU1). Senior
management recognised that innovation needed to encompass all the business business processes, financial processes and customer engagement - and took steps to
ensure that innovation pervaded the way it did business (SBU1). While ideas were
sought from trusted external parties, innovation took place primarily within the
confines of the COSBU.

The COFBU also had high innovation intensity (innovation pervasiveness).
However, it was not articulated in such a holistic manner as within the COSBU and
was not supported by the same level of innovation infrastructure. It adopted CMMI
as a guide to process improvement across the organisation with the ultimate objective
to improve business performance. It had mapped all of the business processes with
the aim of revising all process, policies and procedures from top to bottom (SBU5).
In addition, it also ensured that its research and development activities were aligned
with its business objectives. The COTBU also introduced new ways to improve
customer relationships and interactions and this encompassed all aspects of the
business with “no boundary to it” (FBU2). The latter term implied an innovation
expansiveness which extended beyond the firm (FBU4) and this strategic
entrepreneurship resulted in the development of the through-life support business
model (FBU4).

The high innovation intensity of the COFBU and COSBU was fuelled by their drive
for improved commercial outcomes and management’s increased recognition of the
need for greater customer intimacy and awareness (SBU1, FBU4). This increased
awareness was the catalyst for cultural change within the business unit and the high
level of targeted engagement with customers, complementary partners and research
organisations to gain a greater understanding of research and development
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imperatives and market drivers.

This in turn resulted in innovation in business

processes, customer engagement and idea capture.

Conversely, the CO’s knowledge and resource constrained innovation and myopic
customer understanding were evident in the COTBU interviews (TBU2, TBU3), and
frustrated the interviewees. This resulted in low innovation intensity with innovation
being reactive, incremental and adaptive, and primarily being limited to technology
(TBU2). Any innovation within the COTBU was the result of individual initiative or
prompted by the customer (TBU4), rather than a firm-wide innovation focus.
4.6.7

Innovation Absorptive Capacity

Both of the positive cases were committed to proactively building relationships with
external parties which could provide accelerated access to complementary
knowledge.

This knowledge, when combined with the knowledge each held,

provided a stimulus for innovation and capability development, which in turn,
provided further impetus for innovation (SBU1, FBU4). Both business units had
externally focused innovation learning structures and processes to facilitate the
development of innovation oriented managerial competencies.

In analysing absorptive capacity within the case studies, depth and breadth
dimensions were identified. When new knowledge was added which pertained to the
firm’s existing knowledge base, it increased the depth of its knowledge and, with this
increased specialisation, it enhanced the rationalisation, routinisation and efficiency
of knowledge absorption. The breadth dimension of absorptive capacity enabled the
absorption of knowledge from domains which were outside, but related to, the firm’s
existing knowledge base. This dimension is of particular relevance to increasing
knowledge scope as well as to knowledge exploration.

The relevance of analysing absorptive capacity in terms of its depth and breadth is
that it provides alternative strategies for transforming a firm’s knowledge. The two
positive cases support this view as the COFBU significantly increased the breadth of
its knowledge through the addition of its through-life support capability. In contrast,
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the COSBU increased the depth and specialisation of its knowledge, but also slightly
increased its knowledge breadth through its acquisition of knowledge and experience
pertaining to the CHLSS. These innovation knowledge acquisition strategies are
depicted in Figure 4.11 below. As the COTBU entered the CHLSS as well as the
GHLSS in the US and UK, its innovation knowledge acquisition map should have
been similar in breadth to that of the COFBU and depth to the COSBU.

COFBU
Original
Knowledge
Base

Increased knowledge breadth through
addition of through the addition of
through-life support knowledge from
overseas OEMs
Increased knowledge depth through
acquisition of knowledge from RO and
other complementary research
organisations

COSBU
Original
Knowledge
Base

Increased knowledge breadth through
acquisition of new knowledge pertaining
to the CHLSS such as the appointment of
new business development manager
Increased knowledge depth through
acquisition of knowledge from RO and
other complementary research
organisations

Figure 4.11 Knowledge Acquisition Strategies – Breadth and Depth
While knowledge transformation is important, it is the commercial exploitation of
that knowledge that can lead to competitive advantage. “(A)bsorptive capacity refers
not only to the integration or assimilation of information by an organisation but also
to the organisation’s ability to exploit it” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p. 131).

Both the COFBU and COSBU were committed to increasing the absorptive capacity
of their external knowledge sources through a process of mutuality and embedded
resource sharing external collaboration. The COSBU had regular workshops with the
RO, for example, a forum on national security where COSBU specialists spent a day
with their counterparts sharing research on seven subjects and, in the process,
generated ideas which could be developed in co-operation with the RO. The COFBU
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also encouraged its staff to participate in both RO and academic knowledge transfer
through presentations at or participation in conferences and post doctoral seminars
and, in doing so, it extended its expertise and absorptive capacity (FBU6).

Another strategy for external innovation knowledge acquisition for all three business
units was the employment of staff that had expertise or experience that the business
unit lacked. The employment of the business development manager by the COSBU
(SBU3) and the new manager employed from the GHLSS who brought with him
knowledge of IT security product acquisition processes as well as knowledge of
product certification and accreditation of systems (TBU1, TBU3), provide examples
of this approach.
4.7

Core Dimensions of an Innovation Capability: Processes, Skills And
Integration

This research examined the development of an OIC within three business units of the
CO to seek to explain how heterogeneity of innovation resources is developed and
how firms use resources and capabilities to achieve competitive advantage.

From the case analysis the OIC is represented by the following elements:
•

three preconditions which facilitated development of an organisational
innovation capability: strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning
capability and alliance building capability;

•

A functional innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal component, which
provided the organisational structure which supported innovation and
included an innovation management system, innovation experience and
innovation memory;

•

An integrative innovation absorptive capacity component incorporating
externally focused innovation learning structures and processes, embedded
resource sharing external collaboration, and transformative and exploitative
learning;
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•

An innovation culture component which included values that support and
encourage innovation (facilitative leadership, collaboration, and tolerance for
risk taking and no blame behaviour);

•

An organisational innovation intensity component which incorporated a multi
innovation focus – product, managerial, process, marketing, and strategic
innovation.

The three preconditions and their underpinning constructs are depicted in Figure 4.12
while the OIC framework components, supporting constructs and linkages are
presented in Figure 4.13.
Adaptive learning
Organisational Learning
Capability

Generative learning
Unlearning
Business model design & ecosystem
shaping
Entrepreneurial discipline

Strategic
Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurial intentionality
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk taking propensity
Strategic alliance partner
identification and assessment

Alliance Building
Capability

Alliance learning
Creation of idiosyncratic alliance
resources and capabilities

Figure 4.12 Case-derived Preconditions and their Underpinning Constructs
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Preconditions

Organisational learning
capability

OIC Components

Externally focused
innovation learning
structures and processes
Embedded resource sharing
external collaboration

Innovation absorptive
capability

Organisational
innovation intensity

Transformative and
exploitative learning
Multi innovation focus –
Product, Managerial,
Process, Marketing
Strategic innovation: new
business model

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Innovation
infrastructure capability
renewal

Innovation Management
System
Innovation experience
Innovation memory
Facilitative leadership

Alliance building
capability
Innovation culture

Collaboration
No blame

Figure 4.13 Organisational Innovation Capability Framework as derived from
the Case Analysis
4.8

Preconditions required to support an OIC

Weerawardena contends that the firm’s entrepreneurial intensity is the key factor
determining its capability building activity (2003 p. 410). The case analysis supports
this position as where there was either moderate or strong levels of strategic
entrepreneurship the impetus existed for organisational learning, such as learning
about markets, learning about customers, learning about new research and learning
about building system efficiency and effectiveness. Management sensed, in their
strategic decision-making, the changing environmental conditions and the need for
business model revision or overhaul, and proactively and purposefully took measured
business risks in identifying and entering adjacent (COSBU) or new markets
(COFBU) and building strategic alliances. It was the entrepreneurial decisions which
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provided the basis for differentiating these business units from their competitors. The
analysis of the COFBU and COSBU case studies also suggests that there was a strong
correlation between the strength of the strategic entrepreneurship and other
preconditions and the subsequent development of the four innovation capability
components. Conversely, in the negative case, as a consequence of the absence of
strategic entrepreneurship, there was limited organisational learning and similarly low
levels of the other OIC dimensions.

Strategic entrepreneurship provided the purpose (intentionality), focus (discipline)
and impetus from most innovation behaviours and played a key role in the innovation
capability building routines of the COFBU and COSBU.

The pre-eminence of

strategic entrepreneurship is also supported by the experience of the COFBU where
the dynamic capabilities built were designed to assist in achieving evolutionary
fitness, in part by helping to shape the evolving aerospace environment in Australia.
This environment shaping element of dynamic capabilities is entrepreneurial in nature
supporting Teece who equated the importance of entrepreneurial fitness with
evolutionary fitness (2007, p. 1321). The combination of evolutionary fitness with
strategic entrepreneurship results in the expanded definition of innovation intensity
from an internal focus to include innovation of the business model and ecosystem.
Through strategic entrepreneurship the COFBU identified the need for strategic
renewal beyond the boundaries of the firm. In doing so, by its proactive leadership, a
new business model was designed which reshaped its ecosystem. The new business
model directly impacted on organisational innovation intensity and, in particular,
strategic innovation.

Strategic entrepreneurship and organisational learning capability are important in
shaping innovation culture. In particular, facilitative leadership provided the impetus
for the behaviour change required to foster and encourage innovation. Facilitative
leadership created the “right environment” (either from a cultural or structural
perspective) to encourage knowledge sharing and collaboration, and the
psychological safety to challenge the status quo (Edmondson 1999) and take
innovation risks without the institutionalised blame. Consistent with Augier and
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Teece this leadership also led the organisation forward to seize opportunities that
were sensed by the firm’s entrepreneurial function (2009, pp. 417, 418).

It was entrepreneurial proactiveness and intentionality that focused the COFBU and
COSBU’s attention on the identification and assessment of alliance partners and
complementary external knowledge sources that could accelerate learning and
capability development or provide augmented resources. The external focus of the
alliance building capability suggests a strong relationship between innovation
absorptive capacity and organisational innovation intensity.

The presence of

innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking propensity were also strongly
associated with (a) knowledge acquisition through exploration and, therefore, alliance
building capability and innovation absorptive capacity, (b) challenging assumptions
to create generative learning and, therefore, the organisational learning capability, and
(c) the rapid development of new behaviours to leverage learning and, therefore,
innovation culture. These causal associations observed in the case data are consistent
with those described in Slater and Narver (1995, p. 68).

Learning from external organisations (a component of an organisational learning
capability) is facilitated through an effective and efficient alliance building capability
(particularly the alliance learning construct) and integrated through an innovation
absorptive capacity (particularly the transformative and exploitative learning). The
case analysis supports Slater and Narver’s contention that “(o)rganisational learning
is a function of the form and strength of the organisation’s interdependence with its
learning partners” (1995, p. 70). Organisational learning capability is an important
driver of an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal. Learning from and about
innovation became entrenched in organisational memory and experience and was
deployed to renew the innovation management system.

Innovation culture was both a facilitator of and driven by the CO’s organisational
learning capability. Leadership values and attitudes to the status quo and existing
mental models determined whether behaviour change and generative learning took
place within the business unit. This relationship between culture and learning also
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provided the organisational flexibility to reconfigure architecture or resources to meet
environmental changes. The learning experiences, such as the COSBU’s “failing
forward” where no blame was attached to failure, also became embedded in the
innovation culture.
4.9

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the analysis of the data collected, identified key themes
and patterns in the data and revealed new understandings of innovation capability
preconditions and OIC components in each of the three embedded case studies. The
case analysis explored the embedded and inherited path dependencies of the three
business units to establish how those path dependencies affected each case in its
response to internal and/or external environmental pressures and how or if they
embraced change in their approach to innovation. The data was interrogated to
identify how each business unit’s innovation approach emerged.

In the case comparison, triggers of organisational change were identified as well as
similarities and differences in approaches in the formation each OIC.

An OIC

framework was developed based on the case comparison with three preconditions and
four OIC components.

The three preconditions which facilitated renewal of an

innovation capability are strategic entrepreneurship, organisational learning capability
and alliance building capability. The four components of the OIC are an innovation
absorptive capacity, an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal, an innovation
culture and organisational innovation intensity. Constructs defining each of these
preconditions and OIC components were also identified from the case analysis and
the interrelationships between the preconditions and OIC dimensions supported.
Chapter 5 provides a comparison between capability preconditions, components and
linkages between the literature and case-derived OICs. The Chapter continues with
an outline of the contributions of the research to innovation theory and management
practice.
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Chapter Five
5CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION

5.1

Introduction

In the continuous search for organisational competitive advantage, business and
academic commentators recognise that innovation is fundamental with the
expectation that it is endogenous to the firm (Hunt and Davis 2008, p. 12). However,
despite this universal recognition of the importance and value of innovation,
innovation success rates are at unacceptably low levels. Even more baffling is that
numerous innovation critical success factors lists have been compiled over the last
forty years, yet innovation is still a significant challenge for most organisations
(McKinsey 2010).

What most organisations have failed to recognise is that the very foundation of
entrepreneurship is the practice of systematic innovation (Drucker 1985, p. 31).
While there is often a focus on the new product development process, there has been
a failure to recognise that innovation is essential for the entire organisation, but, most
importantly, the management of innovation itself (Hamel 2005; 2006). “As Peter
Drucker often points out, every failure is a failure of management” (Leonard 1998,
p. 55).

The imperative for the development of an innovation management capability is
founded in the identification of barriers to innovation and the recognition that
organisational core capabilities can simultaneously be core rigidities (Leonard 1998,
p. 55; Newey and Zahra 2009).

Therefore, when an organisation operates in a

turbulent environment, a dynamic organisational innovation capability is essential.
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An organisational innovation capability (OIC) was conceptualised from the literature
in an IT solutions context. The literature derived OIC consisted of two preconditions
- organisational learning capability and entrepreneurial intensity – and three
components - organisational innovation intensity, market-focused learning capability
and innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal. The OIC was then studied in three
embedded business units within the one case organisation. As each business unit had
its own distinctive paths, processes and positions, the analysis provided an
opportunity to study the development of an OIC within different organisational
contexts.

This research focused on answering the following research question: “How can an
OIC be conceptualised in an information technology solutions context, and what is
the role of learning in organisational innovation capability renewal”. The intention
of this research question was to provide an explanation of the components of an
organisational innovation capability, the organisational preconditions that support its
renewal and the ability of the OIC to support innovations that are both continuous and
discontinuous to the organisation.

This fifth and concluding chapter provides a comparison between the capability
descriptors and linkages between the components of the literature and case-derived
OICs. The Chapter continues with an outline of the contributions of the research to
innovation theory and management practice.
5.2

Capability Descriptors: A Comparison with the Literature

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 consolidate the descriptors from the three embedded cases in the
case organisation (CO) and the OIC capability and identify where the descriptors
have been previously identified in the innovation literature. The Tables comprise
four columns with the first indicating the Preconditions/Components and Constructs;
the second, the key descriptors from the case analysis which support the constructs;
and the third the key concepts from the literature. The fourth column indicates
whether the descriptors from the case analysis support, extend, refute or are silent
with respect to the literature (Column 3). Where the literature has been extended a
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section entitled “Comments” has been added at the end of the precondition or
component. A more detailed analysis of the content of the Tables is included in the
Appendix.

While the analysis of the capability descriptors was generally supportive of the
innovation literature it has highlighted an expanded and integrated conceptualisation
of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition and innovation intensity OIC
component. In addition, it has provided alternative strategies for developing an
organisational learning capability and an innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal.

While most of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition have been
identified previously in the literature, this dissertation has brought them together for
the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship. Of particular
importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in
stimulating the development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an
organisational learning capability and an alliance building capability) critical to
developing an organisation-wide innovation capability. The case data confirmed that
where these preconditions were absent, innovation was contained within an
innovation development process and limited by individual product championing.

The inclusion of the traditionally accepted entrepreneurship constructs of
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking propensity has been supported by the
comparison between the case findings and the literature. The addition of the business
model design and ecosystem shaping construct, and entrepreneurial discipline provide
qualitative evidence in support of the current literature (Teece 2007, pp. 1325, 1326;
Drucker, 1985, p. 19; Helfat et al., 2007, p. 7). The final construct in the strategic
entrepreneurship precondition is entrepreneurial intentionality. While the definitions
of dynamic capability have a strong focus on intentionality of resource configuration,
the case analysis requirement for entrepreneurial intentionality focused on
intentionality at the strategic level.

The purposeful creation, extension, and

modification of a firm’s resource base is encapsulated in such a characterisation but,
while it is an important tool of strategic management, it is but one strategy tool from
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of a “dynamic set of initiatives, activities and processes” (George and Bock 2011,
p. 102).

The comparison also revealed a broader definition of the innovation intensity
capability. The first construct of the capability, multi-innovation focus – product,
managerial, process and marketing - is consistent with and supportive of the
literature. Through this research the definition has been extended from an internal
focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances
and its ecosystem. While success may lie with innovation of the firm’s products,
process or management behaviour, in dynamic markets managers must be prepared to
examine the sustainability of the firm’s business model and take appropriate steps to
refresh, rejuvenate or even retire the model.

Table 5.1 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability
Literature – OIC Preconditions
Preconditions

Case Descriptors

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Managers sense and shape the future,
address path dependency barriers and
augment knowledge assets to establish
new resources (Teece 2007).

Extend

Innovativeness,
Proactiveness,
Risk taking
propensity

The COFBU and COSBU
proactively surveyed their
environment, identified threats and
took anticipatory steps to transition
to new business models.

Conceptualised in terms of its
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk
taking propensity (Weerawardena
2003, p. 410).
Focus on looking outward/forward
(Cope 2005).

Support

Business model
design and
ecosystem
shaping

Evident in the selection and
implementation of the COFBU’s
differentiated and hard to imitate
through-life support business model.

Managers shape ecosystem and
marketplace outcomes through
innovation, entrepreneurship, and semicontinuous asset orchestration and
business reconfiguration (Teece 2007;
Garnsey et al., 2008).

Support

Entrepreneurial
discipline

COSBU – demonstrated by its move
from ad hoc to strategic
entrepreneurship.

“Discipline of entrepreneurship”
(Drucker 1985).
The business strategy provides focus
and a filter for all enterprise decision
making (Teece 2007).

Support

Entrepreneurial
intentionality

Purposeful steps taken to analyse the
exogenous “shock” and
development of new strategies to
pre-empt impact.

Dynamic capability definitions focus
on purposefulness (Helfat et al., 2007;
Zahra et al., 2006).

Support
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Case Descriptors

Preconditions

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Comments

The research was supportive of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition
which had been identified previously in the literature. However, this dissertation has brought
them together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship. Of
particular importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in
stimulating the development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an
organisational learning capability and an alliance building capability) critical to developing an
organisation-wide innovation capability.

Organisational
learning
capability

Case analysis reinforced the
importance of organisational
learning in a positive and negative
sense.

Adaptive
learning

All business units displayed
evidence of adaptive learning. In
COTBU, generally occurred in
response to a business crisis.

Generative
learning

Staff passionate about challenging
“old assumptions” and mental
models.Achieved through culture
(COSBU) and structure (COFBU).

Unlearning

as above

Comments

Organisational learning capability has been extended primarily though the identification of the
different strategies employed by two of the business units to achieve the same path dependency
breaking outcomes through generative learning and unlearning. While the COSBU achieved
this objective through its collegiate culture where staff were passionate about challenging “old
assumptions” and an unwillingness to accept the status quo, the COFBU achieved the same
generative learning paradigm through a change in organisational structure (project/domain
matrix) as this provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status
quo.

Organisational learning is endogenous
to the firm.
Provides the basis for learning about
marketplaces, clients, competitors and,
themselves (Hunt 1999).
Only capable of facilitating incremental
innovation (Baker and Sinkula 1999a).
Occurs within a set of recognised and
unrecognised organisational constraints
(Wang 2008).
Challenging paradigms, perceptual
filters and fundamental
beliefs/practices that define a firm’s
innovation processes (Baker and
Sinkula 1999a; 1999b; Kang et al.,
2007; Morgan and Berthon 2008).
Past learning inhibits new learning
(Sinkula 2002); unlearning crucial for
absorptive capacity (Cepeda-Carrion et
al., 2010).

Alliance
building
capability

Extend

Support

Extend

Extend

Support

Strategic
alliance partner
identification
and assessment

The focus of COFBU and COSBU
was on identifying partners to fill
their knowledge and capability gaps
and accelerate their learning.

Alliance
learning

Focus on accelerating external
learning through strategic alliance
partnerships at varying levels of
complexity.

Creation of
idiosyncratic
alliance
resources and
capabilities

Crucial aim of the COFBU’s OEM
strategy - develop exclusive and
idiosyncratic alliance resources and
capabilities which augmented the
firm’s resources.

In dynamic environments, knowledge
absorption is focused on exploration
(scope and flexibility dimensions) and
partners who have that knowledge (Van
den Bosch et al., 1999).
Important strategy for joint capability
building and learning (Hamel 1991)
and learning about the process of
alliance management (Kale and Singh
2007).
Firms need to move to systematic
investments in the alliance relationship
in order to create an idiosyncratic
combination of resources and
capabilities (Dyer and Kale 2007).

Support

Support

Support
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Table 5.2 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability
Literature – OIC Components
OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature
Extend

Organisational
Innovation
Intensity
Multi innovation
focus

Broad innovation focus
encompassing all aspects of the firm.

Internal innovation primarily focused
on products, processes, work
organisational systems or marketing
systems” (Weerawardena 2003).

Support

Strategic
innovation: new
business model

COFBU – new through-life support
business model.

See literature relating to Strategic
Entrepreneurship, Business Model
Design and Ecosystem Shaping (above)

Extend

Comments

The research extended the definition of organisational innovation intensity. The first construct
of the capability, multi-innovation focus – product, managerial, process and marketing - is
consistent with and supportive of the literature. Through this research the definition has been
extended from an internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model,
strategic alliances and its ecosystem.

Innovation
absorptive
capacity

Ability to exploit external knowledge a
critical component of innovative
capabilities/performance at all levels of
a firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).

Support

Embedded
resource sharing
external
collaboration

Collaborative knowledge sharing by
strategic alliance partners
entrenched in organisational
routines.

Collaboration, inter-partner trust
relationship interconnectedness and
openness are key behavioural
dimensions that demonstrate that a
relational association exists (Jarratt
2004; Inkpen 2000).

Support

Externally
focused
innovation
learning
processes and
structures

Development of structures and
processes to capture external
innovation knowledge from
complementary knowledge owners
or holder.

Learning structures and processes
focused on acquiring knowledge
external to the firm (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990; Lane and Pathak 2006;
van den Bosch et al., 2003).

Support

Transformative
and exploitative
learning

Understanding depth and breadth
dimensions provides alternative
strategies for transforming a firm’s
knowledge.

External knowledge must be exploited
and then applied in the
commercialisation of that knowledge
(Lane and Pathak 2006).
Knowledge has depth and breadth
dimensions (van den Bosch et al.,
2003).

Support

Focus on renewal leads to proactive
innovation and continuous learning
designed to anticipate customer needs
and necessary structural changes to
innovation infrastructure (Hunt 1999).

Extend

Portfolio management approach with a
balanced project mix, and continuous
and discontinuous innovations (Cooper
and Edgett 2003).

Extend

Innovation
Infrastructure
and OIC
Renewal
Innovation
Management
System

COSBU - Innovation Management
System included project
prioritisation routines and embedded
learning.
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OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature

COFBU - project/domain matrix
provided innovation knowledge
sharing.

Ecosystem framework to sense market
and technological opportunities (Teece
2007).

Innovation
experience and
memory

Development of organisation
routines to capture and share
innovation experience in structured
and unstructured ways.

Repetition and experimentation enable
tasks to be performed better and
quicker (Teece et al., 1997). Learning
becomes embedded into behavioural
routines (Moorman and Miner 1997).

Comments

This OIC component has been extended on a similar basis as to the organisational learning
capability through the identification of the different strategies employed. The difference in
approach between the COFBU and the COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms
involved in innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal. While the former’s focus was on
knowledge sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation management
system.

Innovation
culture

Extend

Behaviour which challenges
established organisational norms
(facilitative leadership); supports
learning (collaboration, Jarratt 2004, p.
302); provides an understanding of risk
taking in innovation (tolerance of
risk/no blame behaviour)
(Weerawardena 2003).

Extend

Essential to create the innovation
behaviour change needed to perform in
complex environments and to manage
paths to effective generative learning
(Slater and Narver 1995; Osterberg
2004).
Essential for knowledge sharing and
influences the type/depth of knowledge
from partners. Behaviours include
sharing information/ideas,
communication openness and
forbearance (Jarratt and O’Neill 2002).
A risk taking propensity is an essential
part of entrepreneurship in strategic
decision making (Weerawadeena
2003).

Support

Facilitative
leadership

Proactive leadership involved in
creating the right environment for
innovation.

Collaboration

Achieved through collegiate culture
and formal informal knowledge
sharing routines COSBU and
structural transformation (COFBU).

No blame

Importance of responsible risk
seeking propensity balanced by the
acceptance of failure in innovation
(failing forward).

Comments

The extension to innovation culture was primarily driven by the increase in collaboration
through alternative strategies. In the COSBU it was achieved through its collegiate culture and
formal and informal knowledge sharing routines while in the COFBU increased collaboration
was the result of its structural transformation. In addition, while risk taking is widely
recognised as imperative to innovation, this research stresses the importance of responsible risk
seeking propensity balanced by the acceptance of failure in innovation (failing forward).

Extend

Extend

The other primary contribution of this research is the contrast between how two
business units addressed the constraints of path dependencies and mental models
through different strategies. The strategy used by the First Business Unit (COFBU)
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and the Second Business Unit (COSBU) to overcome these barriers was generative
learning. The COSBU achieved this objective through its collegiate culture where
staff were passionate about challenging “old assumptions” and unwillingness to
accept the status quo. This generative approach enabled the COSBU to gain a
reputation for solving difficult problems and anticipating client needs (SBU1).

By contrast, the COFBU achieved the same generative learning paradigm through a
change in organisational structure (project/domain matrix) as this provided the
framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status quo. This structure
also provided the foundation for the COFBU’s innovation infrastructure and OIC
renewal as it facilitated the capture of innovation memory and the sharing of
innovation experience. The COSBU achieved the same renewal objective through its
line of business structures, its Strategic Technology Roadmap and collegiate culture.
5.3

Comparing OIC Frameworks

In the following section a comparison will be made between the framework derived
from the literature and the OIC framework that has emerged from the case analysis.
Figure 5.1 depicts the literature derived OIC superimposed over the case derived
OIC. The oval shapes with bolded lines and descriptors represent those preconditions
and constructs which are common between the two OICs. The dotted lines represent
a component and linkage from the literature derived OIC (market-focused learning
capability) which has not been included in the case derived OIC. The remainder of
the Figure represents components and linkages in the case derived OIC not present in
the literature derived OIC.

The case derived OIC consisted of three preconditions – organisational learning
capability, strategic entrepreneurship (instead of the literature derived entrepreneurial
intensity) and alliance building capability. The third pre-condition, alliance building
capability, provided vital external knowledge sources to increase the depth or breadth
of knowledge within the business unit (van den Bosch et al., 2003, p. 14). While two
of the same components from the literature derived OIC were present (organisational
innovation intensity and innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal), two additional
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components emerged from the case analysis (innovation culture and innovation
absorptive capacity). The market-focused learning capability component evidenced
through the literature review was incorporated in the organisational learning
capability pre-condition.
Preconditions

Organisational learning
capability

OIC Components

Innovation absorptive
capacity

Organisational
innovation intensity
Strategic
entrepreneurship

Innovation
infrastructure and
OIC renewal
Alliance building
capability
Innovation culture

Key
Oval shapes with bolded lines and descriptors preconditions and constructs which are common
between the two OICs
Dotted lines - a component and linkage from the
literature derived OIC which has not been included in
the case derived OIC.
Remainder - components and linkages in the case
derived OIC not present in the literature derived OIC.

Market-focused
learning capability

Figure 5.1 Organisational Innovation Capability Framework Comparison
5.3.1

OIC Preconditions

5.3.1.1 Strategic Entrepreneurship
In the literature derived OIC entrepreneurial intensity was defined in terms of
innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking propensity (Weerawardena 2003,
p. 410). While this analysis has reinforced the importance of these constructs, three
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additional constructs were added as the literature derived entrepreneurial constructs
were not, of themselves, sufficient to achieve competitive advantage.

Following Teece’s submission that firms “with good dynamic capabilities will have
entrepreneurial management that is strategic in nature…” (2007, p. 1344),
entrepreneurial intensity (a dimension of the literature derived OIC) emerged from
the case data as strategic entrepreneurship to reflect the need for entrepreneurial
behaviour to be exercised with a purpose (entrepreneurial intentionality) and in a
systematic and disciplined manner (entrepreneurial discipline). This is an important
finding from the research and a key difference between the two models.

While the three original entrepreneurial intensity constructs were similar between the
two frameworks, there were distinct differences in application.

Innovativeness,

proactiveness and risk taking propensity take place within a context including
different industries, technologies, functional areas and organisations (Helfat et al.,
2007, p. 7). For example, Weerawardena determined the entrepreneurial intensity of
machinery and equipment manufacturing and metal products manufacturing firms
(2003, p. 414). According to IbisWorld (2008), these industries are in the mature life
cycle stage where the industry is growing slower than the economy (over an extended
period), innovation is focused on existing products and there is the rising threat of
import penetration. In addition, there is typically a well defined and established
product market which provides little incentive to undertake the manufacture of new
goods which can be a time consuming and costly procedure.

Accordingly, the

entrepreneurial intensity measures are predominantly product, service or project
related with only one measure extending beyond these limitations (item 10,
Weerawardena 2003, p. 427). Weerawardena also acknowledged that research in
other industries, particularly the rapidly growing services sector, is required to
validate the relationships explored in his study (2003, p. 420). The sixth component,
business model design and ecosystem shaping (following Teece 2007, p. 1341), is
included to reinforce the importance of looking for innovation at a more fundamental
level than product, service or project and often beyond the firm’s boundaries.
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5.3.1.2 Organisational Learning Capability
In both frameworks organisational learning capability was of high importance. The
case analysis supports the view that organisations are residues of past learning with
the lessons of prior successes and failures embodied in their routines (Grey and
Antonacopoulou 2004, p. 23; Edmonson and Moingeon 1998, p. 7). These routines
dominated the CO’s organisational life with the result that “action stem(med) from a
logic of appropriateness or legitimacy, more than from a logic of consequence or
intention” (Levitt and March, 1998, p. 320).

Wijnhoven’s argument that there is a direct relationship between environmental
complexity and dynamics and learning needs (2001, p. 183) is supported from the
case analysis although it is the accuracy of management’s perception of the
environment which is of importance. As the COFBU and COSBU’s complex and
dynamic environments were characterised by a wide diversity of dissimilar
environmental factors which were in a constant state of change, learning needs were
high and, therefore, double loop learning was required to develop and innovate
existing action-outcome theories and mental models (Wijnhoven 2001, pp. 183, 185).
Successful innovation required each business unit to adopt a new way of looking at
things and it was generative learning and their unlearning capability, which enabled
the COFBU and COSBU to question long held assumptions and mental models
(Senge 1990, p. 8; Argyris 1999, p. 68).

By contrast, it was the COTBU

management’s bounded perception of the environment, the inadequacy of its
inherited adaptive learning orientation and the absence of a generative learning
approach which led to its poor business performance.

From each of the three case studies organisational unlearning was as important as
organisational learning (Sinkula 2002; de Holan, Phillips and Lawrence 2004, p. 49,
Fiol and Lyles 1985, p. 804). It was essential to counteract the path dependent mental
models and defensive routines, eliminate old logics and develop new approaches in
order to achieve superior value for the stakeholders (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). As
the competitive intensity of the market in which the business units competed was
changing (in the case of the COFBU and COSBU) or novel (in the case of the
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COTBU), unlearning was required to reorient the organisational values, norms and
behaviours by changing cognitive structures, mental models, dominant logics, and the
core assumptions which guided behaviour (following Sinkula 2002, pp. 255, 256).
Perhaps this also offers an explanation of why the market learning capability in the
case data was integral to the organisational learning capability, and a separate
dimension of the OIC within the literature derived structure.

The difference in how the COFBU and COSBU learnt should also be noted as the
former’s learning and knowledge sharing processes were based on its reconfigured
organisational project/domain matrix structure. By contrast, the COSBU achieved its
generative learning through its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies. Both of
these strategies appeared successful in leveraging innovation.
5.3.1.3 Alliance Building Capability
The alliance building capability was not a dimension of the literature derived OIC.
Strategic alliances have been defined as the “relatively enduring interfirm cooperative
arrangements, involving flows and linkages that utilise resources and/or governance
structures from autonomous organisations, for the joint accomplishment of individual
goals linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring firm” (Parkhe, 1991, p. 581).
Following Dyer and Kale’s argument that relational capabilities are preconditions for
firms to access the benefits of their networks, it is argued that this capability was
critical as a precondition because of the close correlation between it and innovation
absorptive capacity and the need to move quickly in reconfiguring its market
position.

The establishment of alliances with partners with complementary

knowledge was the impetus for the implementation of the innovation absorptive
capacity and a major contributor to achieving environmental fitness (Dyer and Kale
2007, p. 71). The formation of alliances was also important in helping the COFBU
manage the increased perceived competitive complexity within its target markets
(Mazzarol and Reboud 2008, p. 248).

Traditional models adopt a more organisational centric understanding of innovation
and the incorporation of an alliance building capability within an OIC framework is
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recognition of the fundamental importance of alliances as sources of innovation,
reflecting a stakeholder approach to innovation. Therefore, the case data confirms
that an OIC represents the integration of innovation, relationship linking, and market
linking, i.e. the core marketing capabilities.
5.3.2

OIC Components

5.3.2.1 Innovation Absorptive Capacity
In the literature derived OIC the innovation absorptive capacity was not a component
as external learning was derived from market focused learning (Weerawardeena
2003). The case analysis supports the view that there is a recursive relationship
between innovation and absorptive capacity (Lane and Pathak 2006, p. 849). In the
framework arising from the case analysis the innovation absorptive capacity was
comprised of three constructs – externally focused innovation learning structures and
processes, embedded resource sharing external collaboration, and transformative and
exploitative learning.
5.3.2.2 Organisational Innovation Intensity
Weerawardena defined innovation as “the application of ideas that are new to the
firm, to create added value either directly for the enterprise or indirectly for its
customers, regardless of whether the newness and added value are embodied in
products, processes, work organisational systems or marketing systems” (2003,
p. 412). While the definition appears expansive, its primary focus is innovation
within the boundaries of the firm, an approach consistent with the early broadening of
the definition of innovation from technical innovation to non-technological valuecreating activities. The measures that were adopted by Weerawardena reinforce this
view as they capture the extent of the firm’s product, process, managerial, and
marketing innovations with high scores on the innovation intensity scale indicating
that the firm has introduced radical innovations in the four value creating activities
(2003, p. 415). This current analysis parallels the discussion with respect to strategic
entrepreneurship where the narrowness of the definition emanated from the mature
manufacturing industries chosen for analysis by Weerawardena.
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Like strategic entrepreneurship, the COFBU and COSBU provide a more expansive
definition of innovation intensity. For the COFBU, innovation intensity encompassed
both technological and non-technological innovation within the firm but, because of
the loss of its manufacturing business, also extended to “improvement in the business
model itself” (FBU4) and, by implication, innovation of the ecosystem in which it
operated even though the customer remained the same. Similarly, the COSBU sought
to sell its security solutions to a new target market. While this form of innovation
could arguably be included within Weerawardena’s intensity measures (perhaps
under the headings managerial or marketing innovations), the data suggests that
innovation of a target market, i.e. market leadership, would be an explicit measure of
a market learning capability.

Therefore, as a consequence of this research, the

understanding of innovation intensity has been expanded beyond product, process,
managerial, and marketing innovations to innovation in relation to primarily external
factors such as the business model and strategic alliances.
5.3.2.3 Innovation Infrastructure and OIC Renewal
From the case analysis, the innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal component
included the establishment and renewal of the firm’s innovation management system,
and the accumulated experience, expertise and knowledge embedded in the
organisational memory. The difference in approach between the COFBU and the
COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms involved in innovation
infrastructure capability renewal.

While the former’s focus was on knowledge

sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation
management system.

The move to formalise the project/domain matrix structure was a key initiative by the
COFBU. This structure removed the functional barriers that constrained knowledge
flow, facilitated the sharing of innovation experiences, increased innovation memory
as well as access to that memory, and encouraged open-minded communication
within a commonly held framework.

It also increased the number of strategic

partners with whom it shared, acquired and developed complementary knowledge.
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The COSBU’s focus was on its Strategic Technology Roadmap which, when
combined with its Product Portfolio and Stage-gate processes, achieved a disciplined
ideation capture and management process for new products/solutions, processes and
management ideas. For these two business units infrastructure renewal was driven by
the need to ensure that innovation achieved commercial, and not simply research,
outcomes (a function of its strategic entrepreneurship) as well as the need to ensure
that the new business model and its associated routine and process changes were
rapidly adopted (organisational learning capability). For the COSBU, this analysis is
consistent with the view that portfolio planning and management is a dynamic
capability that lies at the heart of routine adaptability of the organisation (Newey and
Zahra 2009, p. S97).
5.3.2.4 Innovation Culture
The fourth component of the case derived OIC is innovation culture, which included
facilitative leadership, collaboration and a no blame orientation. Culture can act as a
de facto governance system as it influences the behaviour of individuals (Teece et al.,
1997, p. 520).

The CO’s culture comprised Schien’s three cultures of management (1996): firstly,
an operationalisation culture responsible for the delivery and production of key
assets; secondly, an engineering culture responsible for the engineering design of
infrastructure assets; and thirdly, an executive culture. This amalgam of cultures
originated in the CO’s predecessor and was transferred notwithstanding the change in
the ownership structure. The engineering culture was characterised by “problem
oriented knowledge workers…focused on delivering acceptable products to their
customers” with those in executive management in the “deep command and control
hierarchy” preoccupied with “increasing short term shareholder-added value” at the
expense of longer term objectives such as innovation (Cor4).

As Slater and Narver concluded, there is a correlation between entrepreneurship and
organisational culture as new behaviours can leverage learning (1995, p. 68). These
behaviours generally enable the entrepreneurial firm to “innovate, initiate change, and
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rapidly react to change flexibly and adroitly” (Naman and Slevin 1993, p. 137). In
the OIC developed from the case analysis, it was essential that the three business
units recognised, understood and confronted the strategic limitations of the CO’s
culture and its impact on their business operations.
5.3.3

OIC Component Relationships

While entrepreneurial intensity was one of the two preconditions identified in the
innovation literature its importance was not compelling.

Zahra et al., without

differentiating between preconditions and components, identified entrepreneurship as
the starting point for dynamic capability development as it influenced the selection of
skills and resources and promoted organisational learning processes to capture
external knowledge as new situations arise (2006, p. 925).

This research identified strategic entrepreneurship as the commencement point for the
development of an OIC as it provided the impetus for the organisational learning
capability (the learning orientation) and the alliance building capability (the learning
focus). Without the proactiveness and intentionality of strategic entrepreneurship,
possibly prompted by the likelihood of an exogenous shock, the OIC development
process was unlikely to have commenced. In the literature, entrepreneurial intensity
was linked to the organisational innovation intensity and the innovation infrastructure
and OIC renewal. While the case-derived strategic entrepreneurship precondition had
the same linkages, it was the nature and strength of the linkages, rather than their
existence, which was of importance. Strategic entrepreneurship extended innovation
intensity from an internal focus to considered innovation of the business model and
elements of the firm’s ecosystem.
5.4

Further Implications for Theory

5.4.1

Opening the Organisational Innovation “Black Box”

By opening the innovation “black box”, this research has provided a higher order
capability which may provide some guidance to strategic managers as they attempt to
build, systematise and replicate an innovation capability within their organisations.
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The OIC is a capability which provides managers with the capacity to manage the
component capabilities of the framework together with their linkages and
interdependencies. It enables managers to impact the firm’s existing “resource base
and transform it in such a way that a new bundle or configuration of resources is
created so that the firm can sustain or enhance its competitive advantage” (Ambrosini
and Bowman 2009, p. 35).

The OIC framework which emerged from the case analysis answers the call to
address the “abstract and intractable” nature of dynamic capabilities (Danneels 2008,
p. 536) through detailed, micro mechanisms based on qualitative fieldwork to identify
how a capability is deployed and how it works (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 37).
Through the analysis of the formation of an OIC in three embedded business units in
the CO, this research has focused on understanding the complex world of
contemporary experience from the point of view of its participants (Yin 2009, pp. 8,
11), and, in doing so, provided a closer, richer, thicker, more subjective view of an
idiosyncratic organisational innovation phenomena (McKelvey 2003, p. 6) beyond
the common unit analysis of the firm.

The research examined whether an OIC existed for the CO or whether the capability
is conceptualised differently depending on the organisational context of the business
unit. By exploring a dynamic capabilities perspective to innovation, the case analysis
demonstrated that although the three business units were embedded in the one case
organisation, one OIC was not common across the three business units. The analysis
found that different but interrelated OIC frameworks existed in the COFBU and
COSBU and that a third model was beginning to emerge in the COTBU. Although
each model exhibited some differences in dimensions and the constructs defining
those dimensions, nevertheless a common framework emerged out of the cross-case
analysis of the two positive cases and the negative case. The difference between the
three OICs reflected the different environmental contexts, management’s perceptions
and interpretations of those contexts, and the effectiveness of management’s actions
in relation to the constraints of path dependency.
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Despite the different component names there was a high degree of commonality in
the intent and operation of the respective components and this commonality
facilitated the development of the OIC from the case data. This outcome supports the
view that “while dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details…specific
dynamic capabilities…exhibit common features that are associated with effective
processes across firms” (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, 1108). For instance, a primary
strategy of the COSBU was to “create the right environment” for innovation (SBU1).
A major environmental element was its collegiate culture which was characterised by
open communication, respect for the views of colleagues and a willingness to
collectively solve difficult technical problems. For the COFBU the focus was on
increasing employee engagement through peer to peer knowledge sharing, a “can do
attitude” and high degree of personal accountability (FBU4). It was also moving
quickly to tolerate failure without blame while the COSBU had the same approach
although expressed in terms of “failing forward” (SBU1).

The case derived OIC consists of three preconditions – an organisational learning
capability, strategic entrepreneurship and an alliance building capability – and four
components - innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal, an integrative innovation
absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and organisational innovation intensity.
Idiosyncratic constructs for each of the preconditions and components have been
derived from the case studies. From the case analysis, an OIC is defined as a higher
order capability which has the capacity to systematically reconfigure the firm’s
resource base in order to transform knowledge and ideas into new business models,
products, processes and systems for the benefit of the firm and its stakeholders.

The case analysis also supports Eisenhardt and Martin contention that “(t)he
existence of common features among effective dynamic capabilities does not,
however, imply that any particular dynamic capability is exactly the same across
firms” by demonstrating that while the OIC’s in the two positive cases had common
attributes, the constituent elements of those differed and also, there are many starting
points and “multiple paths (equifinality) to the same dynamic capabilities” (2000,
pp. 1109, 1116). The development of the innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal
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of the COFBU and COSBU reflected their different starting points and organisational
contexts, similar though different paths and the different decisions of their respective
managements. However, they serve to illustrate this argument as the capability was
established through the COFBU’s project/domain matrix structure while for the
COSBU the same objective was achieved through its Strategic Technology Roadmap,
stage gates and its portfolio planning approach. Similarly, the COFBU’s structure
provided the foundation for its generative learning while the COSBU achieved this
objective through its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies.
5.4.2

Intentional and Disciplined Strategic Entrepreneurship

Ireland et al. highlighted the need for empirical research “to explicate and understand
how entrepreneurial leaders manage resources strategically to create competitive
advantages” (2003, p. 983).

Welter argued that a contextualised view of

entrepreneurship is required to increase our knowledge of when, how, and why
entrepreneurship happens and stresses the need for qualitative research to capture the
richness and diversity of organisational context (2011, pp. 176, 177). O’Connor et al.
commented on the difficulty experienced by firms “in making an immediate, strong,
shared

or

consistently

helpful

connection

between

‘discipline’

and

‘entrepreneurship’” and in the understanding of entrepreneurship as bricolage
(freedom to play and do whatever is necessary) and disciplined thought and
activity…” (2007). This research provides valuable insights into these and other
entrepreneurship issues and increases the understanding of its nature, richness and
dynamics (Zahra 2007, p. 451).

This research has brought together for the first time the previously identified
entrepreneurship

components

and

provided

a

framework

for

strategic

entrepreneurship. In doing so, while supporting the innovation literature and the
inclusion of each construct, it extends the current understanding of entrepreneurship
by combining it with the intentionality and discipline of strategic management to
complement the risk orientation inherent in entrepreneurship. While Helfat et al.
consider that entrepreneurship and strategy are often linked (2007, p. 1), this research
suggests that the linkage is a requirement for innovation success.
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Weerawardena’s entrepreneurship model reflects the display of firm behaviours
(innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking propensity) (2003, p. 410) without
identifying the underlying causes and the firm’s level of intentionality in
implementing those behaviours. Entrepreneurial intentionality has been included as a
construct as the invisibility of innovation critical success factors and the low
innovation success rate (Cooper 1999, pp. 2, 8, 9; de Waal, Maritz and Shieh 2010)
requires the development of an organisational capability to bring about innovation
such that “the outcome bears a definite resemblance to what was intended” (Dosi et
al., 2000, p. 2; see also Helfat et al., 2007, p. 4). It should be noted that the source of
the purposefulness arises from the entrepreneurial mantra to identify and respond to
change to achieve a higher productivity and yield (Drucker 1985, p. 25).
Intentionality is important as an “organisation that adapts in a creative but disjointed
way to a succession of crises is not exercising a dynamic capability” (Zollo and
Winter 2002, p. 340).

The research supports Teece’s contention that the key strategic function of
entrepreneurial “management is to find new value-enhancing combinations inside the
enterprise, and between and amongst enterprises, and with supporting institutions
external to the enterprise”, develop new organisational structures and business
models and make brave decisions to develop new business models, ecosystems and
strategic architectures (2007, pp. 1341, 1346). It also emphasises the importance of
making disciplined and purposeful entrepreneurial decisions.

This intentionality

enables a firm to better prioritise the allocation of its scare resources (Teece 2007,
p. 1324) as the purposefulness narrows the search horizon and enables those
resources to be applied more effectively and efficiently.

This requirement for

intentionality is also consistent with the Zahra et al. definition of dynamic capabilities
“as the abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner
envisioned and deemed appropriate by the firm’s principal decision-maker(s)” (2006,
p. 924 emphasis added). The conceptualisation of entrepreneurial intentionality is
consistent with the entrepreneurial strategic vision of Ireland et al. which “represents
a commitment to innovation and entrepreneurial processes and behaviour that is
expressed as the organisation’s philosophical modus operandi” (2009, p. 26).
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Strategic entrepreneurship enables a firm to be more in tune with its business
environment and to sense changes or potential exogenous shocks and to proactively
find new and better opportunities for revenue generation and competitive advantage.
Newey and Zahra suggest that endogenous entrepreneurship, that is, “the firm’s
initiatives in developing new products, services and/or businesses arising from the
firm’s own internal opportunity recognition”, causes the firm to take the initiative
“without the dominating pressure from an exogenous shock” (2009, p. S83, emphasis
added). In the case analysis, the management of the COFBU and COSBU acted
through endogenous entrepreneurship in anticipation of an exogenous “shock” and, in
doing so, minimised the later impact of the exogenous “shock” when it occurred.
This proactive and anticipatory action enabled its entrepreneurial managers to sense
and shape the future, unshackle their business unit from the past, and implement
strategies to augmenting their knowledge resources, establishing new value
enhancing asset combinations, and transforming organisational structures to achieve
evolutionary and entrepreneurial fitness (Teece 2007, p. 1346).

The relationship between strategic entrepreneurship and organisational discipline is
evident from the need for the function that a dynamic capability performs to be
repeatable and to consist of patterned and practiced activity (Helfat et al., 2007, pp. 4,
5), for discovery to be grounded in organisational processes” (Teece 2007, p 1323)
and to be “a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the
organisation systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of
improved effectiveness” (Zollo and Winter 2002, p. 340). The firm’s ability to sense
opportunities and threats can also be facilitated if it explicitly or implicitly employs a
systematic and analytical decision making framework to assist in prioritising
innovation (Teece 2007, p 1323) at the level required to achieve environmental
fitness. The COSBU’s move from ad hoc to strategic entrepreneurship illustrates this
disciplined approach to strategic entrepreneurship.

Another point of difference between the case data and the literature is the application
of the measure “risk taking propensity”.

Weerawardena’s measures implicitly

support the view that the higher the risk the greater the entrepreneurial intensity
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(items 5, 7, 10, p. 427). For example, “a strong tendency for high risk investments
(with chances for very high rates of return)” is a factor which contributes
significantly to a high entrepreneurial intensity.

The positive cases suggest that while risk taking is important it must be related to
management’s perceptions of the environmental change taking place, and be designed
to shift resources from areas of low productivity and yield to areas of higher
productivity and yield (Drucker 1985, p. 25). It is not simply about having a high
tolerance for risk per se. In addition, the risk of not taking any action also needs to be
considered as the failure by the COFBU to take action may have resulted in the
closure of the business.

In the dynamic capabilities framework the entrepreneur/manager’s role in the modern
corporation is not necessarily an individual but a function which is part
Schumpeterian (the entrepreneur introduces novelty and seeks new combinations of
resources), part evolutionary (the entrepreneur endeavors to promote and shape
innovation learning) and part Porterian (as the entrepreneur seeks to achieve strategic
fit with its internally controlled assets and those of its alliance partners) (Augier and
Teece 2009, pp. 417, 418).

While recognising that entrepreneurship is multi-

disciplinary and a complex domain of human practice with few or no enduring rules
or solutions (O’Connor et al., 2007), this research has provided an increased
understanding of the role of management and entrepreneurship in achieving enhanced
business performance. It has also stressed the need for the entrepreneurial strategic
vision to be a “defining mind-set shared by the organisation’s top managers” (Ireland
et al., 2009, p. 40).
5.4.3

The Breadth of Innovation Intensity

The traditional focus of innovation has been on a firm’s products, processes,
management or marketing approach. As has been demonstrated in sections 5.3.1.1
and 5.3.2.2, Weerawardena’s innovation and entrepreneurial intensity measures were
developed in a manufacturing and metal products environment. In this environment,
where the market and technology is stable, the internally focused definition of
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innovation intensity is appropriate in order to minimise the development costs of
dynamic capabilities (Zahra et al., 2006, p. 942).

While this research supports

Weerawardena’s definition of innovation intensity, the definition has been extended
from the internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model,
strategic alliances and its ecosystem.

Accordingly, from the case analysis

commercial success was as dependent on management, entrepreneurship and business
model design and implementation as it was on technological innovation.

This broadening of the definition of innovation intensity expands the search horizon
for opportunities available to firms to achieve environmental fitness from within the
firm to include innovation opportunities of the firm’s architecture, its business model
or its ecosystem.

As the selection/design of business models is a key micro-

foundation of dynamic capabilities, management’s role is, particularly in rapidly
changing environments, to systematically deconstruct existing business models and to
evaluate each element with an idea toward refinement or replacement, and to design
the new integrated business model having regard to the anticipated business/customer
environment and the trajectory of technological development in the industry.

The COFBU case study illustrates, in a positive manner, the increased breadth of
innovation intensity and its management’s willingness to seek innovation beyond its
organisational and learning boundaries. While it implemented innovation within the
firm’s boundaries (processes, structure, culture), it also looked beyond its boundaries
to find a new business model in through-life support. By contrast, the COTBU
illustrates the constraints of a low innovation intensity (limited primarily to adaptive
technical innovation) and the failure to design and implement an effective business
model.

In today’s global economy, strategic managers must behave in an entrepreneurial
manner as the intensity of the firm’s innovation performance will determine whether
or not it continues to retain a competitive advantage. While success may lie with
innovation of the firm’s products, process or management behaviour, in dynamic
markets managers must be prepared to examine the sustainability of the firm’s
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business model and appropriate take steps to refresh, rejuvenate or even retire the
model. The anticipation of an exogenous shock may also lead to innovation within
the firm’s ecosystem as the firm seeks to achieve a sustainable competitive
advantage.
5.4.4

The Importance of Managerial Perception and Capability Intensity

When environmental changes occur or are anticipated, managers must interpret those
changes and decide upon a course of action, including the decision whether or not to
change the resource base.

The degree of alignment between management’s

perception of the environment and the actual change will impact upon the success of
the dynamic capabilities selected to bring congruence between the firm and its
environment.

The importance of managerial perception of the nature and degree of environmental
change has been identified as a key success factor determinant for dynamic
capabilities (Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S13). The role of managers in designing and
guiding strategic and organisational change is influenced by their perception and
interpretation of the external environment and, accordingly, they must be able to
“accurately sense changes in their competitive environment, including potential shifts
in technology, competition, customers, and regulation” (Harreld et al., 2007, p. 24,
emphasis added).

One reason why managers may misperceive or misinterpret

environmental signals is because their “bounded rationality” emanating from “their
history, their expectations, and the probabilistic judgments that they make when
scanning the organisational context will have an impact on the way they manage the
firm’s portfolio of resources” (Moliterno and Wiersema 2007, p. 1081). If managers
misperceive the impact of environmental changes they may develop inappropriate
capabilities (Adner and Helfat 2003, p. 1020; Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 39,
41; Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S22).

While the literature has focused considerable attention on the formation of dynamic
capabilities, the capability intensity level selected in the formation process
(regenerative, renewing or incremental (Ambrosini et al., 2009, p. S10) also needs to
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be considered. An appropriate dynamic capability can be identified for formation but
if the capability intensity level is inappropriate then the case analysis suggests it is
likely to fail. The cross-case analysis suggests that there is a correlation between the
degree of accuracy of a manager’s perception of the variance in the environment
(between the actual and perceived) and the level of capability intensity selected. The
COFBU and COSBU’s management both correctly recognised that there was a high
degree of environmental variance between its former and new environments.
Accordingly, the management selected a regenerative capability intensity to achieve
new change capabilities.

Conversely, the COTBU was a newly formed business unit. However, its starting
point reflected the paths of the CO – the supply of high value infrastructure products
to the government high level security sector (GHLSS). Its new environment, while
partly embracing this market, also extended to the GHLSS in the US and other
countries, as well as the commercial high level security sector (CHLSS).

Its

challenge was to develop change routines in and for an environment in which it had
limited or no experience. The degree of variance between its parent’s business paths
and its new environment was very high.

However, the COTBU’s management

perceived that the variance was low. The difference between the actual (very high)
and perceived (low), resulted in the COTBU deciding to renew its GHLSS capability
rather than seeking a fundamental reconstruction of its change capabilities.

This research has emphasised the importance of managerial perception and validates
the views of Adner and Helfat (2003) and Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) in relation
to this issue.

While these authors have highlighted the impact of managerial

perception this research has contributed to theory and practice by focusing attention
on the gap in perception between the actual environmental change and management’s
perception of that change, and the impact of the gap on both the nature and capability
intensity of the dynamic capabilities deployed to impact the firm’s resources.

In summary, the key contributions of this dissertation to theory are the development
of a comprehensive innovation capability framework that managers can employ
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within their organisations, and which places a primary focus on the organisational
precondition of strategic entrepreneurship (and in particular, the constructs of
discipline and intentionality) and the expansion of the definition of innovation
intensity.
5.5

Implications for Management Practice

5.5.1

Introduction

The case analysis has placed strategic entrepreneurship at the centre of strategic
management and in the building of an OIC. More importantly, it provides guidance
to managers in defining the firm’s competitive arena and ecosystem and the trajectory
of its future evolution through the co-ordination and assembly of disparate and
usually cospecialised elements.
5.5.2

The Importance of Understanding Path Dependencies

The dynamic capabilities framework recognises that the firm is shaped but not
necessarily constrained by its past. Accordingly, one of the key implications for
practice arising from the case analysis is the need for managers to make explicit the
path dependencies, and information, belief and behaviour barriers to innovation
within their firms, particularly where past learning inhibits or excludes new learning.
By identifying path dependencies and understanding their impact upon the intended
future direction of the firm in its quest for environment congruence, managers can
make a significant difference to achieving and retaining competitive advantage
through its investment choices and priorities, and through implementing strategies for
unlearning. The application of these capabilities is in itself an important class of
dynamic capabilities which “emerges around a manager’s ability to override certain
‘dysfunctional’ features of established decision rules and resource allocation
processes” (Teece 2007, p. 1327)

The key barriers to innovation which emerged from the analysis include:
(a)

the need for organisations to be aware that its strengths and capabilities can
simultaneously be weaknesses and, accordingly, that core capabilities can
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become core rigidities in the absence of dynamism in the maintenance,
development and continuous enhancement of that capability;
(b)

the inertia or complacency in relation to the subtle transformation of a core
capability to a core rigidity generally results from belief system barriers, where
there is a gap between theories in use and espoused theories, or from
information barriers, where information is excluded from consideration due to
pre-existing biases or mental models;

(c)

organisational behavioural barriers which manifest themselves in defensive
routines which are triggered by the possibility of embarrassment or threat
resulting in the entrenchment of a culture where failure is unacceptable,
inflexibility is embedded and errors not discussed without blame or criticism.

5.5.3

The Importance of Generative Learning and Unlearning

The case analysis reinforced the importance of having an effective organisational
learning capability to identify new knowledge and new sources of knowledge and,
most importantly, to challenge mental models and information barriers (cf. Mazzarol
et al., 2009 p. 338 where the emphasis is on thinking skills to challenge “strategic
myopia”). The emphasis from the case analysis was upon generative learning and
unlearning (i.e. changing the way we do things) as central to the dynamic capability
formation and renewal process. The COFBU and COSBU business units recognised
that their learning was a path dependent process in which what they learnt depended
on the knowledge they possessed, and both business units developed mechanisms to
provide a culture in which challenging the status quo was accepted as a norm.
Generative learning and unlearning enabled the COFBU and COSBU to recognise
their dysfunctional routines and prevent strategic blindspots (Teece and Pisano, 1994
p. 545).

As has been stated in sections 4.6.3.2 and 5.3.1.2, different methods of fostering and
promoting generative learning were developed by the COFBU and COSBU and these
provided options as to how managers can develop generative learning within their
firms at both an organisational and individual level. A change in organisational
structure (project/domain matrix) reinforced the generative learning paradigm within
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the COFBU and provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of
the status quo. This finding is consistent with that of Jarratt (2009) who confirmed
the importance of formal and informal structures in supporting learning and the
application of new knowledge.

This change in formal and informal structures was achieved in the COSBU through
its collegiate culture and recruitment strategies and its focus on solving difficult
technical problems. These organisational changes facilitated knowledge sharing and
problem solving and generated patterns of interactions that represented successful
solutions to particular problems. Through this disciplined approach new knowledge
was then embedded into the innovation management system, added to innovation
experience and stored in the innovation memory.

Generative learning was also fostered through boundary spanning behaviours and coordinated search routines where the focus was on identifying complementary
knowledge sources external to the firm.
universities and the RO.

These included research partners,

The COSBU case analysis emphasises that while

understanding how individuals and firms learn is important, what they learn is equally
important.

Managers must develop intentional and systematic generative search

routines based on product/solution and capability gaps within the firm to maximise
the acquisition, integration and exploitation of new knowledge from beyond its
learning and organisational boundaries.
5.5.4

Strategies for Increasing Absorptive Capacity

Absorptive capacity is the “ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal
1990, p. 128 emphasis added). A question which arises from this definition is, When
does the recognition of the knowledge value takes place and what is involved in the
process of recognition? Is the value proactively recognised and identified before the
new information is acquired? Is the value of information recognised systematically
through an organisational routine of knowledge identification and evaluation or does
recognition occur serendipitously?

Both the COFBU and COSBU proactively
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identified valuable knowledge that was not within their current knowledge base and
deliberately and strategically sought to acquire that knowledge (hence the linkage
between strategic entrepreneurship and innovation absorptive capacity). This early
recognition of the potential value of new knowledge and of potential alliance partners
who possessed such knowledge was an important factor in accelerating their
knowledge acquisition and integration, and therefore, the development of their
respective OICs.

The case analysis also provides guidance for managers in relation to the external
knowledge acquisition strategies that are available to them. Section 4.6.7 highlights
the options available to firms seeking to expand their organisational knowledge and
absorptive capacity. Consistent with van den Bosch (2003, p. 43), the case analysis
demonstrated that a firm can elect to firstly, increase its knowledge breadth by
acquiring knowledge related to its existing knowledge base but outside its current
learning boundary, secondly, it can increase the depth of its knowledge base by
acquiring more of the same knowledge it currently holds, or thirdly, increase the
breadth and depth of its knowledge base.

The question as to which of these

absorptive capacity strategies to adopt will depend on the dynamism in the firm’s
market, the likelihood of exogenous shocks and their anticipated impact on the firm,
as well as management’s perceptions of the firm’s environment and the impact of any
environmental changes.
5.5.5

The Importance of Coherence

The way in which a firm coordinates and integrates mutually consistent and
supportive resources and assets within the firm and between the firm and its
ecosystem determines the level of coherence between those routines. Through the
intentionality and discipline of strategic entrepreneurship, the firm leverages its
“architectural knowledge or knowledge about the ways in which the components are
integrated and linked together into a coherent whole” (Henderson and Clark, 1990,
p. 11). The architecture of system components may provide insight into the ways in
which OICs differ from each other and provide a source of competitive advantage as
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partial imitation of a successful model may yield zero benefits (Teece et al., 1997,
p. 519; Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 11).

The case analysis, particularly the COFBU and COSBU case studies, support the
view that an essential element to prevent imitation is the level of coherence between
the processes and routines, as both business units, in their own ways, were focused on
developing disciplined frameworks for innovation, behaviour and learning. Learning
was a critical objective as organisational learning was the product of synergies among
the management innovation practices and routines.
5.5.6

Understanding Capability Life Cycles

The concept of capability life cycle provides strategic managers with a common
language and way of thinking about the evolution of capabilities as well as
recognisable life cycle stages as they seek to increase their resource and capability
heterogeneity (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 998).

Consistent with the RBV, the

intentionality and discipline constructs of strategic entrepreneurship demonstrate the
need for strategic managers to understand the stage of the life cycle of their
capabilities, the capability options arising from the existing capabilities and, where
transformation is to take place, the intended development path trajectory of those
dynamic capabilities.

By understanding the life cycle of capabilities and their evolution over time managers
are better able to identify capability options and identify those which may best suit
environmental triggers. Failure to understand the evolutionary process of resources
and capabilities will limit management’s ability to “answer questions about
competitive advantage and disadvantage over time based on capabilities and
resources” (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 1008).

Depending upon the nature of

environmental factors, the selection of the renewal, redeployment or recombination
branches may lead to a substantial alteration to the original dynamic capability,
particularly if multiple episodes of branching along different renewal, redeployment
or recombination paths are involved (Helfat and Peteraf 2003, p. 1008).
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The COFBU provides a research-based case study of the way in which management
evaluated its capability options and identified a dynamic capability development path
and trajectory. It provides evidence and management insights into the founding and
development stages of the capability life cycle. With the retirement of its aircraft
manufacturing capability, the COFBU decided that its future lay in through-life
support. To accelerate its capability development in this related knowledge domain it
developed strategic alliances with overseas aerospace OEMs to accelerate its
capability development with this acceleration represented by the steepness of the
curve in Figure 4.1.

Key insights from this case study include the need for

management proactiveness in anticipating exogenous “shocks” before they occur, the
need for management to proactively retire a capability, the importance of identifying
the capability development trajectory and identifying ways to increase the steepness
of the capability curve (i.e. its speed of capability development).
5.5.7

Boundaryless Innovation

Another major path dependency is the architecture and structure of the firm with silos
common between business units, functions and projects. The case analysis provides
guidance for managers in building an OIC as awareness of the location and
permeability of the firm’s internal boundaries can provide opportunity for restructure
in order to increase knowledge sharing and collaboration. The COFBU provides an
example of how generative learning and increased innovation memory and
experience can result from a restructure of the firm.

This case study also

demonstrates that open innovation takes place beyond the internal boundaries and
extends externally to the boundary of the firm’s ecosystem and also to its learning
boundaries.

It also provides examples of both outside-in and inside-out open

innovation (Chesbrough and Garman 2009, p. 70). See Figures 4.2 and 4.11.
5.5.8

Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage

This research has confirmed management is not constrained by a prescribed
innovation capability framework.

The case analysis demonstrated that there are

multiple ways in which an OIC can flourish through establishing preconditions that
support their development and then building the core components of the framework.
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The preconditions and core framework of an OIC will be shaped by the paths and
positions of the firm, the accuracy of its managements perception of the environment
in which it operates and managerial actions taken in relation to those path
dependencies and to environmental changes.

Most importantly, the analysis

demonstrates that while history matters, historical paths can be changed by
disciplined and intentional entrepreneurial action.

Managers need to remember that the development and implementation of a dynamic
capability does not necessarily lead to competitive advantage.

The dynamic

capability literature supports the view that “there are more or less effective ways to
execute particular dynamic capabilities” (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p. 1108) with
the result that a firm can either achieve sustainable or temporary competitive
advantage, competitive parity or failure (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 38). The
COTBU’s initial activities in regard to dynamic capability formation were
unsuccessful and its management was forced, through this lack of success, to
recalibrate those capabilities.

Accordingly, the COTBU case study supports the

views that “dynamic capabilities may not necessarily have the intended effect or a
positive outcome” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 35) and that a change to the
resource base “implies only that the organisation is doing something different, but not
necessarily better, than before” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 5). The case data suggests that
an OIC will flourish where management attention has first been directed towards
developing preconditions that guide and sustain an OIC.

In summary, the key contributions of this research to practice include the imperative
for management to understand the nature of the firm’s path dependencies and their
impact upon organisational change, the imperative for generative learning to
challenging the status quo and the firm’s mental models, the criticality of the
preconditions supporting OIC sustainability and the accuracy of management’s
perceptions of the firm’s environment and the impact upon innovation capability
development. One other primary contribution is the emphasis upon coherency of the
way the components are integrated and linked together to form the OIC.
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5.6

Limitations

This research, like all research, suffers from some limitations.

Firstly, it has

investigated a single CO with its own peculiar characteristics, diverse business
contexts and three embedded units each with differing paths, positions and processes.
The business context included the CO’s broad industrial diversification and its
endeavours to capitalise on its acquisitions by expanding into new markets as well as
its transition from a single project GHLSS technology contractor to a broader supplier
of products and services to both the high level security sector and the commercial
sector. In addition, there are the idiosyncratic business contexts of each business
units.

Accordingly, the OIC, preconditions, components and their respective

relationships derived from the single case, despite the cautious and prudent approach
to the research methodology, raise questions in regard to the generalisability of the
findings.

Secondly, as the analysis is based on data from one firm, the ability to make interfirm comparisons is limited. The diversity of the business units of the CO provided a
limited basis for comparison between firms in other industries. Accordingly, as
dynamic capabilities are context-dependent, it is not clear to what extent the results
are generalisable across firms and industries as some of the dynamic effect captured
in this study could be lost in a non-IT solutions environments.

A third limitation is that the primary industry focus of the research was on IT
solutions firms operating in the GHLSS with a limited focus on the CHLSS. While
this research employed a holistic approach within the IT solutions environment there
may be other factors which impact the formation and development of an OIC. As the
OIC preconditions and components arose out of each business unit’s economic and
commercial environment and context, differing environments and contexts may
resulting in the identification of a different OIC framework or a similar framework
comprised of different preconditions and components.

Fourthly, as the qualitative research was conducted over several months it did not
provide opportunity to gain an understanding of the competitive advantage created
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over time or the challenges faced by the business units is sustaining any advantage
that was created. Ideally, a longitudinal study over at least several years supported by
suitable quantitative research would provide deeper and more robust insights into the
innovation capability formation process and any evolutions over time in the models
developed. Studies of this nature would increase the generalisability of the findings.

A final limitation may be the employment of the researcher by the CO. While this
employment assisted in the research and facilitated access to interviewees and
confidential information, there is the possibility that the researcher’s experience
within the CO may have influenced the selection of interviewees or led to a less
objective analysis of the cases. As Popper observed all observations are “theoryimpregnated” by the life experiences, dispositions and education of the researcher
(1972, pp. 71, 72).

For this researcher those life experiences, dispositions and

education included the researcher’s employment by the CO, his experience in
working in several parts of the CO and understanding of the operation of the CO. In
addition, the fact that the researcher was known to many of the interviewees may
have affected their response in some way.
5.7

Further Research

One major opportunity for future research is the conduct of longitudinal studies to
better understand the preconditions, components and constructs of the case derived
OIC to further open the organisational innovation black box. Several related research
questions could also shed light on the OIC. These questions include: Is there a
correlation between strength of strategic entrepreneurship precondition and the
strength of the organisational learning capability and the strength of the other OIC
components? Is it the strength of the strategic entrepreneurship and the strength of
the organisational learning capability that is correlated to a corresponding strength in
the other OIC components?

While Teece et al. (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) make no clear distinction
between capabilities performed at corporate rather than business unit level, the
business unit may have dynamic capabilities which could be enhanced by different
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capabilities applied at the corporate level (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293) and
presumably could also be constrained by those capabilities as well. “Because of
causal ambiguity we cannot be certain that particular activities that the centre engages
in will result in the creation of true resources that pass the VRIN 8 tests” and this leads
to “a possible blurring between (strategic business unit) level competitive strategy
issues, and corporate level strategy” (Bowman and Ambrosini 2003, p. 293).
Accordingly, one research opportunity is to examine the nature of the relationship
and interaction between corporate and business unit dynamic capability development
in respect of the creation of new rent generating resources. While there has been a
significant level of firm-level dynamic capability research there has been no research
on the way corporate level dynamic capabilities impact on firm performance and the
development and effectiveness of dynamic capabilities at the business unit level.

The concept of the learning boundary and its impact on organisational learning and,
consequently, innovation, is well known (Slater and Narver 1995). This case analysis
raises questions in regard to how best a firm can identify the nature of the recognised
and unrecognised constraints which constitute its learning boundary, the nature of and
the positioning of the learning boundary and how far a firm needs to go beyond the
learning boundary in order to secure the knowledge it seeks to acquire and develop.
A related issue, of particular relevance to the innovation absorptive capacity, is
identifying the strategies for facilitating the permeability of the boundary with trusted
partners in order to maximise its augmented resources.

The composition of components and attributes of an OIC depend on the nature of the
environmental changes (magnitude of difference between the current and anticipated
environment both actual and perceived) and the nature of the change required to bring
congruence with the environment.

Further research needs to be conducted on

managerial perception and the manner in which the accuracy of the management’s
perception of its environment impacts upon the selection and development of an OIC.

8

Valuable, Rare, Imperfectly Imitable, Non-substitutable (Barney 1991)
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Research could also be conducted to develop measures to quantify the existence and
strength of the preconditions, components and constructs of the OIC and the nature of
their relationships to each other. This analysis could also be extended to measuring
the strength of the OIC itself.

The focus of this research has been conducted at the firm level. Penrose emphasises
the importance of the individual and states that “experience produces increased
knowledge about things and contributes to ‘objective’ knowledge in so far as it
results can be transmitted to others. But experience itself can never be transmitted; it
produces a change – frequently a subtle change – in individuals and cannot be
separated from them” (2009, p. 48).

Accordingly, further research could be

considered into whether learning and entrepreneurial behaviours are truly firm level
constructs or whether it is an individual that influences the character and culture of
the organisation. This research could also consider questions around how and why
individuals interact with the firm to shape an OIC.

The final research opportunity is consistent with that identified by Ireland et al. - to
verify the “presence and strength of an entrepreneurial strategic vision as a defining
mind-set shared by the organisation’s top managers” (2009, p. 40, emphasis added).
While this research has identified the importance and existence of that vision, it has
not addressed in any quantitative manner the strength of that vision.
5.8

Conclusion

Innovation is regarded as the principal source of sustainable competitive advantage
(McKinsey 2010; Hunt and Davis 2008; Teece 1998, pp. 55-60; Leonard and
Sensiper, 1998, p. 112; Teece et al., 1997, p. 515), yet many firms approach
innovation haphazardly and without discipline, expecting another serendipitous
Newtonian apple to fall from the sky. These organisations appear poorly equipped to
implement a comprehensive innovation strategy as they focus only on incremental
innovation and are “genetically programmed to preserve the status quo” (Stringer
2000, p. 71).
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Applying the dynamic capabilities framework this research has answered the call for
fine-grained qualitative case studies to look at the detail of how dynamic capabilities
are deployed to better understand how these capabilities work in practice and whether
and how they might differ across firms (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 46). The
analysis of three embedded business units in the one case organisation has provided a
capability framework for strategic managers to build, systematise and replicate within
their organisations. It provides guidance to managers as they manage the component
capabilities

of

the

OIC

framework,

together

with

their

linkages

and

interdependencies, to transform the firm’s existing resource base to enable the firm to
sustain or enhance its competitive advantage” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, p. 35).

The analysis found that a different OIC existed in the COFBU and COSBU, and that
a third model was beginning to emerge in the COTBU.

Although each OIC

framework had different components and different constructs supporting those
components, common elements in each framework were identified. The cross-case
analysis enabled a case derived OIC to be developed comprising three preconditions
– an organisational learning capability, strategic entrepreneurship and an alliance
building capability – and four components - innovation infrastructure and OIC
renewal, an integrative innovation absorptive capacity, an innovation culture and
organisational innovation intensity.

Of these preconditions and components, strategic entrepreneurship was the most
prominent as it provided the linkage to all of the OIC components. Through its
proactiveness and intentionality, and, in association with the alliance building
capability, it provided the focus on externally focused innovation learning, the
integration and exploitation of that learning and the impetus for broadening the
innovation intensity beyond the boundaries of the firm and into its external
environment and ecosystem. Through its entrepreneurial discipline, its innovation
infrastructure is developed and renewed. Underpinning all of these relationships is
the focus on cultural change to provide the facilitative leadership to foster innovation,
the right environment for collaboration and knowledge sharing and the psychological
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safety to fail without blame.

This culture also provides the foundation for

questioning the status quo and existing mental models.

In summary, this research is part of the increasing momentum in understanding the
“how” of dynamic capabilities (Helfat and Maritan 2007, p. 37) by providing theory
that is interesting and testable (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 26). It provides
learning for management on how dynamic capabilities originate, how firms built and
deployed their OIC and how distinctive processes support the creation, modification,
reconfiguration and augmentation of firm resources to achieve competitive
advantage. Most importantly, it has provided a framework for an OIC which can be
applied in practice.
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Appendix
Semi-structured Interview Template
Date of Interview
Place of Interview
Interviewee’s Name
Interviewee’s job title
Interviewee’s BU
Time in current role
Previous roles within BU
Previous roles within
Case Organisation
Reporting lines
Industry background
Qualifications
Role in the innovation
process
1

Tell me how innovation happens in your BU

2a
2b
2c

Tell me about an innovation success story in your BU
What were the reasons for the success?
What about another success story?

3a
3b
3c

What about a story where the innovation wasn’t a success?
What were the reasons for the failure?
If there has been a failure, what happens next?

4

What stimulates innovation in your BU?

5

Do you have an innovation process?
How has your BU’s innovation process changed over time?
If there has been a change, what were the drivers for the change and how
have they been successful?

6

What impact does the structure of your organization have on your ability to
be successful at innovation consistently?

7

Does your organisational culture support or hinder innovation?

8

What barriers to innovation do you encounter?
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Table 5.1 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability
Literature – OIC Preconditions
Preconditions

Case Descriptors

Strategic
entrepreneurship

Innovativeness,
Proactiveness,
Risk taking
propensity

Business model
design and
ecosystem
shaping

Entrepreneurial
discipline

Entrepreneurial
intentionality

The COFBU and COSBU
proactively surveyed their
environment, identified threats and
took anticipatory steps to transition
to a new business model in throughlife support (COFBU) and to the
addition of sales to the CHLSS
(COSBU).
Evident in the selection and
implementation of the COFBU’s
differentiated and hard to imitate
through-life support business
model.

COSBU – demonstrated by its
move from ad hoc to strategic
entrepreneurship.
Established an innovation
management system to provide a
strategic and disciplined
methodology for ideation,
capability and knowledge
acquisition and prioritisation of
innovation.
Both the COFBU and COSBU took
purposeful steps to analyse the
likely exogenous “shock”.
COFBU - focus on boundary
spanning behaviours to acquire,
integrate and exploit external
knowledge, resulting in the new
business model.
COSBU - Strategic Technology
Roadmap dictated which
capabilities and products to develop
and projects to target.

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Entrepreneurial managers can sense and even
help shape the future, address path
dependency barriers and augment knowledge
assets to establish new resources (Teece
2007, p. 1346) .
Conceptualised in terms of innovativeness,
proactiveness and risk taking propensity
(Weerawardena 2003, p. 410.
Focus on looking outward and forward
(Cope 2005, p. 379).

Extend

Support

Managers shape competition, ecosystem and
marketplace outcomes through innovation,
entrepreneurship, and semi-continuous asset
orchestration and business reconfiguration
(Teece 2007, pp. 1325, 1344, 1345).
The business model guides the acquisition
and allocation of resources and specifies the
ensemble of routines needed for value
creation for customers and value capture for
the firm and its investors (Garnsey et al.,
2008, p. 222).
“Discipline of entrepreneurship” (Drucker
1985, p. 19).
The business strategy provides focus and a
filter for all enterprise decision making
(Teece 2007, p. 1326).

Support

Definitions:
• Focus on purposeful creation, extension,
and modification of firm’s resource
base” (Helfat et al., 2007, p. 7)
• Emphasis on the ability to reconfigure a
firm’s resources and routines in the
manner envisioned and deemed
appropriate by the firm’s management
(Zahra et al., 2006, p. 924).

Support

Support
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Case Descriptors

Preconditions

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Comments

The research was supportive of the elements of the strategic entrepreneurship precondition which
had been identified previously in the literature. However, this dissertation has brought them
together for the first time and provided a framework for strategic entrepreneurship. Of particular
importance, this research has highlighted the role of strategic entrepreneurship in stimulating the
development/renewal of linked organisational preconditions (i.e. an organisational learning
capability and an alliance building capability) critical to developing an organisation-wide
innovation capability.

Organisational
learning
capability

The case analysis reinforced the
importance of organisational
learning in a positive sense
(COFBU and COSBU) and in
negative sense (COTBU).

Adaptive
learning

All business units displayed
evidence of adaptive learning
although for the COTBU the
learning occurred generally in
response to a business crisis.

Generative
learning

COSBU - staff passionate about
challenging “old assumptions”
leading to a reputation for solving
difficult problems (SBU1).
COFBU - change in organisational
structure (matrix/domain)
reinforced the generative learning
paradigm and provided the
structural framework for knowledge
sharing and questioning of the
status quo.

Unlearning

as above

Comments

Organisational learning capability has been extended primarily though the identification of the
different strategies employed by two of the business units to achieve the same path dependency
breaking outcomes through generative learning and unlearning. While the COSBU achieved this
objective through its collegiate culture where staff were passionate about challenging “old
assumptions” and unwillingness to accept the status quo, the COFBU achieved the same generative
learning paradigm through a change in organisational structure (project/domain matrix) as this
provided the framework for knowledge sharing and questioning of the status quo.

Organisational learning plays an inherent
role in competition as it is endogenous to the
firm and as such provides the basis for firms
to learn about marketplaces, clients and
competitors and, themselves (Hunt 1999, p.
148).
Capable of facilitating incremental
innovation (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, p.
412).
Occurs within a set of recognised and
unrecognised organisational constraints
(Wang 2008, p. 638).
Involves challenging paradigms, perceptual
filters and fundamental beliefs and practices
that define a firm’s innovation processes
(Baker and Sinkula 1999a, pp. 412, 413;
Baker and Sinkula 1999b, p. 296; Kang et
al., 2007; Morgan and Berthon 2008, p.
1330).
Frame-breaking; more likely to lead to
competitive advantage than adaptive learning
(Slater and Narver 1995, p. 64).
Occurs when core firm competencies are
unlearned and new competencies are
explored in a proactive sense (Morgan and
Berthon 2008, p. 1331).
Past learning inhibits new learning (Sinkula
2002, p. 256).
The firm’s unlearning context is a crucial
determinant for absorptive capacity (CepedaCarrion et al., 2010).
Unlearn existing capabilities learn new ones
(Morgan and Berthon 2008, p. 1332)
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Extend

Support

Extend

Extend

Preconditions

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature
Support

Alliance
building
capability
Alliance
learning

COFBU - identification, assessment
and selection of OEMs was intended
to accelerate its external learning
focus and guide its learning efforts
towards capability sets with
immediate payoffs in its innovation
performance.

Strategic
alliance partner
identification
and assessment

Both the COFBU and COSBU
recognised that their business
environments were dynamic with a
consequent turbulent knowledge
environment so the focus was on
increasing their innovation absorptive
capacity by identifying partners to fill
their knowledge and capability gaps
and accelerate their learning.
Crucial aim of the COFBU’s OEM
strategy - develop exclusive and
idiosyncratic alliance resources and
capabilities which augmented the
firm’s resources.

Creation of
idiosyncratic
alliance
resources and
capabilities

Important strategy for joint capability
building and learning ideally to achieve
internalisation of some or all of the skills
each partner contributes to the alliance
(Hamel 1991, p. 84).
Also relates to the process of alliance
management (Kale and Singh 2007 p. 982).
In dynamic environments “a firm's
knowledge absorption is likely to be
focused on exploration and therefore on the
scope and flexibility dimension of
knowledge absorption” (Van den Bosch et
al., 1999, p.553). For this reason, the
identification and assessment of compatible
and strategically complementary alliance
partners is critical.
Firms need to move to systematic
investments in the alliance relationship in
order to create an idiosyncratic
combination of resources and capabilities
(Dyer and Kale 2007, p67).

Support

Support

Support

Table 5.2 Comparison between Case Descriptors and Innovation Capability
Literature – OIC Components
OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature
Extend

Organisational
Innovation
Intensity
Multi innovation
focus Product,
Managerial,
Process and
Marketing

In the COSBU, innovation
encompassed “the way we do
business, and that constantly evolves”
(SBU3).
COFBU - transformation in business
focus, and the mapping and review of
all processes to ensure that they
aligned with customer and
commercial drivers.

Internal innovation primarily focused on
products, processes, work organisational
systems or marketing systems”
(Weerawardena 2003, p. 412).

Support

Strategic
innovation: new
business model

COFBU – new through-life support
business model.

See literature relating to Strategic
Entrepreneurship, Business Model Design
and Ecosystem Shaping (above)

Extend

Comment

The research extended the definition of organisational innovation intensity. The first construct of
the capability, multi-innovation focus – product, managerial, process and marketing - is consistent
with and supportive of the literature. Through this research the definition has been extended from
an internal focus to include external factors such as the firm’s business model, strategic alliances
and its ecosystem.
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OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Innovation
absorptive
capacity

Literature

Impact on
Literature

The ability to exploit external knowledge is
a critical component of innovative
capabilities and innovation performance at
all levels of a firm (Cohen and Levinthal
1990, p. 128).

Support

Embedded
resource sharing
external
collaboration

COFBU’s alliance with OEMs was a
mutually beneficial and collaborative
learning dyad where partners had
similar basic knowledge but different
specialised knowledge. When they
shared their specialised knowledge
they assumed the role as teacher.

Collaboration, openness, inter-partner trust
and relationship interconnectedness are key
behavioural dimensions that demonstrate
that a relational association exists (Jarratt
2004, p. 302; Inkpen 2000, pp. 1026,
1027).

Support

Transformative
and exploitative
learning

Understanding depth and breadth
dimensions provides alternative
strategies for transforming a firm’s
knowledge.
COFBU significantly increased the
breadth of its knowledge while the
COSBU primarily increased the
depth and specialisation of its
knowledge.

To be exploited external knowledge must
be transformed, assimilated and integrated
and then applied in the commercialisation
of that knowledge (Lane and Pathak 2006,
p. 856).
Knowledge has depth and breadth
dimensions (van den Bosch et al., 2003, p.
14). An understanding of these dimensions
assists in targeting the knowledge to
acquire and the exploitation of that
knowledge.

Support

Externally
focused
innovation
Learning
structures and
processes

The COFBU and COSBU both
developed structures and processes to
capture external innovation
knowledge. COSBU – forming
relationships with external knowledge
providers to gain access to
complementary knowledge.
The COFBU’s Human Factor
Domain proactively kept informed of
the latest thinking in their domain
(members built networks and social
capital within the academic
community, with complementary
partners, and participated in academic
forums).

Focus on acquiring knowledge external to
the firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, p.
128; Lane and Pathak 2006, p. 856) and,
therefore, it follows that learning structures
and processes, will be externally focused
e.g development of routines to capture
knowledge from external partners who
have knowledge which will increase the
breadth or depth of the knowledge held
(van den Bosch et al., 2003, p. 14).
Essential structures include prior related
knowledge such as innovation learning
experience and skills, problem solving
methods and a shared language as well as
internal mechanisms (Cohen and Levinthal
1990, pp. 130, 133, 134).

Support
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OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Innovation
Infrastructure
and OIC
Renewal

This capability involves the
establishment of the innovation
infrastructure and the continued
renewal of the OIC.

Focus on renewal leads to proactive
innovation and continuous learning
designed to anticipate customer needs and
necessary structural changes to innovation
infrastructure (Hunt 1999, p. 154).

Extend

Innovation
experience and
memory

COSBU - introduced Cooper’s style
stage gate process combined with a
product portfolio approach to ensure
that its innovation management
system achieved the intended
business outcome.
Regular stage gate reviews enhanced
the COSBU’s innovation memory
and provide innovation experiences to
inform future decision-making.
COFBU - reconfigured organisational
structure so that its domain structure
overlaid its project structure.

Learning is a process where repetition and
experimentation enable tasks to be
performed better and quicker (Teece et al.,
1997, p. 520).
Innovation experience - innovation routines
become embedded into formal and
informal behavioural routines such as
information sharing mechanisms
(Moorman and Miner 1997, p. 92).
Innovation memory - subset of
organisational memory. Consists of mental
and structural and institutional artifacts
pertaining to innovation and stored for
future use (Kruse 2003, p. 334; Stata 1989,
p. 64).

Extend

Innovation
Management
System

COSBU - Innovation Management
System included processes to direct
internal R and D and select new
technologies and capability to
complement existing technologies
and capabilities, to tap developments
in exogenous science, to access
supplier and complementor
innovation and to identify changing
customer needs, and customer
innovation.
COFBU - project/domain matrix
provided vertical/horizontal
knowledge sharing. The COSBU
achieved the same flexibility
objective through its line of business
structures, its Strategic Technology
Roadmap and collegiate culture.

Need a portfolio management approach
with a balanced mix of high to low priority
projects, and continuous and discontinuous
innovations (Cooper and Edgett 2003).
An ecosystem framework to sense market
and technological opportunities includes
processes to direct internal R and D and
select new technologies, processes to tap
supplier and complementor innovation,
processes to tap developments in
exogenous science and technology, and
processes to identify target market
segments, changing customer needs and
customer innovation (Teece 2007, p. 1326).

Extend

Comments

This OIC component has been extended on a similar basis as to the organisational learning
capability through the identification of the different strategies employed. The difference in
approach between the COFBU and the COSBU demonstrated two options available for firms
involved in innovation infrastructure and OIC renewal. While the former’s focus was on
knowledge sharing, organisational structures and routines, the renewal process for the COSBU
focused on increasing the discipline and strategic alignment of its innovation management system.
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OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Innovation
culture

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Captured through behaviour which
challenges established organisational
norms (facilitative leadership); behaviour
which supports learning and the
dissemination of learning (collaboration,
Jarratt 2004, p. 302); and an understanding
of the fundamental role of risk taking in
innovation (tolerance of risk and no blame
behaviour) (Weerawardena 2003).

Extend

Facilitative
leadership

COFBU – initiated a performance
oriented cultural change and
introduction of domains to facilitate
the transfer, translation and
transformation of knowledge across
silos.
COTBU – tried to create an
environment where discussion of
innovation is more on the agenda,
increase openness of communication,
wider sources of ideation, new
knowledge sharing routines both
within and between functions
(TBU4).
COSBU – enhanced collegiate
culture; failing forward.

Facilitative leadership is essential to create
the innovation behaviour change required
to perform effectively in complex
environments and to “manage the tension
between the exploration and exploitation
paths to effective learning” (Slater and
Narver 1995, pp. 66, 69) and to adopt a
generative learning orientation aligned with
its strategy and market (Osterberg 2004, p.
146).
Facilitative leadership also includes a focus
on the development of staff through
providing challenging work which
stretched their technical, learning and
problem solving capabilities and, in doing
so, motivated their “people to do more that
what is expected of them” and to want to
learn and unlearn (Slater and Narver 1995,
p. 69).

Support

No blame

COSBU - responsible risk seeking
propensity was balanced by the
acceptance of failure in innovation
(failing forward). The COFBU was
also moving to tolerate failure
without blame.

A risk taking propensity is an essential part
of entrepreneurship in strategic decision
making (Weerawadeena 2003, p. 410).
Removal of the fear of failure was evident
in the best performing innovative
organisations (Cooper et al., 2004, p. 37).
High tolerance of risk as innovation cannot
exist without risk taking. Risk taking
occurs through challenging and diverting
from the entrenched mental models and
from challenging the dominant logic.
Learning opportunities arise from
experimentation and responsible risk and
frame-breaking entrepreneurial activities
and this learning informs future product
innovations (Slater and Narver 1995, p.
68).

Extend
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OIC
Components

Case Descriptors

Literature

Impact on
Literature

Collaboration

COSBU - collegiate culture and
formal informal knowledge sharing
routines.
COFBU - achieved through structural
transformation (domain/project
matrix).
Externally, both the COFBU and
COSBU demonstrated a willingness
to collaborate openly with
complementary knowledge holders.

Collaboration is essential for knowledge
sharing both within and external to the
business unit and influences the type and
depth of knowledge available from external
and complementary partners.
Collaborative behaviour includes sharing
information and ideas, communication
openness and forbearance (Jarratt and
O’Neill 2002, p. 25).

Comments

The extension to innovation culture was primarily driven by the increase in collaboration through
alternative strategies. In the COSBU it was achieved through its collegiate culture and formal and
informal knowledge sharing routines while in the COFBU increased collaboration was the result of
its structural transformation. In addition, while risk taking is widely recognised as imperative to
innovation, this research stresses the importance of responsible risk seeking propensity balanced by
the acceptance of failure in innovation (failing forward).
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Extend
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